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Abstract 
 Following the global oil crisis of October 1973 the UK government funded and 
administered a range of R&D programmes in renewable energy. Despite the discoveries of 
large deposits of oil and gas in the North Sea during the late 1960s and continuing faith in 
nuclear energy the government was keen to explore the potential of renewable energy as 
what it described as an ‘insurance technology’. This thesis examines the creation and 
evolution of the UK renewable energy programme from 1974 until its demise prior to the 
privatisation of the UK’s nationalised energy industries in the late 1980s. The thesis shows 
the important role that social movements - in this case, the new environmentalism - played 
in the promotion of renewable energy in the UK. This will suggest that the programme can 
be seen in some senses as a tokenistic gesture by the government acting within the 
uncertain political, social, and economic landscape of the 1970s. This thesis shows that 
government decisions on renewable energy were continually driven by socio-political 
factors which overwhelmed the unreliable economic case for renewables at that time. This 
is achieved by a close historical account of the two key elements of the wider programme: 
the Wave Energy Programme and the Wind Energy Programme. Using a mix of the 
existing literature, historical archive and interviews this thesis builds a historical account 
of renewable energy R&D in the UK between 1974 and 1988. 
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Introduction 
 
In sum, it is difficult to change the direction of large electric power 
systems - and perhaps that of large sociotechnical systems in general - 
but such systems are not autonomous. Those who seek to control and 
direct them must acknowledge the fact that systems are evolving cultural 
artifacts rather than isolated technologies. As cultural artifacts, they 
reflect the past as well as the present. Attempting to reform technology 
without systematically taking into account the shaping context and the 
intricacies of internal dynamics may well be futile. If only the technical 
components of a system are changed, they may snap back into their 
earlier shape like charged particles in a strong electromagnetic field. The 
field also must be attended to: values may need to be changed, 
institutions reformed, or legislation recast.1 
 
In recent times renewable energy development is increasingly advanced by politicians and 
commentators as a key ingredient in addressing the future of both domestic and global 
economies.2  The terms ‘green economy’ and ‘green jobs’ have become commonplace and 
in the public mind these are closely associated with renewable energy sources. Speaking in 
June 2010, US President Barack Obama said, 
 
Each of us has a part to play in a new future that will benefit all of us. As 
we recover from this recession, the transition to clean energy has the 
potential to grow our economy and create millions of jobs - but only if 
we accelerate that transition. Only if we seize the moment…3 
 
However, renewable energy represents a dilemma for modern society.4 On one hand, as 
well as the much-touted aid to economic recovery, it also offers solutions to many of the 
challenges that face present and future civilisations by providing energy that is both 
infinite and benign. On the other, it presents massive technological and social challenges 
that are only now becoming fully understood. The dilemma arises because, on the surface, 
                                            
1 Hughes, T. P., Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1983) p.465 
2 LoBianco, T., ‘Obama’s budget focuses on renewable energy’, The Washington Post, 27 February 2009, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/27/obamas-budget-focuses-on-renewable-energy/ [accessed 
11 July 2010]; Vinod, T., and Chomitz, K. ‘From crisis to opportunity’, The Guardian, 16 February 2009. 
This is a comment piece by senior officials of the World Bank; Adam, D., ‘Nicholas Stern: Spend billions on 
green investments now to reverse economic downturn and halt climate change.’ The Guardian,  11 February 
2009.  
3 The White House website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/energy-and-environment [accessed 9 July 
2010]  
4 For an excellent discussion of this dilemma from a current US perspective, Sovacool, B. K., The Dirty 
Energy Dilemma: What’s Blocking Clean Power in the United States (London: Praeger, 2008) 
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the way forward in energy terms appears to be straightforward. Steadily depleting reserves 
of oil and gas, and to a lesser extent coal, should gradually and incrementally be replaced 
with wind farms and other now familiar renewable options in order that our growing 
energy needs remain fulfilled in the future. This path to the energy future was officially 
considered by the government in Britain for the first time in the 1970s following the first 
oil price shock. In more recent years the gradual acceptance of the facts of climate change 
have placed an even greater emphasis on the need to find an alternative to fossil fuels. 
However, the process of displacement and replacement anticipated by some has been 
characterised by a painfully slow rate of progress towards these goals. Advocates of 
renewable energy became increasingly frustrated as the UK lurched back and forward from 
nuclear energy to renewables programmes and back again. This pattern, in general terms, 
has been echoed around the developed world.  In the UK in 2007, nearly thirty-five years 
after the need to develop renewable energy had been officially recognised by the creation 
of a dedicated R&D programme, renewable sources accounted for just over 3% of total 
final energy consumption and less than 5% of total electricity generated.5  What can 
explain this lack of progress toward such apparently obvious goals?  
 
  In recent decades there have been numerous attempts to account for the slow and 
uncertain adoption of renewable energy sources, both in the UK and worldwide. Typically 
these have fallen within one of two disciplines - science (broadly defined) and political 
science.6 Not surprisingly these studies have tended to suggest explanations that coincide 
with their field of study. This is not to suggest that the conclusions reached within either 
discipline are necessarily flawed, but rather that they understandably give less attention to 
perhaps equally compelling factors derived from within alternative narratives. We have 
many technical studies dating back to the beautifully illustrated 1894 study by Wolff7 that 
focus on the technological challenges that confronted the inventors and innovators in 
renewable sources of energy. These offer some insights into the alleged ‘reverse salients’ 
of science and engineering that slowed the development of renewable energy sources but 
                                            
5 BERR (Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform), Energy in Brief July 2008, National 
Statistics Publication. These figures for renewables include hydropower.  
6 For a clear example of this see, Grubb, M. J., ‘The Cinderella options: A study of modernized renewable 
energy technologies: Part 1 - A technical assessment’, Energy Policy, 18:6, July-August 1990, pp. 525-542; 
Grubb, M. J., ‘The Cinderella options: A study of modernized renewable energy technologies: Part 2 - 
Political and policy analysis’, Energy Policy, 18:8, October 1990, pp. 711-725. Here the author deals with 
technical issues and policy issues in separate articles.  
7 Wolff, A. R., The Windmill as a Prime Mover (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1894) 
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show less interest in the impact of the ‘decision-makers’.8 We also have a number of 
generally more recent studies that examine renewables within the broadly political context 
of energy ‘policy’.9 At this time no book-length treatment of the development of 
renewables within this perspective exists for the UK other than Ross’s 1981 study which 
concentrates exclusively on wave power. However Ross (a journalist) was an energetic 
campaigner for wave energy and his output - which included a number of similar articles 10 
- has been criticised, with some justification, for presenting a rather partial account.11 A 
number of these studies have utilised policy-network theories to emphasise the importance 
of power and influence in advancing or retarding renewables and many conclude that the 
overwhelming power of the established energy industries (particularly nuclear) and lack of 
government will was responsible for slowing the adoption of renewables during the 1970s 
and 1980s.12 Similarly, in these accounts, very little attention is directed towards the 
technical challenges of renewables such as grid connection. What is clearly missing from 
the literature is an explicitly historical account of the development of renewable energy in 
the UK which includes some consideration of both of these elements combined with a 
broader social and political context which this thesis will seek to provide. 
 
  
                                            
8 Some examples include, Loferski, J. J., ‘The First Forty Years: a Brief History of the Modern Photovoltaic 
Age’, Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and Applications, 1:1, pp. 67-78; Smith, C., ‘Revisiting Solar 
Power’s Past’, Technology Review, 98:5 (July 1995) pp. 38-48; Shaw, R., Wave Energy: A Design 
Challenge (Chichester: Ellis Horwood, 1982); Simeons, C., Hydro-Power: The Use of Water as an 
Alternative Source of Energy (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980); Barrows, H. K., Water Power Engineering, 
3rd ed. (London: McGraw-Hill, 1943); Golding, E. W., The generation of electricity by wind power 
(London: Spon, 1955); McGuigan, D., Small Scale Wind Power (Dorchester: Prism Press, 1978); Musgrove, 
P. (ed.), Wind Energy Conversion 1984: Proceedings of the Sixth BWEA Wind Energy Conference, 
University of Reading, 28-30 March 1984 (Cambridge: CUP, 1984): Musgrove, P., Wind Power (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
9 Just some of the examples include, Watt, R. N., ‘Towards a synthesised network approach: an analysis of 
UK nuclear and renewable (wave) energy programmes 1939-85’, (University of Birmingham, 1998, PhD 
thesis);  McInnes, D., ‘Policy Networks within the Department of Energy and Energy Policy’, Essex Papers 
in Politics and Government, No. 82, University of Essex ; Ayling, G., Renewable Energy and Sustainable 
Energy Policy in the UK, (University of Birmingham, 1994, MPhil thesis); Connor, P. M., ‘UK renewable 
energy policy: a review’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 7 (2003) pp. 65-82.; Brown, A., ‘The 
UK Renewable Energy Programme’, Renewable Energy, 3: 2/3, (1993) pp. 279-288; Elliott, D., ‘Renewable 
Energy R&D in the UK: A Strategic Overview’, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 1:2 (1989) 
pp. 223-237; Elliott, D., Renewables: Past, Present and Future: The UK Renewable Energy Programme, 
NATTA (Milton Keynes, 1997); Elliot, D., ‘UK Energy Policy’ in P. Cunningham (ed.) Science and 
Technology in the UK, 2nd ed. (Cartermill, 1998); Ross, D., Energy from the Waves (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1981) 
10 Ross, D., ‘The Parting of the Waves’ The Guardian, 16 February 1990; ‘On the Crest of a Wave’, New 
Scientist, 19 May 1990; Ross, D., ‘Scuppering the Waves’, Network for Alternative Technology and 
Technology Assessment, Energy and Environmental Research Unit, Faculty of Technology, The Open 
University (Milton Keynes: May 2001) 
11 Watt, ‘Towards’, p.57 
12 In particular see, Watt, ‘Towards’: McInnes, ‘Policy networks’. 
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The basic features of the course of demand for energy are fairly simple and so 
is the chronology of the emergence of competing sources of supply.  Much 
more complexity appears when one seeks the determinants of the relative 
strength of the various components of the market, especially those which 
stimulated demand in one direction rather than another and those which bore 
upon the relation between cost and price.13 
 
The central hypothesis proposed by this research is that decisions taken by the UK 
government on the development of renewable energy are driven primarily by socio-
political factors; this is illustrated by the quotation above from Ashworth. Consistently, 
from the oil crisis of 1973 until the present day, the UK government has reacted to social 
movement pressure (both domestic and global) in formulating policy on alternative forms 
of energy. In recent years this response has been created and encouraged by the growing 
realisation of the impact of climate change, but in earlier decades the social and political 
pressures were more varied. In the period, which this thesis examines, the issues of energy 
security, problems with the nuclear programme, the development of renewable energy 
sources in other countries (most notably the United States), and the emergence of the ‘new 
environmentalism’ compelled the government to respond. The suggestion of this thesis is 
that the UK renewable energy programme was this response.  
 
 This thesis, therefore, is a work of historical enquiry which seeks to place much of 
the existing non-historical literature on renewable energy during the period within a more 
reliable and robust empirical narrative. It will seek to question the ‘tepid pursuit’ of 
renewable energy programmes through a chronological historical narrative set within the 
social, political and economic context of the period, and show how socio-political concerns 
dominate.14 As noted above there are very few purely historical accounts of renewable 
energy.15 Indeed we may perhaps have the feeling that renewable energy has not yet 
accumulated any history. Clearly this notion is undermined by the general sense that 
renewables have not fulfilled their potential in the UK and elsewhere: this suggests that a 
history for renewables in the UK should in fact exist.16 The extant accounts of renewable 
energy development in the UK tend to be partisan in nature (see above) and a focused 
                                            
13 Ashworth, W., The History of the British Coal Industry: Volume 5:  1946-1982: The Nationalized Industry 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 
14 Bobrow, D. B., and Kudrle, R. T., ‘Energy R&D: In Tepid Pursuit of Collective Goods’, International 
Organisation, 33:2 (Spring 1979) pp. 149-75 
15 Certainly insofar as we understand ‘renewable energy’ today. There does exist a great many studies of 
windmill and watermills, many of which emphasise the symbiotic relationship between society and 
technology.  
16 Although this is largely seen in terms of the ‘failure’ of renewables as an energy source, it is also 
increasingly understood as ‘failure’ in exploiting renewables as an economic opportunity. 
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scholarly history remains to be written. This thesis intends to begin the process of building 
that work of historical scholarship in this important area. The advantage of the historical 
approach is that a very wide range of documentary evidence has accumulated and this can 
now be utilised along with valuable interview material from many of the key individuals 
involved in renewable energy in the UK from the 1970s onwards. The aim is that this will 
create an account of renewable energy development in the UK during the period 1974-88 
which will then provide a basis for future historical enquiry and scholarship.  Moreover, it 
is hoped that this work can help to inform future energy policy by providing a reliable 
historical record of previous attempts at renewable energy development.  
 
 Ultimately the main feature of the programme in 1970s – wave energy – was closed 
down in controversial circumstances. The government at the time opted to justify the 
closure on economic grounds. This thesis will contend that the closure had little to do with 
the unreliable and inaccurate costings for wave power generation. Instead, once again, 
social and political imperatives demanded that the UK be seen to be not just developing 
but demonstrating renewable energy. This is the face of a burgeoning wind energy 
programme in the United States. This caused a Conservative government, pledged to 
cutting R&D expenditure, into the political shift to wind energy.   
 
Renewable Energy 
Renewable energy appears to many to be a relatively modern concept. Wind ‘farms’ and 
tidal barrages are often presented as new and uncertain technologies, ‘alternatives’ vying 
for adoption next to the more ‘traditional’ fossil fuels of coal, oil and gas and the now 
familiar ‘modern technology’ of nuclear energy. However, renewable sources of energy 
have an ancient history.17 They represent the first example of humanity using non-human 
and non-animal effort as a source of power for human endeavour. Beginning with water 
power, in the form of the water wheel, it was recognised that the ceaseless flow of rivers 
and streams could supplement and replace the human and the ox in the milling process. As 
Lynn White Jr. has pointed out, this took place in conjunction with technological 
innovation in engineering that made this new transmission of power possible.18 Eventually 
the potential of the wind as a power source was also recognised (probably from sail) and 
early windmills began to appear based on the same principles as the water wheel. The 
                                            
17 Sørensen, B., ‘A history of renewable energy technology’, Energy Policy (January/February 1992) pp. 8-
12 
18 White Jr., L, Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962) 
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development of wind and water power took place over centuries. It always depended 
heavily on innovation and improvement in engineering which achieved incremental 
increases in the efficiency of energy capture. Indeed, such was the efficiency of the 
watermill that by the nineteenth century at the height of the age of steam power water 
power remained a key source of energy for many industries, particularly in the United 
States. Beginning at the end of the eighteenth century in Britain, the pace of 
industrialisation had forced the development of the steam engine and coal also began to be 
used as a fuel input to generate motive power.19  The technological focus was concentrated 
on improving the steam engine which had many clear advantages over site-specific water 
power and gradually the widespread industrial application of the watermill all but 
disappeared.20  
 
 This thesis will seek to explain the historical lack of progress in harnessing 
renewable energy sources in the UK by examining Britain’s renewables programmes 
between 1974 and 1988. It will propose the oil price shock of October 1973 as the pivotal 
event in the modern technological development of renewable energy in the UK. This 
caused economic and political turmoil on a global scale which had an important impact on 
conventional - fossil-fuel based - thinking about energy policy in Britain. Certainly, this 
was certainly not the first energy shock that was felt in the UK in the post-war era.  The 
first global postwar energy crisis occurred as a result of the Suez crisis of 1956, and a 
contrast can be drawn between the reaction to this first energy crisis and the later shock of 
1973.21  In the 1950s concern over ‘energy security’ was a new and disturbing concept to 
Britain and it resulted in a massive up-scaling of the civil nuclear power programme. This 
was at a time when the capital costs of nuclear power stations were more than three times 
                                            
19 P. Mathias, The First Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1914, 2nd ed.  (London: 
Routledge, 1983) pp. 121-25. 
20 Musson argues that steam power grew gradually in nineteenth century Britain. A. E. Musson, ‘Industrial 
Motive Power in the United Kingdom, 1800-70’, The Economic History Review, New Series, 29:3 (Aug., 
1976) pp. 415-439. A perhaps wider range of sources deals with this transition in the United States. Among 
these are: L. C. Hunter, A History of Industrial Power in the United States, 1780-1930, Volume One: 
Waterpower in the Century of the Steam Engine (Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1979); J. 
Atack, F. Bateman, and T. Weiss, ‘The Regional Diffusion and Adoption of the Steam Engine in American 
Manufacturing’ The Journal of Economic History, 40, 2 (June 1980) pp. 281-3; D. E. Nye, Consuming 
Power: A Social History of American Energies (London: The MIT Press, 1999); P. Temin, ‘Steam and 
Waterpower in the Early Nineteenth Century’, The Journal of Economic History, 26:2, (June 1966) pp. 187-
205.  Each of these accounts point out that this was a much slower process of change from water and wood to 
steam power in what soon became the world’s largest consumer of energy, the United States.  Atack et al 
estimate that even by as late as 1870 waterwheels outnumbered steam engines in the US by 5 to 4. 
21 For a brief account of  the Suez crisis see, Stokes, R. G., ‘Oil as a Primary Source of Energy’, in Fink, C., 
Hadler, F., and Schramm, T. (eds.) 1956 - European and Global Perspectives (Leipzig: Leipziger 
Universitatsverlag, 2006) p.250-252; Chick, M., Electricity and Energy Policy in Britain, France and the 
United States since 1945 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007) pp. 22-23 
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that of traditional coal-fired stations.22 Therefore, massive capital investment in a largely 
untried technology was seen as the solution to Britain’s energy needs. The uncertain nature 
of this technology and the massive economic cost did not deter the government in a period 
characterised by an unshakable faith in ‘big science’.23  In the 1970s continuing faith in the 
promise of nuclear technology was a key reason that a similar leap of technological faith 
for renewable energy was absent.24  One purpose of this thesis is to uncover some of the 
explanations for this.  
 
 This thesis will argue that in this period the UK was perhaps the first developed 
nation to fully uncover the dilemma that has impeded the global progress of renewable 
energy: renewable energy sources cannot simply replace fossil fuels. There are a number 
of reasons for this. Firstly, and most fundamentally, renewables do not represent the store 
of energy that fossil fuels offer (see Appendix II). Renewable energy provides an 
intermittent and site-specific energy source that relies by definition on the vagaries of 
nature. The development of fossil fuels as an energy source since the end of the eighteenth 
century occurred largely because they offered a solution to this ancient problem. 
Therefore, in a sense the acceptance and adoption of renewable energy represents a 
symbolic reversal of progress and a failure of human endeavour. This helps to explain the 
continuing commitment to civil nuclear power despite the many problems that this 
technology had experienced since the 1950s. However, despite the overwhelming reality of 
this fundamental difference in storage capacity this thesis will focus on another 
explanation for the lack of development in renewable energy: dominant systems of power. 
 
Dominant systems of power 
Central to the development of electrical mains power in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century was the introduction of electrical power systems: electricity networks and grids. 
The history of this process has been charted in meticulous detail by a range of eminent 
                                            
22 Hannah, L., Engineers, Managers and Politicians; The First Fifteen Years of Nationalised Electricity 
Supply in Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982) pp. 178-9; 
23 Freeman, C. and Soete, L., The Economics of Industrial Innovation, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 1997) pp. 373-395.  
24 In particular the possibility of nuclear fusion was held many to offer the solution to all future energy needs. 
This was a view that was readily accepted also (at least initially) by the growing environmental movement. 
See, Bunyard, P., ‘The Energy Crisis’, The Ecologist, 3:5 (May 1973) ‘ In theory there is unlimited energy in 
the world. All man has to do is to build breeder reactors and to achieve thermo-nuclear fusion on a 
commercial scale.’ This also highlights the debate that exists over whether nuclear energy should perhaps be 
considered a ‘renewable’ source of energy also. Critics of this approach point to the declining global reserves 
of uranium - the fuel required for nuclear fission.  
16 
scholars.25 For the UK, Hannah’s meticulously researched two volumes provide a 
compelling account of the scale of the engineering and institutional challenge in the UK. 
Conceived by Thomas Edison, amongst others, these grids grew rapidly from the 1880s 
based mainly on the properties of fossil fuels as an energy source and the steam turbine as 
prime mover.26 Coal had been used extensively as a source of primary energy since the 
development of the Watt steam engine in the late eighteenth century and remains the 
dominant fuel in the production of electricity today.27  Oil was discovered in the USA in 
the mid-nineteenth century, but was considered initially as a luminant rather than a fuel 
until the development of the internal combustion engine.  As time passed the actual fuel 
utilised in the generation of electricity shifted to include oil, natural gas and nuclear, but 
each shared the same essential characteristic of fungibility: a flexible, in most cases 
transportable, store of energy that could be utilised in the sites where it was needed most 
(and people were willing to pay for it). By the 1970s in the UK the electricity grid was 
mature, extensive and central to modern developed society. The oil price shock of October 
1973 then combined, and as Beckerman pointed out, was to some extent confused with the 
growing awareness of the impending exhaustion of fossil fuels.28 This was highlighted 
most famously in 1972 by the stark warnings of The Club of Rome’s study The Limits to 
Growth and the official recognition of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE) held that same summer in Stockholm.29 Both of these hugely 
influential events followed the publication success in Britain of A Blueprint for Survival 
from The Ecologist magazine.30   
 
 In the 1970s (and still today) many thought that renewable energy sources could be 
‘plugged in’ to these complex and demanding systems. This was mistaken and represents 
                                            
25 Examples include, Hughes, Networks; Hannah, L., ‘A Pioneer of Public Enterprise: The Central Electricity 
Board and the National Grid, 1927-1940’, in Supple, B. (ed.) Essays in British Business History (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1977); Hannah, L., Electricity before Nationalisation: A Study of the Development of the 
Electricity Supply Industry in Britain to 1948 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979); Hannah, Engineers; Chick, 
Electricity; Hausman, W. J., Hertner, P., and Wilkins, M., Global Electrification: Multinational Enterprise 
and International Finance in the History of Light and Power, 1878-2007 (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008); Gooday, G., Domesticating Electricity: Technology, Uncertainty and Gender, 1880-1914 
(London: Pickering & Chatto, 2008) 
26 Many early systems were based on hydropower in those areas most geographically suited. Indeed, so 
prevalent was this that in some areas such as in the province of Ontario, Canada, electricity is known to this 
day as ‘hydro’.  
27 In the UK in 2006, coal-fired power stations accounted for 37.5% of electricity production. The equivalent 
figure for coal in the US in 2008 was 48.2%. BERR, Energy 2008; Sovacool, Dirty, fig. 1, p.3  
28 Beckerman, W., In Defence of Economic Growth (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974) pp.249-50 
29 Meadows, D. et al., The Limits to Growth (London: Pan Books, 1974).  
30 Goldsmith, E., A Blueprint for Survival (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972) For a discussion of the growth 
of environmental awareness in the period see, Wilson, J. C., ‘Energy and the New Environmentalism: the 
view from The Ecologist, 1970-75’, (University of Glasgow, 2007, MSc thesis)  
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one explanation for the lack of success in renewable energy programmes in the UK during 
the period, and perhaps to this day. This thesis will suggest that the successful adoption of 
renewable energy sources required a much more fundamental shift in thinking about 
energy: one that both the developers and the policymakers either failed to fully understand 
at the time, or shied away from. It required, among other things, a paradigm shift away 
from centralised energy supply. This would demand both a fundamental reorganisation of 
the National Grid and a massive investment in more localised energy systems on a scale 
similar to that which had taken place in the 1950s to extend and standardise the national 
grid.31 This was not something that could ever be achieved by developing renewables as an 
‘insurance’ technology, as it was described by the government through the 1970s.32 It also 
required a shift away from the pervasive notion that a single dominant source of fuel 
should provide the bulk of Britain’s electricity-generating energy needs. The result was 
that the public investment in renewable energy was misguided and inadequate. It is no 
surprise therefore that some commentators judge that the adoption of renewable energy 
technology ‘failed’ in this period and beyond.33 However, this thesis will propose the 
counter argument that it was the dominant system that ‘failed’ the successful adoption of 
renewable energy. 
 
 This thesis will focus on the more recognisable aspects of renewable energy; wave 
and wind energy.34 These two energy sources represented the most ancient forms of 
renewable energy and dominated the 1974-88 UK renewables programme. The study will 
conclude in 1988 as this coincides with a major shift in UK energy policy. At that point the 
free-market, liberalisation drive of the Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher 
resulted in the privatisation of British Gas in 1986 and the electricity industry followed 
soon after.35 In 1988 the government produced a key statement on renewable energy, 
Renewable Energy in the UK: The Way Forward.36 This paper proposed a new incentive-
based scheme to promote renewables which has shaped the policy response of successive 
                                            
31 Hannah, Engineers, pp. 70-1 
32 TNA, EG 16/1, Department of Energy, ‘Energy Prospects: A Background to Research and Development’, 
Advisory Council on Research and Development for Fuel and Power, undated (1975), p.8. The report goes 
on to say, ‘There has, however, so far been insufficient inducement to warrant taking out such a potentially 
very costly insurance policy.’  
33 Grubb, ‘Cinderella: Part 2’, p.711 
34 See Appendix for a technical explanation of renewable sources of energy 
35 Elliott, D., ‘Renewables and the privatisation of the UK ESI: A case study’, Energy Policy, 20:3 (March 
1992) pp. 257-268 
36 Department of Energy, Renewable Energy in the UK: The Way Forward, Energy Paper 55 (London: 
HMSO, 1988) 
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UK governments to the present day and signalled a move away from Government-
sponsored RD&D (research, development and demonstration) programmes.37 
 
 The most common application for renewable energy in modern times is in the 
production of electricity and consequently this thesis will concentrate entirely on that 
particular aspect of energy history. It is also the case that electricity provides one of the 
most visible manifestations of growing energy consumption in the twentieth century and is 
a clear example of our overwhelming demand for energy. Attention will be given to the 
evolution of electricity networks since the late nineteenth century in order that the 
challenges to renewable energy can be more fully understood. Electricity has helped to 
shape the world that we occupy, and the systems that have grown since their introduction 
in the 1880s are now seen as essential. Both domestically and in industry there is a 
fundamental reliance on electricity to provide instant and reliable energy at the flick of a 
switch.38 The pervasiveness of this understanding is crucial in beginning to understand the 
apprehension that arises when fundamental change is suggested. The dominance of the 
electricity grid network in the UK acted as a barrier to any serious attempt to integrate 
renewable energy sources into the National Grid during the 1970s and 1980s. However, 
this thesis will show that the emergence of ‘energy morality’ in the 1970s, through the 
emergence of the new environmental movement in the UK, helped to create a different 
context in which that struggle took place.  I will return to this theme.  
 
Themes  
A central theme of this thesis is the impact and extent of government involvement and 
intervention in energy matters in the UK, with the emphasis on renewable energy. In 
Britain the central importance of the rapidly developing grid network was quickly 
recognised by the UK government in the first half of the twentieth century and after the 
Second World War the electricity industry was nationalised; followed soon after by the 
coal and gas industry. Additionally, as a relic of Churchill’s decision in 1914 the UK 
government owned a majority stake (51%) in the major international oil company, British 
Petroleum.39 Furthermore the 1950s saw the development of Britain’s civil nuclear 
                                            
37 Brown, ‘UK Renewable Energy Programme’.  
38 Patterson, W., Transforming Electricity (London: Earthscan, 1999); Patterson, W., Keeping The Lights On: 
Towards Sustainable Electricity (London: Earthscan, 2007) 
39 ‘[BP] was widely perceived as the instrument of the government on the understandable assumption that 
what the state owned, it surely controlled.’ see, Bamberg, J. H., British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-
1975: The Challenge of Nationalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p.39 
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programme paid for and controlled (for obvious strategic and defence reasons) by the 
government.40 Therefore by the mid-1950s virtually all of Britain’s energy production and 
consumption was coordinated - in theory at least - by the government. This means that any 
consideration of UK energy in the postwar age must necessarily pay attention to the role of 
government and the impact of nationalisation. The work of Kelf-Cohen, Millward & 
Singleton, and Tivey on Britain’s nationalised industries, and Hannah, Chick, and 
Hausman et al on the electricity industry, all provide useful and reliable accounts of this 
aspect of the history.41  
 
 Hannah and others have shown that the extent of nationalisation was not unique to 
Britain in the postwar period. However, the dominance of government control in energy 
through nationalisation is central to historical development of renewable energy in Britain. 
The control of all of Britain’s energy providers by the government had a profound impact 
on the evolution of renewable energy. At one level, this manifested itself in multiple layers 
of bureaucracy that many of the innovators found stifling.42 More crucially though it also 
meant that the path and pace of innovation in renewable energy was set by the government 
mainly by means of the budget that was allocated to the programme. This thesis will 
concentrate on the example of Britain’s wave and wind power programmes in the 1970s 
and 1980s to examine the attitude of the government towards renewable energy in the 
period. There will be a particular focus on wave energy as this was the first large-scale 
renewable energy programme undertaken by the UK government.43 Between 1975 and 
1982, when the programme was effectively closed down (amid controversy) the majority 
of the UK budget for renewable energy R&D was devoted to wave power programmes. 
Previous scholarly studies of wave power have been produced, most notably by Watt and 
McInnes, as well as the aforementioned contribution of Ross.44  However, in the case of 
Watt and McInnes, these contributions seek to use the example of wave power to explore 
the existence of policy networks within government in the period from a wider political 
                                            
40 Williams, R., The Nuclear Power Decisions: British Policies, 1953-78 (London: Croom Helm, 1980) 
provides the best account of this relationship 
41 Kelf-Cohen, R., British nationalisation, 1945-1973 (London: Macmillan, 1973); Millward, R. and 
Singleton, J., The political economy of nationalisation in Britain 1920-1950 (Cambridge: CUP, 1995); Tivey, 
L. (ed.) The nationalized industries since 1960: A book of readings, Royal Institute of Public Administration 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973); Hannah, Engineers; Hannah, ‘Pioneer’; Hannah, ‘Electricity’; 
Hausman et al, Global Electrification 
42 Salter, S., ‘Looking Back’ in Cruz, J (ed.), Ocean Wave Energy: Current Status and Future Prospects 
(Springer: Heidelberg, 2008) 
43 In addition, due to the thirty-year rule on access to public documents, the archives for the wave energy 
programme are currently more extensive and therefore allow a greater depth of historical archival analysis.  
44 Watt, ‘Towards a Synthesised Approach’; McInnes, ‘Policy Networks’; Ross, Waves 
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science perspective. Whereas Ross, as previously mentioned, uses his study as a largely 
unsubtle device to advocate wave power take-up in Britain.  This thesis will instead place 
the story of the wave power programme within the broader unfolding of renewable energy 
development during the two decades.  
 
 Crucial to understanding government involvement in energy is a discussion of the 
economic assessment of energy technologies in the period. Although the facts of carbon 
emissions and climate change were not widely known at the time (certainly during the 
1970s) there were other environmental pressures growing at the time which insisted that 
the energy debate be widened beyond the purely economic. Despite these demands, both 
government and the dominant energy industries remained impassive, and were fixated on 
their own economic assessment of renewable energy technologies on a strict cost per kWh 
(kilowatt hour) basis.  This cost was calculated on the basis of capital costs (annuitized 
over the lifetime of the plant), fuel costs, and the operation and maintenance costs. This 
approach caused a number of challenges for renewables as this thesis will show. Firstly, 
although renewable ‘fuel’ is effectively free, the capital costs of establishing renewable 
generation can be high. This makes renewable energy particularly sensitive to the cost 
accounting methods used in assessing potential energy developments.  Both the discount 
rate used and the investment period selected are crucial to the decision to invest (or not) in 
alternative energy projects. Furthermore, this initial barrier to renewable energy 
development severely hampered any possibility of cost reductions through the well-
recognised processes of scale economies, ‘learning by doing’, and ‘learning by using’ that 
was so instrumental in the development of the incumbent energy technologies. Chapter 7 
will discuss these issues in some more depth.  
 
 This leads to a second theme that will be explored - the evolution of energy 
technology; and more specifically, renewable energy technology. Despite its apparent 
novelty renewable energy technology has a significantly longer history than the more 
‘traditional’ fossil fuel or nuclear technologies alluded to above. Many have explored this 
history of renewable energy technology and more recently Vaclav Smil has extended his 
authoritative energy histories to include the evolution of wind, water and solar power.45 
This thesis will focus on the accelerated evolution of the technology after 1973. In 
                                            
45 Smil, V., Energy in World History (New York: Westview, 1994); Smil, V., Energies: An Illustrated Guide 
to the Biosphere and Civilization (London: The MIT Press, 1999); see footnote 5 above 
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particular, it will use a case study of Stephen Salter at the University of Edinburgh, and the 
invention of ‘Salter’s Duck’ to explore some of the technological challenges that faced the 
renewables community in the period.46 This study of renewable energy technology will be 
delineated within the broader understanding of technological development and its 
interaction with society advocated by Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) School. 
As Callon stated‘... the development of scientific knowledge and technical systems cannot 
be understood unless the simultaneous reconstruction of the social contexts of which they 
form part is also studied.’ 47 Already mentioned is the seminal contribution of Hughes on 
electrical power systems which demonstrates in meticulous detail how modern power 
systems grew out a combination of technical, economic, political and social factors. 
Hughes presented an account of technological development that challenged the determinist 
view that saw technology as driving historical change. Much of this crude determinism 
emerged from postwar neo-classical economic theory where ‘technology’ became the key 
variable in economic growth and influential studies such as Mokyr’s The Lever of Riches 
and Landes’ The Unbound Prometheus appeared to confirm the relentless influence of 
technological advances on economic growth.48 Historians of technology and society such 
as Bijker and Pinch came to challenge this straightforward account as they presented 
technological innovation in terms of its negotiated evolution within society.49 Of particular 
interest to this thesis is the work of Langdon Winner who has made a significant 
contribution within this field to the specific study of energy choices.50 He argued that, 
‘Choices about supposedly neutral technologies – if “choices” they ever merit being called 
– are actually choices about the kind of society in which we shall live’.51  
 
 Closely related to the above is another theme that will be explored; the 
phenomenon of what I will term ‘energy morality’. This describes a view of energy policy 
that extended beyond technical considerations and extended into a broader critique of 
                                            
46 I am particularly grateful in this regard to Prof. Salter for allowing me unrestricted access to his personal 
archive.  
47 Callon, M., ‘The Sociology of an Actor-Network: The Case of the Electric Vehicle’ in Callon, M., Law, J. 
and Rip, A. (eds.) Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology: Sociology of Science in the Real World 
(London: Macmillan, 1986) p.20 
48 Landes, D., The Unbound Prometheus: Technological change and industrial development in Western 
Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Mokyr, J., The Lever of 
Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 
49 Bijker, W. E., Hughes, T. P., and Pinch, T. J. (eds.), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: 
New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (London: The MIT Press, 1987) 
50 Winner, L., The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of Technology (London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1986); Winner, L., ‘The Political Philosophy of Alternative Technology: Historical Roots 
and Present Prospects’, in Technology in Society, 1:1 (1979) pp. 75-86 
51 Winner, “Alternative Technology’, p.85 
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western capitalism. I will argue that this represents an example of Winner’s argument, 
alluded to above, that ‘artifacts have politics’.52 This broader consideration of the 
implications of energy choices emerged in the 1960s, but found its first full expression in 
the 1970s. In Britain energy morality was most closely identified with the rise of the new 
environmentalism, which had grown from a mixed bag of influences ranging from 
Victorian amenity societies to the US counter culture movement. During the early part of 
the 1970s the new environmental movement was concerned with a range of issues from 
pollution to nuclear disarmament. Closely related to both of these issues, the question of 
energy came to occupy a central role in environmental action and debate. What began as 
‘Ban the Bomb!’ marches in the 1950s widened to include active opposition to civil 
nuclear power. The founding of Friends of the Earth UK (FoE UK) in 1972 and the output 
of the influential magazine The Ecologist ignited the energy debate in the UK and in the 
view of Williams forced what had been a private discourse into the public arena.53 
 
 The final theme that this thesis will explore is the attempted commercialisation of 
renewable energy technology. Chapter 5 will feature a case study of Sea Energy Associates 
Ltd (SEA), the short-lived commercial collaboration between Stephen Salter and Ready 
Mixed Concrete Ltd (RMC).  A strong feature of the current dominant perceptions of 
renewable energy in Britain is that industry has ‘missed’ opportunities to take a lead in the 
global development of this technology. These are familiar criticisms to the ears of the 
economic historian and arguably have their roots in the alleged lag that the UK 
experienced from the time of the Second Industrial Revolution.  Furthermore, as Edgerton 
pointed out, it is a common view among nations that they themselves ‘are good at 
inventing, but bad at developing and using technology’.54 It is not the intention of this 
thesis to examine the veracity of the claims, or the extensive literature on Britain’s relative 
economic decline in the post war era. Rather, this research will primarily outline the 
relationship between business and renewable energy technology between 1973 and 1988. 
At present there is no standalone account of the evolution of this important relationship for 
the UK for this formative period. Vietor and Sovacool both pay some attention to 
commercial developments in the US, where government policy encouraged private capital 
from the outset. John Berger provides a useful analysis of the ‘business’ of renewable 
                                            
52 Winner, The Whale and the Reactor. 
53 Williams, Decisions.  
54 Edgerton, D., ‘From Innovation to Use: ten eclectic theses on the historiography of technology’, History 
and Technology, 16:2 (1999) p.132 fn,32 
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energy in the US which this thesis will use to tease out some essential contrasts in the 
UK.55  
 
 It is not the intention of this thesis to develop its argument within a single dominant 
theoretical perspective. Rather, it will employ a number of theoretical devices as 
appropriate. These will be utilised primarily as organisational tools rather than any attempt 
to prove their inherent explanatory power. Watt has previously explored both wave energy 
and nuclear programmes through a ‘synthesised network approach’ within a broadly 
political discourse.56 His thesis adopted a meso-level analysis of the wave energy 
community in the 1970s to reach conclusions about the effectiveness of energy policy 
communities during that time. McInnes undertook a similar exercise, employing the policy 
network theories of Marsh and Rhodes to explore the structure of the UK Department of 
Energy.57 This thesis will draw on some of the conclusions of this previous valuable 
research and will use network theories insofar as they help to explain the relationships 
within the broader energy community. Of particular interest to this thesis will be an 
examination of the particular interest groups that contributed directly or indirectly to 
energy policy.  
 
 The examination of these themes will be based on a wide reading of the existing 
literature, a close examination of primary source material, and a selection of interviews 
with some of the key individuals involved in energy during the period.  The primary source 
material is drawn mainly from government records held at the National Archive at Kew. 
This has involved a great number of Freedom of Information requests to access relevant 
material that nestles within the thirty-year rule. In addition to this a significant amount of 
primary source material was very generously made available to the author by Professor 
Stephen Salter who has built a detailed (and extensive) personal archive of his involvement 
in renewable energy since 1973. Whilst undoubtedly the historian of more recent events 
faces many challenges as these events are still to a large extent unresolved, it also provides 
tremendous opportunities. In methodological terms, this thesis is able to develop the 
interplay between documents and individual interviews. This allows the often neutral tone 
                                            
55 Berger, J. J., Charging Ahead: The Business of Renewable Energy and What It Means for America 
(London: University of California Press, 1997) 
56 Watt, ‘Synthesised Network Approach’  
57 McInnes, ‘Policy Networks’ 
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of official records to be enhanced by personal recollection and interrogated by historical 
enquiry.  
 
Organisation of thesis 
The material will be presented in two main parts and these will follow a chronological 
narrative based on the wide range of source materials. The parts reflect a chronological 
order that coincides with moments of change in the development of renewable energy in 
the UK.  Part one will encompass a fairly broad historical sweep of the period leading up 
to the 1970s, concluding at the end of the Golden Age and the changed social and 
economic context of Britain in the 1970s. The first part will include two chapters. Chapter 
1 will summarise the development of renewable energy and electricity until the 1974. The 
aim of this is to demonstrate continuity in many of the issues that confront renewable 
energy innovation and development. Chapter 1 will also address the evolution of mains 
electricity and will focus heavily on the development of electricity grids in the UK. This 
chapter will consider the nationalisation of the UK’s energy industries after the war, and 
will examine the significance of Britain’s civil nuclear programme from the 1950s, 
drawing particular attention to the impact that the Suez crisis had on UK energy policy.  
According to the central theme of this thesis this discussion will be primarily focussed on 
the theme of government involvement in energy policy and technology.  
 
 Chapter 2 will examine the growth and spread of the new environmental 
consciousness in the early part of the 1970s in the context of the period and will show the 
significance of this for energy policy in Britain. This chapter will develop and discuss the 
theme of energy morality in the period. This describes a sense in which debates over 
energy, for so long confined to government and the nationalised energy industries, spread 
out to encompass the general public. This was encouraged by the re-emergence of the 
debates over reactor choice and the industrial unrest in the coal industry, but this chapter 
emphasises the key role that the new environmentalism occupied in forcing energy into the 
mainstream. A key conclusion of this thesis is that the 1974-88 UK renewables programme 
was in many senses a tokenistic gesture, responding to the new social movement pressure.  
Therefore, the examination and explanation of the role of a new energy consciousness 
propagated by the 1970s environmental movement helps in understanding just why such a 
gesture was deemed necessary.  
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 The second part of the thesis will concentrate on the period 1974-88, and will 
include four chapters.  Chapter 3 sets the context for the creation of the UK renewables 
programme. It includes a discussion of the role that Lord Rothschild’s Central Policy 
Review Staff (CPRS) played in encouraging the development of renewable energy in the 
UK. This chapter will describe the development of the infrastructure of the UK renewable 
energy programme, which emerged immediately following the 1973 oil crisis. This will 
establish the important institutional background to renewables development in the UK.  
Chapter 4 then focuses on an analysis of the major UK renewables initiative during the 
1970s, as recommended by Lord Rothschild, the Wave Energy Programme (WEP). This 
chapter highlights the tremendous enthusiasm that existed for wave energy during the early 
part of the programme. Between 1974 and 1978, renewable energy in the form of wave 
power was regarded as a serious aspect of Britain’s energy future. However, this chapter 
will also show how this initial fervor was rapidly deflated by the economic and technical 
challenges unveiled during the first Wave Energy Conference at Heathrow in November 
1978. Thereafter, as this thesis shows, amidst dwindling government support (accelerated 
by the election of the Thatcher Government in 1979) renewable energy faced a much more 
troublesome passage.  
 
 The central figure in wave energy development was Stephen Salter of the 
University of Edinburgh, and therefore Chapter 5 is a case study of his involvement in the 
UK renewable energy programme.  This chapter brings together several of the themes of 
this research. It will discuss the impact of the new environmentalism on forming Salter’s 
motivation to develop a source of ‘clean energy’, the role of the renewable energy 
institutions in managing the device teams, and finally, the attempted commercialisation of 
renewable energy through partnership with industrial partners. Chapter 6 will explore the 
shift in renewables policy in the UK at the end of the 1970s. This centred on the abrupt and 
controversial closure of the Wave Energy Programme and a move to develop wind energy. 
This chapter will consider the influence of developments in the US, where a new package 
of financial incentives encouraged the Californian wind rush of the early 1980s. This 
stimulated an explosion in wind energy projects that, during the period, culminated in the 
massive 3MW wind turbine in Orkney at a cost of £17M. Chapter 7 will revisit and 
summarise some of the key economic aspects of renewable energy development during the 
period. This will help to emphasis the more minor role allocated to wider economic 
considerations in the period before the science of climate change was widely known.  This 
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channeled any economic assessment of renewable energy sources into a rather narrow 
calculation of the capital costs of the technology.
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Chapter 1 
Energy and Electricity in the UK before 1974 
 
 This chapter will help to set the background for the UK energy scene in the 1970s, 
which will be dealt with in Chapter 2, through a brief examination of the development of 
electrical networks. The main aim of this chapter is to explain how electrical systems grew 
from uncertain beginnings in the 1880s to dominate national energy distribution and 
consumption by the mid-twentieth century through the National Grid. As well dealing with 
the evolution of the grid this chapter will also briefly outline the growth and change in the 
patterns of energy consumption in the UK in the post-war period.  
 
 The story of early enterprise in electrical lighting systems has some interesting 
parallels with the attempts to develop renewable energy later in the twentieth century that 
forms the focus of this thesis. The early innovators in electric lighting in Britain were faced 
with a network (in their case, gas lighting) which was well-developed and widely used 
particularly in urban settings, and a gas industry that, in the UK, was efficiently managed.1 
Lighting faced a number of serious hurdles in developing into a competitive alternative not 
least of which was the fact that gas lighting remained roughly one third cheaper than 
electric lighting in Britain until the outbreak of the First World War.2  The electrical power 
industry of the late nineteenth century was therefore confronted by many technical, legal, 
financial, and social barriers which I suggest were in some ways similar to the 
impediments that renewable energy development was to encounter in the 1970s and 
beyond.  
 
  In nineteenth-century Britain the demand for all those things that we would now 
call ‘energy’, both in domestic and commercial terms, was being almost entirely met by 
coal. In the home, cooking and heating were both achieved by burning coal3 whilst 
artificial light was traditionally provided either by whale oil lamps or tallow candles until 
the introduction of gas lighting (also derived from coal) in the early part of the century.4 
                                            
1 Byatt, I. C. R., The British Electrical Industry 1875-1914: The economic returns to a new technology  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) p.3 
2 Byatt, British Electrical; Wilson, J. F., Ferranti and the British electrical industry, 1864-1930 (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1988) p.7 
3 Oil was not discovered until 1867.  
4 Rendered animal fat 
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The spread of gas lighting in the first half of the century was partly encouraged by the 
changing work patterns of industrialisation as the demands of the new factories changed 
the definition of the working day and stretched it into the hours of darkness. Factory 
owners faced large bills for candles and whale oil in the period before gas lighting was 
introduced - not to mention the frequent and expensive fires that damaged property, 
delayed work, and often ended in human tragedy.5 Therefore the commercial demand 
(market pull) for a cheap and safe alternative prompted innovation and development in gas 
technologies. This eventually led to almost every town in Britain having a domestic gas 
supply by the middle of the century as economies of scale then successfully encouraged 
the shift from dedicated gas-lighting systems in factories, commercial premises and large 
homes to a wider public supply.6 Generally a new gas mains network would initially be 
built to supply a town with street lighting and then this could easily be extended to include 
new domestic consumers as the supply costs fell.7 This model of distribution was an 
important development in public utility systems and electrical power networks adopted it 
later in the century. However, the ‘lusty infant’ of electricity would first have to dislodge 
mains gas-lighting from its dominance in UK illumination.8 
 
 Within this early period in the development of electricity there are two aspects that 
are particularly relevant to this thesis. The first concerns the involvement of the 
government in the provision of electricity in Britain.9 From the earliest days of electrical 
developments, legislation has helped to shape the rate and direction of progress in the 
industry. This started in the late 1870s and continued the pattern of state involvement in 
energy matters that had begun with the gas industry. Initially this was a practical and 
technical interest in the breaking of roads and the safety of the public from swaying 
overhead cables, but it soon was to develop into an ideological interest in electricity as a 
public good. Coming as it did at the end of the nineteenth century, electricity was added to 
the list of public utilities that municipal socialism would seek to control to ‘protect’ the 
                                            
5 Falkus, M. E., ‘The Early Development of the British Gas Industry, 1790 -1815’, The Economic History 
Review, New Series, 35:2 (May 1982) p.219.  Falkus quotes the example of the Manchester firm of 
McConnel & Kennedy which ‘burned an average 1,500 candles each night for 25 weeks in the year and 
consumed more than 1,500 lbs. of tallow.’  The annual cost of this in 1806 was about £750.  
6 Ibid. p.217. ‘During the first half of the nineteenth century gas supplies were brought to all major towns and 
even to must small centres numbering no more than three thousand or so inhabitants.’  
7 Falkus, M. E., ‘The British Gas Industry before 1850’, The Economic History Review, New Series, 20:3 
(Dec 1967) pp. 494 - 506 
8 Hughes, T. P., ‘British Electrical Industry Lag: 1882-1888’ Technology and Culture, 3:1, (Winter 1962), 
pp. 27-44. Hughes quotes this description of electricity from the Paris Exhibition of 1881.  
9 Hausman et al, Global, pp. 23-24 
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public from exploitation and monopoly power.10 Related to state involvement in electricity, 
another aspect of the early period of development that is crucial to this thesis is the 
evolution of central station electricity. As the potential scale of electrical networks grew 
after the invention of the incandescent bulb the potential (which Edison had anticipated) 
for large central generating systems offering a public supply also increased. Despite slow 
and unsteady progress central station electricity became the natural choice for electrical 
networks in the UK due to the economies of scale and the largely urbanised population.11   
 
Central Generating Systems 
Prior to the invention of the incandescent bulb, arc lighting systems had mainly been sold - 
and regarded - as independent, dedicated (self-contained) systems; similar to the early gas-
lighting systems. Each installation would have its own generator and formed a complete 
system within itself.12  Much of the reason for the adoption of this approach is explained 
by the limited and site-specific applications of arc lighting, the technical limits on lamps, 
and the economic limits to demand imposed by cost. However with the invention of the 
incandescent bulb many of the limits to electrical systems were transformed. Now that 
electrical lighting could actually be used in an interior setting, the possibility of selling the 
light to a large number of ordinary domestic consumers opened up. Even more crucially it 
now became a technical possibility - and economically desirable - to run huge numbers of 
lamps from a single generator. Just as the gas industry had shown, central generating 
systems offered an opportunity to drive down the costs of generating electricity by 
achieving the economies of scale necessary.13  
 
 The key figure in the development of central station electricity in the UK was 
Thomas Edison. Although popular legend tells of the ‘heroic’ inventor Edison obsessed 
with creating a light bulb (his team of scientists and engineers had indeed been focused on 
developing a reliable incandescent light bulb) the overarching goal for Edison was the 
potential that an electrical network offered.14 From his earlier experience of developing the 
telegraph and his interest in the telephone and an awareness of the way in which gas 
networks had grown, Edison was convinced that the future for electricity lay in developing 
                                            
10 Ibid. p.67 
11 A further crucial factor was the technical imperative; load factor. As electrical networks developed it 
became essential that central generating plant was used efficiently. One example of how this could be 
achieved was by combining domestic demand (mostly evenings) with industrial demand (mostly daytime).  
12 Hausman et al, Global, p.10 
13 Falkus, ‘Early Development’, pp. 229-31 
14 Hausman et al, Global, pp. 11-12 
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a similar system. Hughes has shown clearly that rather than setting out to confront the 
purely scientific and technical barriers that this entailed Edison also had a keen awareness 
of the economic aspects of the challenge; he described Edison’s general approach as 
‘econotechnical’.15 Edison was among the first to recognise that electrical light would have 
to be sold in significant volume in order to compete with the well-established gas networks 
if it were ever to be any more than a ‘luxury’ light.  
 
 By the end of the First World War electrical networks had become well established 
in the UK, particularly in urban settings. However, these systems had developed in a 
haphazard way offering consumers a bewildering variety of supply-led options to the 
consumer; AC and DC systems operating at a range of voltages and frequencies. As 
Hughes noted wryly, 
 
Londoners who could access electricity, toasted bread in the morning with 
one kind [of electricity], lit their offices with another, visited associates in 
nearby office buildings using still another variety, and walked home along 
streets that were illuminated by yet another kind.16 
 
   
Though according to Hannah, 
 
The fragmented nature of the British supply industry had not proved an 
unbearable handicap in the early stages of development, but by the end of the 
first decade of the twentieth century there could be no doubt that a new 
strategy was required and that the existing structure of the industry was not 
conducive to the development of large central stations and bulk supply. 17 
 
  During the war the importance of electricity to the economy and society was made 
plain, and its many flaws exposed.  Political attention was turned towards the industry once 
more as numerous ‘Reconstruction’ Committees began to consider the future of the 
electricity industry.18 Although the scale of the problem was exaggerated in London, a 
similar problem operated throughout the country. There was little regional interconnection 
as municipal electrical enterprises often resisted expanding their networks through 
integration with contiguous enterprises, and as such the national picture was fragmented. 
                                            
15 Hughes, Systems, p.29 
16 Hughes, Systems, p.227  
17 Hannah, Electricity, p.51 
18 Wilson, Ferranti, p.124; Self and Watson, Electricity . Around the same time in 1916 the two committees 
were set up, one under Lord Haldane and the other under Charles Parsons to consider manufacturing. The 
Williamson Committee arose as a recommendation of the Parsons Committee.  
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This had resulted in the UK falling behind its competitors, mainly Germany and the US, in 
terms of development and scale in electricity. This was not just a matter of national pride 
however as by the second decade of the twentieth century three of the UK’s biggest 
electrical firms were subsidiaries of German or US firms.19 The habit of having one eye 
fixed on the other side of the Atlantic was something that also had an impact later, in the 
1980s, when Britain shifted its renewables programme to wind energy to follow the 
American lead (see chapter 6).  
 
The Weir Committee and the National Grid 
In October 1924 a Conservative government was returned to power in Britain under Prime 
Minister, Stanley Baldwin. By this time it was clear that electricity supply was really in 
desperate need of reorganisation and the short-lived Labour government (elected in 
January 1924) had begun to address some of these problems through a committee for Coal 
and Power set up under ex-Prime Minister, Lloyd George.20 Hughes advanced the view 
that the barrier to change in the UK since the earliest days of electrical supply had been 
‘primarily political’ and it was clear that by this time ‘politics’ was beginning to take some 
notice of the challenges.21 By 1924 the damaging economic consequences of the war, 
increasing trade union activity, and a first Labour administration under Ramsay 
MacDonald had arguably weakened much of the more entrenched political impediments to 
change. The new Conservative government rather surprisingly found itself supporting state 
involvement in electricity as the only possible solution to the problems, and Baldwin 
immediately made this a key priority for the new administration.22 
 
 The report of the Weir Committee was signed on 14 May 1925 only five months 
after its establishment and its recommendations were bold. Undoubtedly the speed at 
which the committee reached its conclusions was helped in large part by the accumulated 
output of the various committees on electricity set up by the government since the First 
World War and the five years of experience gathered by the Electricity Commissioners, a 
creation of one of these earlier committees. From the start the Weir Committee regarded 
Britain as ‘an ideal electrical area’ and accordingly its report was focussed on the 
                                            
19 Hannah, Electricity, p.37 
20 Self & Watson, Electricity, pp. 51-54; Hannah, Electricity, pp. 88-89. The Lloyd George committee 
engaged the services of Merz and McLellan to investigate the costs of standardisation using Clydebank as an 
example.  
21 Hughes, Networks, p.351 
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challenges of national interconnection.23 The Weir Committee quickly reached conclusions 
that were largely similar to those of the Williamson Committee some years earlier, 
although they went much further in proposing national (rather than regional) 
interconnection that formed the core of their recommendations. The committee envisaged a 
future where there would be,   
 
...generation in large stations, favourably situated as regards fuel, water and 
load with units of comparatively large capacity; the minimum legitimate 
amount of stand-by plant; and the highest obtainable load factor, to secure 
which stations should be inter-connected with one another. 24  
 
 The Weir Committee also recommended the establishment of area boards, but it proposed 
that these would be organised under a central body, the Central Electricity Board (CEB).  
Weir foresaw that the entire country should form one large integrated network of 
generation and distribution - facilitated by an interconnected ‘gridiron’ - operating on a 
single standardised frequency and voltage.25  
 
 It is some indication of the awareness of the poor state of electricity in the UK and 
the perceived impact that this was having on international competitiveness that this time 
around the proposals of a government electricity committee were accepted largely 
unaltered by the government.26 Despite some initial hesitancy from the government in 
publishing the Weir Report due to the radical nature of its proposals (and the likely 
reaction of vested interests), the Electricity Supply Act (1926) created the CEB and set 
plans for a national grid in action.27  According to Hannah, the Weir Committee had, 
 
...indulged in sensationalism and exaggeration - perhaps necessarily - in order 
to emphasise the seriousness of the problem and to encourage the adoption of 
their recommendations.28   
 
 Weir had promised Baldwin that the proposals would require ‘courage and possibly 
a considerable financial investment’, and accordingly the committee had estimated (based 
                                            
23 Hannah, Electricity, p.91 
24 Hughes, Networks, p.353 
25 Ibid. Merz coined the term ‘Grid’ because the proposed pattern of transmission lines reminded him of a 
gridiron.  
26 Hannah, Electricity, p.96. Furthermore, it is also some indication of the influence of Lord Weir.  
27 Ibid. pp. 94-96. As noted above the report was delivered to the Government in May 1925. It was not 
published until March 1926.  
28 Ibid. p.93 
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on the commissioned reports) that their proposals, including the cost of new power stations 
and distribution systems, would cost £250m over fifteen years to implement but that this 
would result in annual consumer savings of £44m by 1940 through lowered prices.29  
These ‘fragile’ savings estimates convinced the government that action was required. The 
creation of the CEB signalled a significant new direction in state enterprise in the UK 
which would foreshadow much of the subsequent nationalisation of key industries.  
However, this thesis is particularly interested in the establishment of the national grid. The 
government had accepted the economies of scale that a national grid could offer and the 
structure of the UK’s electricity networks was to be radically re-ordered through a massive 
engineering project to create an interconnected national electrical network.  
 
The National Grid: ‘...power, in the service of the people…’ 30 
The National Grid was begun in Central Scotland in December 1927. Through that year the 
newly formed CEB was assisted by the Electricity Commission in formulating plans for 
how the challenges of grid construction would be met. It was decided that the industrial 
areas such as South Wales, Central Scotland, and the Midlands should be tackled first. 
Given the preponderance of Scots in the CEB and Electricity Commission it was perhaps 
no surprise that Scotland was chosen first: many of the senior engineers had previous 
experience of the existing electrical networks in this area.31 The physical scale of the 
challenge was huge; the construction of a network of transmission lines snaking around the 
nation; the standardisation of frequency, voltage, and current; and the drastic 
rationalization of the existing generating capacity.32  Leaving aside the construction of new 
power stations, the 3,000 miles of planned transmission lines would require 150,000 tons 
of steel and 12,000 tons of aluminum. 28,000 pylons were erected and the system required 
200,000 porcelain insulators. After some research into systems abroad the CEB decided to 
standardise the frequency of the grid at 50Hz and this required that more than twenty per 
cent of the installed capacity be converted.33 The erection of the ‘ugly’ pylons stirred up 
some opposition from those who felt that they ‘disfigured’ the landscape 34 - and the CEB 
had to deal with 22,000 affected landowners on the issue of wayleaves. Chapter 6 shows 
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32 Self & Watson, Electricity, p.60 
33 Hughes, Networks, p.358; Hannah, Electricity, pp. 116-118 
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how this environmental opposition created a painful memory for the electricity industry 
that would resurface during the late 1970s when the CEGB was considering the 
development of wind turbines in the UK.   
 
 Fortunately for the CEB it had two great advantages. The first of these was that 
despite the physical challenge that the grid presented it never represented a technological 
challenge. Hughes in particular is clear in stressing that the CEB was able to use existing 
technology in constructing the grid. ‘Britain’s engineers concentrated on a host of 
relatively routine problems that were complicated more by their number, a tight schedule, 
and economic dimensions than by technical challenge.’35 The second advantage enjoyed 
by the CEB was that the construction of the grid coincided with the Depression in the UK. 
This gave the construction project access to large volumes of skilled labour and materials 
and avoided the costly delays that might otherwise have afflicted the programme.36  Less 
quantifiable but equally important was the associated benefit that this gave the CEB and 
the grid in being seen in positive terms as a job creator at a time of economic hardship.37 
The CEB was quick to claim that the construction of the grid created 120,000 jobs, either 
directly or indirectly.38 This access to existing technology and labour helped to ensure that 
the national grid was completed on schedule. The last pylon was erected at Fordingbridge 
in the New Forest on 5 September 1933.39 By the end of 1935 general trading was 
underway in most of the UK and by this time there were 2880 miles of primary 
transmission lines in operation.40 The grid had been completed within schedule and within 
budget. The Weir Committee estimated that it would cost between £24-29m to construct 
the grid - and the final cost was an impressively accurate £29m.41  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
35 Hughes, Networks, p.357 
36 Hannah, Pioneer, p.215 
37 Perhaps, an early echo of the ‘green jobs’ claims, emphasised in the introduction to this thesis. 
38 Hannah, Electricity, p.119 
39 ‘National Grid Complete: A British Engineering Achievement: Electricity for all purposes’, The Times, 
p.34,  5 December 1933 
40 The North East area remained outside of the national grid at this point due to problems with frequency 
standardisation. Self & Watson, Electricity, p.60 
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Energy and Electricity during the golden age 
Economic historians, ever drawn to themes of continuity and change, have viewed the 
three decades beginning after the end of the Second World War as Les Trentes 
Glorieuses.42 The unprecedented period of sustained economic growth, which occurred 
after the Second World War, led to a ‘golden age’ of higher living standards, and the 
inevitable corollary of increased consumption, for most of the citizens of the developed 
nations. 43 Britain also enjoyed a period of sustained growth during this time, but at growth 
rates somewhat more modest than its competitors.  
 
 As demonstrated by the work of Darmstadter, economic growth and energy 
consumption enjoy a close relationship, and one important result of the increasing wealth 
of individuals during this period was the increasing consumption of energy, both by 
industry and households.44 Between 1950 and 1970 the total world consumption of energy 
increased by 151 per cent, from 2059 to 5170 million metric tonnes oil equivalent 
(mmtoe).45 Within this global aggregate figure many of the industrialised nations, 
particularly those that had suffered infrastructure damage during the war, accounted for 
even greater rises in demand.  As Clark put it ‘a handful of nations consumed the bulk of 
the world’s energy’.46  Japan, which accounted for only 2 per cent of world consumption in 
1950, was by 1970 consuming 6 per cent of a much increased total, as its per capita 
primary energy consumption rocketed over the twenty years (Table 1.1). France and 
Germany also witnessed massive increases in energy consumption as they rebuilt their 
damaged economies following the war.  Despite the less spectacular incremental increases 
in the US in this period, the energy consumed was on a scale with no equal anywhere else 
in the world, at more than double the per capita consumption of Britain and Germany. 
Somewhat less dramatic was the rise in consumption in Britain during this period. 
 
 
 
                                            
42 Chick, Electricity, p.1. This phrase is attributed to Jean Fourastié. 
43 N. F. R. Crafts, ‘The golden age of economic growth in Western Europe, 1950-1973’ in Economic History 
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45 Clark, World Energy, p.188, Table 6.1 
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Table 1.1  
Per Capita Consumption of energy, selected years (mmtce) 
 1950 1960 1970 
UK 4.4 4.9 5.4 
Germany 2.5 3.7 6.0 
France 1.9 2.6 5.0 
Japan 0.6 1.2 4.0 
USA 7.9 8.6 12.5 
World 1.0 1.4 1.9 
 
Source: Clark, World Energy, p.188, Table 6.1 
 
 Some of the explanation for what Clark termed a ‘negligible’ rise in Britain’s 
energy consumption during this period can be attributed to economic factors, and this 
forms part of a wider debate on relative economic decline in the post war period which 
falls outside the constraints of this research. However – leaving the US aside – it can be 
seen that the UK was the leading per capita consumer in the developed world in 1950 and 
was overtaken only by Germany by 1970.  Therefore it could be argued that earlier growth 
had limited the potential for UK consumers (both domestic and industrial) to increase their 
energy consumption. Despite this possibility, the period was witness to huge growth in the 
demand, availability and consumption of electricity in Britain (Table 1.2).  The boost that 
this gave to the newly nationalised industries of coal and electricity was seen only in the 
most positive of terms.  Similarly, though perhaps more of a concern for the ongoing 
British preoccupation with the balance of payments, the steady growth in car ownership in 
the period led to increasing imports of foreign oil to the UK.  
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Table 1.2 
UK electricity, 1950-74 (GWh) 
Year Production Consumption 
(total) 
Consumption 
(per capita 
kWh) 
Installed 
capacity per 
1,000/pop. 
(kWh) 
1950 66 66 1309 376 
1955 94 94 1834 531 
1960 137 137 2601 697 
1965 196 197 3604 906 
1970 249 250 4473 1200 
1974 273 273 4873 1418 
 
Source: Chick, Electricity, Appendix A1, Table A1.1, p.147  
 
 Despite the rather modest increases in total primary energy demand compared with 
the other industrialised nations, Britain did reflect the shifting pattern of global energy 
consumption after 1950.  By 1945 oil accounted for 23 per cent of world primary energy 
consumption; by 1970 the figure was 45 per cent.  Coal which had provided 66 per cent of 
primary energy in 1945, had by 1970 slipped to providing only 33 per cent of world 
primary energy requirements.47  Of course, primary energy needs were not provided by 
coal and oil alone in the golden age.  But despite the massive attention and capital invested 
in nuclear energy in the period, it did not play a significant role in world energy by 1970; 
accounting for less than 1 per cent.  Indeed, the only ‘renewable’ of any significance in the 
period, hydroelectricity, was providing more than twice this amount of primary energy in 
1970. Much more significant was the increase in the consumption of natural gas in the 
period. Gas remained almost unnoticed amongst what Yergin showed as the 
swashbuckling allure of the international oil industry and the technological attraction of 
nuclear power.48 However, from a share of only 10 per cent of world requirements in 1945, 
natural gas doubled to provide 20 per cent in 1970.  
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UK Balance of Trade in Fuel, 1947-88 
In 1936 (in terms of the balance of trade) the UK became a net importer of fuel.  Up until 
this point the nation had through virtue of its huge coal reserves and well-developed export 
networks made a profit on fuel. The one exception to this had been during the General 
Strike of 1926 when it was necessary to import £66.6m of fuel to replace the disrupted 
supply.  From the mid-thirties the gradual decline in coal exports combined with increasing 
imports of petroleum meant that a net national outlay for fuel would become a feature of 
the overall economic position of the UK.  Furthermore, this deficit steadily increased 
through time.  Chart 1.1 shows the balance of trade in fuel from 1947 until the oil crisis of 
1973.49 
 
Chart 1.1 
 
Sources: Ministry of Power, Statistical Digest 1965 (London: HMSO, 1966); Ministry of Power, Digest of 
Energy Statistics, 1968 and 1969, (London: HMSO, 1969); Department of Energy, Digest of United 
Kingdom Energy Statistics 1974 (London: HMSO, 1975) 
 
                                            
49 The values of imports are quoted ‘c.i.f.’ (cost, insurance and freight) and exports are ‘f.o.b.’ (free on 
board).  ‘c.i.f.’ - ‘this value is the price which the goods would fetch at that time, on sale in the open market 
between buyer and seller independent of each other, with delivery to the buyer at port of importation, the 
seller bearing freight, insurance, commission and all other costs, etc., incidental to the sale and delivery of 
the goods with the exception of any duty or tax chargeable in the United Kingdom.’ ‘f.o.b.’ – ‘which is the 
cost of the goods to the purchaser abroad, including packing, inland and coastal transport in the United 
Kingdom, dock dues, loading charges and all other costs, charges and expenses accruing up to the point 
where the goods are deposited on board the exporting vessel or at the land boundary of Northern Ireland.’  
Quoted from, Department of Energy, Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics 1989 (London: HMSO, 
1989)   
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 Chart 1.1 shows an inexorable decline in the balance of trade in fuel in the UK 
during the golden age. This net cost of fuel increased steadily during the 1950s and 
gathered pace through the early 1960s; eventually showing dramatic shifts in the second 
half of the 1960s and early 1970s.  The growing cost of fuel to the country reflects the 
concomitant shift from coal to oil that was taking place after the war.  From its position of 
dominance, supplying over 90 per cent of fuel needs in the UK in 1947, coal was quickly 
being replaced by oil as the dominant fuel.  Much of this growth was explained by the 
growth in transport from the 1950s onwards.  
 
Electricity in the postwar era: changing inputs 
The final section of the chapter will look at one aspect of the evolution of electricity in the 
UK from the time of nationalisation in 1948 until the early 1970s. Therefore, it is not 
intended as a detailed analysis of the industry within the context of nationalisation as 
Hannah and Chick have already admirably served this task.50 Rather the focus will be on 
the growth of consumption in the period and the changing pattern of inputs within the 
electricity generating industry. The CEGB was the coal industry’s largest customer 
through the postwar period, and it was the only customer for nuclear power. This meant 
that the decisions that the CEGB took with regard to fuel were crucial in shaping the 
development of energy sources within the UK.  This is of particular interest to this thesis as 
later chapters will show that the interest and enthusiasm of the CEGB had a direct impact 
on the success of renewable energy sources - particularly wind energy - during the 1970s 
and 1980s.  
 
 The British Electrical Authority (BEA) was created in April 1948 under its first 
chairman Lord Citrine. During the 1950s the choice of fuel became a political issue, and 
Hannah notes that throughout this time, despite the supply difficulties, the BEA believed 
that coal would continue to be the ‘fuel of choice’ for electricity generation.51  However, 
coal shortages prompted the Government and the BEA to consider alternative fuels, such 
as oil and nuclear as the NCB officially informed the BEA that they would be unable to 
meet the rising demand for coal by the 1960s.52 During this period the BEA had also 
investigated the potential of wind power, with proposals to build an experimental turbine 
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in Wales.53 These plans were ultimately shelved amid local opposition on environmental 
grounds. At this point the BEA only operated one oil-fired power station at Bankside in 
London and nuclear energy was yet to make any contribution to electricity generation.  
However the warning from the NCB over future coal supplies encouraged the BEA to 
reach an agreement with ESSO on oil supplies to the new oil-fired plant at Marchwood at 
an annual loss (relative to coal) of £1.6m on the expectation that oil prices would continue 
to decline.54  
  
 The BEA was also attracted to the potential of nuclear energy. It had ‘the technical 
appeal of the new’ and the BEA which sought a central role in its development was 
disappointed by the creation of the UKAEA in 1953. Clearly, the electricity industry would 
be the sole commercial customer for nuclear energy but sensitivity over the weapons 
aspect of nuclear technology caused the government to separate its operation from the 
BEA. Ultimately this decision would cause repeated tension over almost four decades 
between the UKAEA, the government, and the electricity industry over the scale of the 
various nuclear programmes and the perennially thorny question of reactor choice (see 
chapter 2). In the 1970s this would have consequences for the development of renewable 
energy as the CEGB operated largely outside of the official government programme. In 
1957, following a report by the Herbert Commission, the UK electricity supply industry 
was restructured as the supply constraints began to ease.  At this point the new authority - 
the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) - controlled a vast industry with net 
assets of £1000m employing 53,000 people; this included 262 power stations and the 6000 
miles of the National Grid. The electricity Boards were selling more than half a million 
appliances annually, as the dominance of electricity for lighting was extended to space 
heating also. Massive investment in distribution and connection continued as the Grid was 
upgraded through the 1950s.55   
 
 The reorganisation of the electricity industry coincided with the first major postwar 
energy crisis in the UK - the Suez crisis - and this period provides a useful insight into 
British attitudes to the future of inputs for electricity generation during the period. 56 The 
events surrounding the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the subsequent disruption to 
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world oil supplies prompted what Chick and others have suggested was an over-reaction 
by the UK government in a massive expansion of the proposed nuclear programme.57 This 
has to be seen in the context of a planned shift within the UK energy mix from coal to oil.  
The minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet in February 1957 summarised the situation as it 
appeared at the time.  
 
The Minister of Power said that, if we were to keep pace with a demand for 
electricity which was increasing at a rate of 7 per cent per annum, the total 
electricity output capacity installed by 1970 would need to be of the order of 
51,000 MW. There was no prospect that supplies of coal would match an 
acceleration of demand at this rate, and since it would clearly be unwise, from 
every point of view, to rely too heavily on oil-burning plant, a considerable 
expansion of the existing nuclear power programme was indicated.58 
 
 Chick points to the ‘large psychological impact on the geopolitical mindset of 
politicians’ that this (and the later Tapline crisis in 1967) had. Accordingly, in 1957 the 
new Prime Minister Harold Macmillan ordered a trebling of the nuclear programme from 
1,500 - 2000MW to 6000MW. National energy security dominated the fuel choices of the 
UK government, and by implication the CEGB, as nuclear energy moved to represent the 
key long-term fuel choice for the UK as the Government sought to ‘liberate’ themselves 
from oil ‘to the fullest possible extent’.59 In this way the pattern of fuel choice was set for 
electricity generation in the UK for decades to come. Despite the CEGB’s attempts to 
introduce a gradual switch-over to oil-burning power stations (or dual-fire, coal and oil 
plants) the government imposed protectionist fuel tariffs that would force it to continue to 
build coal-fired power plant and to burn coal. The government recognised the coal 
industry’s reliance on the CEGB, and as Ashworth put it ‘There was thus erected a very 
special market relationship between the coal industry and the electricity supply industry’. 
60In addition, the dramatic up-scaling of the nuclear programme in 1957 (much against the 
wishes of the CEGB) would also constrain the Board’s future fuel choices.  
 
 Although coal, and to some extent oil, would continue to account for the vast 
majority of electricity generation through to the 1970s and beyond, nuclear power came to 
dominate energy thinking in the UK to a disproportionate degree. In 1964 coal accounted 
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for 88% of electricity generation, and oil was 11%. The new chairman of the CEGB after 
1957 was Lord Hinton who had come to the Board from the UKAEA. This was the 
beginning of a close relationship between the two organisations, and during the period on 
which this thesis focuses, Walter Marshall moved from the UKAEA to assume control of 
the CEGB. Again, this was a somewhat unrepresentative arrangement and a similar pattern 
of related appointments did not take place with the NCB. Vast amounts of government 
money were invested by the UKAEA and the CEGB into nuclear R&D, and slowly in the 
latter part of the 1960s it began to make some contribution to electricity generation, though 
this remained a small percentage of overall energy consumption.  
 
 This section has shown how unshakeable faith in the nuclear future shaped the 
development of electricity generation in the UK from the 1950s. This grew from a delight 
in the new technology in the immediate postwar years to an issue of national energy 
security from the time of Suez. Awareness that coal could not meet the rising demand of 
electricity consumption coupled with unwillingness to depend on foreign oil supplies 
compelled the government and the CEGB to rely on coal-burning and focus on a nuclear 
energy future. In this period renewable energy made little progress in the UK other than 
the isolated attempt by the CEGB to experiment with wind energy on the Lleyn Peninsula 
in Wales during the 1950s.61 As usual, the only exception to this was the continued and 
growing contribution of hydroelectricity. It would not be until after the first oil crisis of 
1973 that national governments across the developed world would turn some of their 
attention to the ‘alternative’ energy sources.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to set the scene for the main focus of this thesis - the development 
of renewable energy technology in the UK after 1973.  In this regard it has been necessary 
to examine two key issues that influenced the period 1974-88. The first issue that this 
chapter examined is the development of electricity in the UK, from the late nineteenth 
century and through the twentieth century. This has served to emphasise the gradual 
development of a national electricity distribution system based on large, centrally-located, 
fossil-fuelled power stations, which, by the 1970s, would prove to be a massive barrier to 
the introduction of renewable sources of energy. This also emphasised the disproportionate 
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attention given to the nuclear industry during this period – and the distorting effect that this 
had on the mindset of politicians. The second issue discussed was the increase in energy 
consumption during the post-war golden age and the attendant shift in the patterns of that 
consumption. In primary energy, the move away from coal and towards oil was reflected 
throughout the developed world, as was the attempts to develop nuclear energy. 
44 
Chapter 2 
Energy and Environmentalism into the 1970s 
 
In Chapter 1 the development of electricity and the growth in energy consumption 
in the UK is marked by a sense of continuity.  Coinciding with the post-war ‘golden age’ 
of economic growth and prosperity energy supply grew to meet increasing demand for 
electricity along a largely uninterrupted path of development within the National Grid. But 
by the beginning of the 1970s this pattern was beginning to unravel. In the UK, exogenous 
shocks - most significantly for this thesis the 1973 oil crisis combined with a long list of 
internal socio-economic factors to create a new set of imperatives for energy in the UK. 
For energy these internal factors included political upheaval, repeated industrial unrest in 
the coal industry, the discovery of North Sea oil and gas, decisions over the choice of 
reactor for the new nuclear programme, and the emergence of the ‘new 
environmentalism’.1 This chapter will set the context for the remainder of this thesis 
through a brief examination and evaluation of how these individual factors combined to 
create the conditions for the creation of the UK renewable energy programme after 1974, 
with a particular focus on the crucial impact of the new environmentalism.   
 
  Although subsequent chapters will show that renewable energy was subsequently 
judged within a dominant and rigid energy paradigm in the UK, this thesis argues that 
increasing social pressure from the new environmentalism in the UK was an important 
factor in explaining the creation of a UK renewable energy programme. Moreover it is also 
clear that much of the motivation for many of the developers within, and outwith, the 
programme was founded on environmental concern. Recent work by Sine and Lee has 
explored the effect of social/environmental movements on the creation of new industries 
(mainly in renewable energy).2 They produce compelling evidence that wind energy 
development in the United States was legitimised and advanced through environmentally-
                                            
1 Brookes, S. K., et al, ‘The Growth of the Environment as a Political Issue in Britain’, British Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 6, No. 2, (Apr., 1976) p. 253. The authors describe the growth in environmental 
interest and the expanding range of issues included within this area in the UK as the ‘new environmentalism’. 
I will adopt this term both as a useful phrase for identifying those groups and individuals that arose during 
this period and as a way of signifying the unique nature of the movement in the period. 
2 Sine, W. D. and Lee, B. H., ‘Tilting at Windmills? The Environmental Movement and the Emergence of the 
U.S. Wind Energy Sector’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 54, 2009. pp. 123-55 
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focused social pressure groups acting as ‘disrupters of institutionalised arrangements’.3 I 
suggest that a similar process took place in the UK, particularly for wave and wind power.  
The broad coalition of interest groups that formed the new environmental movement in the 
UK was the only social grouping that demonstrated any interest in energy matters during 
the period and through newly-formed organised campaigning groups such as Friends of the 
Earth UK (FoE UK), Greenpeace and the Socialist Environment and Resources 
Association (SERA) it exerted telling social pressure on government.4 
 
This period was prior to any widespread awareness of the effects of carbon 
emissions and climate change, and as will be seen this concern was focused on an 
opposition to nuclear power, industrial pollution, and the depletion of fossil fuels. This 
chapter will use a brief case study of the coverage given to energy by the most influential 
environmental publication of the period, The Ecologist magazine, and will also consider 
the related emergence of the Alternative Technology movement in the UK. This will give a 
flavour of environmentalists’ views on energy in the UK and will show how these views 
had an influence on the development of renewable energy after 1974.  
 
UK energy in the seventies 
At the end of October 1973, the Golden Age, which had limped on through a declining 
world economy finally collapsed.5 In 1971 the end of the post-war Bretton Woods 
agreement of fixed exchange rates had seemed to confirm that the world was entering a 
new and less certain era.6  It has now become the customary historical periodisation to end 
the Golden Age in 1973 as the first oil crisis of the 1970s hit.7  This had had the effect of 
creating an intuitive causative link between much of the turmoil of the 1970s to the 
decision by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to raise the price 
of crude oil. Whilst there were undoubtedly other factors to blame for the general 
economic decline (particularly since many of the problems pre-date the oil crisis) it is right 
                                            
3 Sine and Lee, ‘Tilting’, p.124 
4 Rootes, C., ‘Environmental Movements: From the local to the global’ Environmental Politics, 8:1 (1999) 
p.1. The author states that,  ‘Of all the new social movements which emerged from the student movements of 
the late 1960s, it is the environmental movements which have had the most enduring influence on politics…’ 
5 Armstrong, P., Glyn, A., and Harrison, J., Capitalism since 1945 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) p.221 
6 Cairncross, A.,  Economic Ideas and Government Policy (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 142 
7 Agreement on the definition of this period as a period of exceptionally high growth in the West is universal. 
Some diverse examples include; Crafts, ‘The golden age’; Crafts and Toniolo, ‘Postwar growth’, p. 3; 
Howlett, P., ‘The ‘Golden Age’, 1955-1973’ in P. Johnson (ed.) 20th Century Britain: Economic, Social and 
Cultural Change (Harlow: Longman, 1994); Hobsbawm, E.,  Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 
1914-1991 (London: Abacus, 1994) 
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to conclude that the oil crisis heightened awareness of energy issues in general.8  However, 
‘energy’ as an issue had already begun to creep up the political agenda in Britain and 
elsewhere.  Although I will show that the growth in new environmentalism accounts for 
much of this heightened awareness, it was also in some part due to the upward spiral of 
wages and prices and the government’s controversial and complex Industrial Relations Act 
which provoked confrontation with the unions.9 Strike action by miners in 1972, targeting 
power stations, resulted in power cuts that both emphasised to consumers an overwhelming 
reliance on energy and highlighted its vulnerability.  
 
 By 1970 oil had overtaken coal as the main source of fuel in the UK accounting for 
nearly 48 per cent of primary energy consumption against just over 44 per cent for coal. 
Natural gas had risen from 0.7 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 1965 to 10.2 Mtoe 
in 1970 and now made up nearly 5 percent of energy consumption.10 This was due mainly 
to the discovery of oil in the North Sea in the 1960s.11 Nuclear power had also grown, to 
nearly 3 per cent of primary energy consumption, as the reactors of the UK’s second 
nuclear programme went critical. In twenty years, from a time when British coal supplied 
over 90 per cent of fuel needs, Britain had become overwhelmingly dependent on imports 
for its energy needs. By 1970 imports constituted 107.4 per cent of primary energy 
consumption in the UK.12  In the era of cheap energy this was seen as little problem, but as 
the economic climate began to worsen in the early 1970s this sanguine outlook changed. 
Energy consumption in Britain, which had grown by over 10 per cent since 1965, began to 
stagnate as Table 2.1 illustrates. Between 1970 and 1971 coal consumption dropped by 
nearly 11 Mtoe, a gap that was filled mostly by natural gas from the North Sea.  
 
 
 
                                            
8 Cairncross, Ideas, p.143. Cairncross wrote that that the years 1970-3 ‘provided much of the tinder for the 
later blaze’.  See also Armstrong et al, Capitalism, p.223, 226.  
9 Wrigley, C., British Trade Unions Since 1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p.70 
10 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2007, 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical
_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/spreadsheets/statistical_review_full_report_workb
ook_2007.xls [accessed 20 June 2007] 
11 Oil from the North Sea would not begin to flow until 1975.  
12 Chick, Electricity, p.4. This contrasts with the US where imports totalled just 13.15 per cent. In further 
contrast, imports of primary energy in France totalled 295.7 per cent in 1970.  
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Table 2.1 
UK Primary Energy Consumption, 1965-1975 (Mtoe) 
 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Oil 74.2 103.6 104.3 110.5 113.2 105.3 92.0 
Coal 117.4 96.0 85.1 74.5 80.7 71.1 71.5 
Natural Gas 0.7 10.2 16.4 23.3 25.2 30.1 31.6 
Nuclear 3.4 5.9 6.2 6.6 6.3 7.6 8.2 
Hydro 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 
Total consumption 196.8 216.9 213.0 216.0 226.5 215.1 203.1 
 
Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2007, 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical
_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/spreadsheets/statistical_review_full_report_workb
ook_2007.xls [accessed 20 June 2007] 
 
 
A detailed analysis of the economic turmoil in the 1970s lie outwith the scope of 
this thesis but some sense of the scale and impact of high inflation and high unemployment 
is essential. Table 2.2 summarises two of the key economic indicators, inflation and 
unemployment, which when considered together offer evidence of the precarious position 
of the UK economy in the first part of the 1970s. It is clear that even before the inflation 
increases caused by the rise in oil prices after 1973 that the Golden Age was rapidly 
grinding to a halt. 
 
Table 2.2 
UK inflation and unemployment, 1970-1975 (annual rate) 
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Inflation rate 7.2 9.3 8.5 7.0 15.0 27.2 
Unemployment rate* 17.6 15.9 20.4 26.9 21.6 13.7 
 
* Long term – defined as in excess of 12 months 
Sources: Schulze, M., and Woodward, N., ‘The emergence of rapid inflation’ in Coopey, R., and Woodward, 
N., (eds.) Britain in the 1970s: The Troubled Economy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); Woodward, N., 
‘The retreat from full employment’ in Coopey, R., and Woodward, N., (eds.) Britain in the 1970s: The 
Troubled Economy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996) 
 
 
The oil price shock   
On October 16 1973, ten days after the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli war, the 
members of OPEC met in Kuwait. The Yom Kippur War was to have the most far-
reaching consequences of any of the previous conflicts coinciding as it did with the 
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increasing shift in power away from the oil companies and towards the oil-producing Arab 
States.13 OPEC was keen to flex its muscles and punish the West (though mainly the 
United States) for the support it was giving Israel in the conflict. At the meeting Iran 
pushed for an immediate hike in the price of crude oil and the other members agreed. The 
increase agreed was 70 percent on the posted price, taking the cost per barrel from $2.90 in 
mid-1973 to $5.12.14 The next day the members of OAPEC (Organisation of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) decided to increase the impact of the price increase by 
simultaneously reducing production by 5 percent a month, and applying an embargo on 
selected countries that were seen to be offering significant support to Israel. In theory these 
measures were to apply until Israel returned behind its pre-1967 borders. In December 
OPEC met again and once again prompted by Iran the price was raised to $11.65. This 
then constituted a four-fold increase in the price of crude oil over a matter of months.15 Just 
as James Akins and others had predicted earlier, it seemed that this time the ‘Wolf’ had 
most definitely arrived.16  
 
  By early November 1973 the government had drawn up contingency plans 
for petrol rationing following an 18 per cent drop in the amount of Arab oil reaching the 
world’s market.17 They also urged motorists to comply with a voluntary 50 mph speed 
restriction. Petrol rationing was not introduced officially though many retailers imposed 
their own systems in order to conserve stocks.18 In January the government announced the 
creation of a new Department of Energy (DoEn) under Lord Carrington.19 The concerns 
over oil prices were overtaken in February 1974 by political events in the UK, as Heath 
once again facing down the mineworkers asked the country with palpable exasperation, 
‘Who Governs Britain?’20 The resulting defeat for the Tories provided the answer. The 
new Labour Energy Minister, Eric Varley, announced in March 1974 that the energy 
restrictions that had been placed on industry were to be lifted.21  Despite large increases in 
the cost of energy to the final consumer in 1974 (see Chart 2.1) the interruption to supplies 
                                            
13 Yergin, D., The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (London: Free Press, 1991) pp. 563-587 
14Yergin, The Prize, p.625; de Montbrial, T., Energy: the countdown, A Report for The Club of Rome 
(Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1979) 
15 Yergin, The Prize, p.625 
16 Akins, J., ‘The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here’ Foreign Affairs 51 (April 1973) pp. 467-490 
17 The Times, ‘Deepening world oil crisis compels action in America and Europe’, 3 November 1973, p.1 
18 Waymark, P., ‘Big fuel savings under 50 mph plan’, The Times, 20 November 1973. p.1 
19 New Scientist, Editorial ‘Tasks for Lord Carrington’ 61 (17 January 1974)  
20 Fraser,, W. H., A History of British Trade Unionism, 1700-1998 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999) p. 229 
21 The Times, ‘Curbs on power and heavy fuel oils to go but minister urges continuing economy’, 22 March 
1974. p. 19 
49 
proved to be a temporary phenomenon. Varley, who was closely associated with coal 
mining, (he was sponsored by the National Union of Mineworkers)22 was now faced with 
the ‘impossible nuclear decision’.23  
 
Chart 2.1  
Per capita expenditure on energy by final consumers, 1970-75 (annual percentage 
increase) 
 
Source: abstracted from, DTI/DoEn, Digest of Energy Statistics, 1971-76 
 
 
Nuclear energy: the CEGB reactor decision 
The day before OPEC met in Kuwait, the Guardian carried a story on its front page by its 
energy correspondent, Peter Rodgers. Rodgers wrote that the CEGB was planning to 
abandon the British Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (AGR) and import the controversial 
American Light Water Reactor (LWR) for its future programme of reactor development.24 
This ‘calculated leak’25 was a complete reversal of its earlier position, which had rejected 
the American reactor on economic and safety grounds; although Arthur Hawkins, 
chairman of the CEGB, had earlier expressed disappointment in the AGR in terms of cost 
and construction difficulty. 26 The appearance of the story caused an immediate reaction.27 
During the 1960s the nuclear industry and the government had carried on a lengthy debate 
barely reported by the press and largely ignored by the public about the choice of reactor 
                                            
22 New Scientist, ‘The new Energy Minister’ 61 (14 March 1974) p.705 
23 Stephenson, H., ‘The impossible nuclear decision’, The Times, 6 May 1974, p.19 
24 The Guardian, 15 October 1973.  
25 New Scientist, Editorial, ‘Which reactor?’ 60 (6 December 1973 
26 Williams, Decisions, p.201, 207 
27 The Economist, ‘Buying American’ 27 October 1973. p.96 
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for Britain’s second nuclear programme. The debate had split broadly between those that 
favoured the British designed AGRs and those that wanted to import the newer US 
designed LWR. The arguments ebbed and flowed over several years in the 1960s before 
the government arrived at a decision to support the British designed reactor. This design of 
reactor and the extent of the programme to build them was then more or less set for the 
coming years. Earlier, in August 1972, Hawkins had appeared before a government 
committee and summarised the Board’s future requirements. 
 
If we take 3 ½ per cent annum growth – which, as I remind you, is a little 
higher than the average over the last three to four years – we should only 
require 19,500 megawatts of additional plant, of which 15,500 have already 
been committed. Therefore we would only require 4,000 megawatts more 
plant. That would mean in this period for commissioning until after 1980 only 
three new station starts, of which one would probably be nuclear  - and 
probably the fast breeder. 28 
 
A range of concerns about the LWR had surfaced during the 1960s that remained 
unresolved in the 1970s, not least of which was safety. Therefore the British nuclear 
programme had avoided consideration of the US designed LWR built by Westinghouse in 
favour of British designed reactors. It was a shock, therefore, when Rodgers uncovered 
news of this complete change of heart at the CEGB and this was exacerbated by the OPEC 
announcement that followed within days. Therefore an issue that may have otherwise 
drifted down into the ‘private’ political realm from whence it had emerged became ‘topical 
and controversial’ and was thrust onto the front pages.29 The oil crisis had transformed 
energy into a hot political topic and the decision by the CEGB was its first unwilling 
target.  
 
 The Select Committee on Science and Technology (SCST), since its creation by the 
‘white heat’ Labour government in December 1966, had conducted several enquiries into 
the nuclear industry by 1973.30 Having only just produced a lengthy report in June 1973 
titled Nuclear Power Policy it was now concerned by reports of the change of heart by the 
CEGB over the choice of reactor, and by December 1973 it had set up an official enquiry. 
When Arthur Hawkins appeared in front of the committee he added to their concerns by 
announcing that contrary to his earlier forecast of perhaps only one new nuclear plant 
                                            
28 Patterson, W., Going Critical, (London: Paladin Books, 1985) p.28  
29 Kerr, M., ‘The cloudy issue of reactor choice’ New Scientist, 61 (7 February 1974) p.314 
30 Williams, Decisions, p.31 
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being required up to 1980, he now estimated that nine nuclear power plants would be 
required in the period 1974-79 and a further nine in the period 1980-83. He based this on a 
growth in electricity demand of 4¾ per cent per annum up to 1980 and 5¼ per cent 
thereafter; a drastic revision of his forecast in August 1972 of a 3½ per cent increase.31  
Hawkins insisted that this was not a knee-jerk reaction to the oil crisis and instead 
explained that it was simply the right time to act in light of a projected deterioration in coal 
and oil supplies. Indeed he was adamant that the plans had been devised before the oil 
price rise as he claimed the subtle distinction that this was not a ‘panic’ measure, but a 
‘crash’ programme.32  
 
The problems with the AGR reactor were well known by this time. Britain’s second 
nuclear programme was launched in 1964 (and increased in 1965 by the Wilson 
government) to build four new nuclear plants with a capacity of 8,000MW (see table 2.3). 
By 1966 building had started on the first reactor, yet at the end of 1973 none of these 
plants had been completed.33 Indeed the first plant begun in 1966 at Hinkley Point would 
not be operational until 1976. Costs, already increasing due to construction difficulties, had 
been further exacerbated by high inflation in the 1970s. Therefore the decision of the 
CEGB to abandon the AGR was not wholly surprising. What was shocking to many was 
that it favoured the import of American technology as an alternative. The Economist saw a 
clear connection between the CEGB’s decision and the oil crisis and called the ‘crash’ 
programme ‘just plain silly’. They argued that there was no need for such a programme 
given the imminent flow of oil from the North Sea.34  After lengthy enquiries into the 
choice of reactor and the extent of the new programme the government finally made an 
announcement in July 1974. Eric Varley stated that there was to be a programme of no 
more than 4,000MW of capacity over four years and the chosen reactor was to be the 
British SGHWR.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
31 Ibid. p.33 
32 Patterson, Critical, p.33 
33 The Economist, ‘Why they forgot about nuclear power’ 12 January 1974, p.74 
34 The Economist, ‘Buying American’ 27 October 1973. p.96 
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Table 2.3 
Nuclear Programmes: Britain 1953-78 
Programme Year Capacity (GW) Proposed completion date 
I 1955 1.5 - 2 10 years 
Ia 1957 5-6 1965 
Ib 1957 5-6 1966 
Ic 1960 5 1968 
II 1964 5 1975 
IIa 1965 8 1975 
III 1974 4 1978 
IIIa 1978  1980s 
Iv 1979 15 1982-91 
 
Source: Williams, Decisions 
 
Coal  
The crises in oil and nuclear were set amidst continued turmoil in the coal industry in the 
period at the end of 1973. The numbers of miners employed by the National Coal Board 
(NCB) had fallen from around 700,000 in 1957 to about 300,000 in 1970 and through the 
1960s miners had looked on with bewilderment as their wages declined relative to other 
industrial workers.35 This disquiet combined with rapid price inflation in the early 1970s 
resulted in a national strike in January 1972 that threatened to cripple supplies to Britain’s 
power stations. The Conservative government caved in after a very short time and awarded 
the miners record pay rises. However by late in 1973 rising inflation and insecurity were 
once again urging the miners towards industrial action. The oil crisis helped to exacerbate 
a further crisis as it created a strong bargaining position for mineworkers during the period. 
By early February 1974 the NUM had called a national strike and the government was 
forced to call a state of emergency and quickly introduced a three-day week. 
 
 In this period coal remained the major source of power for Britain’s electricity 
generation (see Chart 2.2) but came to be largely overlooked in the ensuing debate which 
focused on oil and nuclear. From 1970 oil had begun to replace coal in electricity 
generation, whilst nuclear remained largely static due to problems in getting its new 
reactors operational. Despite this fact the ensuing energy debate did not include a great 
                                            
35 D. Lyddon and R. Darlington, Glorious Summer. Class Struggle in Britain in 1972 (London, 2001) p. 31 
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deal of discussion about coal as a viable fuel for the future. Long before fossil fuels were 
to become identified as the primary cause of global warming, the economic costs of coal 
burning were forcing it down the UK energy mix. 
 
Chart 2.2 
Fuel input for electricity generation, 1970-75 (Mtoe) 
 
Source: Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 
http://stats.berr.gov.uk/energystats/dukes5_1_1.xls  
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The ‘new environmentalism’  
A brief survey of the history of the development of renewable energy technology prior to 
1973, as recounted in Chapter 1, appears a rather inevitable tale of technological progress, 
such as Winner described as being ‘governed by a powerful, stultifying orthodoxy’.36 
Feenberg encapsulates the challenge for the historian in this in this comment,  
 
…once the black box is closed, its social origins are quickly forgotten. 
Looking back from that later standpoint, the artefact appears purely technical, 
even inevitable.37   
 
 It has now been well established that social processes are hugely important in the 
‘promotion, selection, and development’ of new technologies.38 Many scholars, among 
them Thomas P. Hughes, Nathan Rosenberg, Langdon Winner, and David Nye, have 
written extensively on the social aspects of technological development – and a number of 
these have also given specific consideration to the development of energy technologies. In 
Chapter 1, this social background to innovation and development in renewable technology 
was not explored. This failure is partly a result of the constraints of space and focus, and 
partly it is caused by the lack of an accurate record.  Ultimately we are forced to speculate 
as to the reason why the wealthy American electrical entrepreneur Charles F. Brush spent 
so much time and money developing a wind turbine for his backyard in Cleveland, Ohio, at 
a time when coal (and wood) was cheap and plentiful (see Appendix I). The inventions of 
Brush, and many others, appear to spring spontaneously from their drawing boards, live a 
brief life, and then fade into obscurity.  For the period beginning after the first oil price 
shock in 1973 we have the opportunity to present a very much more nuanced picture of 
technological development in renewable energy which in this research takes account of the 
social pressure exerted by the new environmentalism.  
 
 The search for the origins of environmental thought can extend far back into 
history.39  The environmentalists of the 1960s and 70s included many strands that 
combined to present an often incongruous ‘front’ in what the more radical groups saw as 
                                            
36 Winner, ‘Alternative Technology’, p. 75 
37 Feenberg, A., Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999) p.11 
38 A. Smith, ‘The Alternative Technology Movement: An Analysis of its Framing and Negotiation of 
Technological Development’, Human Ecology Review, 12:2, (2005) p. 108; Sine and Lee, ‘Tilting’ 
39 Smout, T. C., Nature Contested: Environmental History in Scotland and Northern England since 1600 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000) 
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‘the battle for the planet’. This section will explore the direct antecedents of the new 
British environmentalism of the early 1970s.  
 
The Sixties – Planet Earth 
In the 1960s the environmental debate became global for the first time. Sheail presents the 
view that the twentieth century is conventionally divided up by its two world wars but also 
perhaps by,  
 
...a third staging point at the end of the Cold War, in 1989. But an 
environmental perspective, and a good deal of hindsight, might also bring to 
the fore the years leading up to 1970. As well as pictures of the oil-stricken 
Cornish beaches and wildlife, television and the press gave particular 
prominence to the thalidomide scandal….It was a time of marked 
disenchantment with science and technology, as developed through ‘big 
business’ and government. 40 
 
 There was a range of factors that were all framed in, and accelerated by, the more 
radical mood of the decade. Criticism and rejection of the nuclear programme, which was 
begun in the 1950s both in Britain and the United States, became an important element of 
the growing ‘counter culture’.41 And all over the world people were also struck by the first 
images of the earth beamed back from the Apollo missions, which made the planet seem 
small and somewhat vulnerable.42 In the US, landmark environmental publications 
punctuated social events like the Vietnam protests and the civil rights marches and 
environmental catastrophes like the Torrey Canyon in 1967, lending a more radical tone to 
the American movement.43 The appearance of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 is 
generally accepted as a key moment in the development of the new environmentalist 
movement that was to follow. 44 ‘More than any other single document, it established the 
term and the idea “environment” in common usage’. 45 
 
                                            
40 Sheail, J., An Environmental History of Twentieth-Century Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) p.222 
41 Herring, H.,  From Energy Dreams to Nuclear Nightmares: Lessons from the anti-nuclear power 
movement of the 1970s (Charlbury: Jon Carpenter, 2005) 
42 Sheail, Environmental History, p. 257.  ‘That single image encompassed all animate life. Life itself 
appeared so fragile and finite’.  
43 Sheail, Environmental History, pp. 221-2. The author quotes the official report on the Torrey Canyon 
tragedy, which called it ‘as unprecedented as it was sudden’. 
44 R. Carson, Silent Spring (London: Penguin, 2000) There is wide agreement about the seminal nature of 
Silent Spring among scholars. Some examples include; R. Garner, Environmental, p. 3; Lamb, Promising; 
pp. 23-25 
45 Lamb, Promising, p.23 
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 One explanation for the enthusiastic reception that Silent Spring received may be 
found in a vague sense of unease that some environmental groups were beginning to voice 
over economic ‘progress’ – a feeling that also ran through the formation of the earliest 
preservation groups in the nineteenth century. In Silent Spring Carson’s concern was the 
use of pesticides and the potential harm that these caused to humans and animals. Carson 
was herself a scientist and the thrust of her study was not ‘anti-science’ but rather a 
critique of the uncontrolled use of new technology and the collusion of the state, in the 
form of public officials, in covering up the potential harms of that technology. It was this 
theme that arguably caught the imagination of the public rather than a specific concern 
over DDT.  In particular, this strong political theme contributed in igniting the radical 
imagination of young people in 1960s America and beyond and contributed to the growth 
of the new environmentalism.46 
 
 The post-war cultural influence of the United States was cast widely and extended 
into a reshaping the thrust of British environmentalism after 1970. The strength of anti-
capitalistic rhetoric grew and became a feature of many influential environmental 
publications. As multinational business spread throughout the 1960s, particularly from the 
United States, and concern over the ‘Third World’ developed, there appeared to be a 
growing sense of discomfort with global inequality. More than twenty years after the end 
of the war the industrialised nations had recovered and made historic progress in raising 
the living standards of their populations. However, similar to the concerns over the 
‘population bomb’,47 the rate of this unprecedented economic growth began to worry many 
and Malthusian concerns were raised about how long this growth could be sustained.  
Disquiet over economic growth combined with concern over the environment was found in 
the work of several influential British economists writing in the period.48 One of the 
earliest was from Barbara Ward, a former Economist contributor, who wrote Spaceship 
Earth in 1966. The book set out a very early version of the case for sustainable 
development.49 Significantly, as an indication of the general mood of the period, the 
‘spaceship’ analogy came from a speech that Adlai Stevenson had given to the UN in 1965 
inspired by images of the earth as seen from space. 
 
                                            
46 Roszak, T., The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and its Youthful 
Opposition, (London: University of California Press, 1995) 
47 Ehrlich, P. R., The Population Bomb (Cutchogue, N.Y.: Buccaneer Books, 1971.) 
48 One clear example is Mishan, E. J., The Costs of Economic Growth (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969)  
49 Ward, B.,  Spaceship Earth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966)  
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We travel together, passengers on a little space-ship, dependent on its 
vulnerable supplies of air and soil; all committed for our safety on its 
security and peace, preserved from annihilation only by the care, the work, 
and I say the love, we give our fragile craft.50   
 
  Ward, who along with Rene Dubos was later to make a significant contribution to 
the landmark 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), was 
certainly not the first to view the planet as an interdependent system, but within the 
established British tradition of amenity and conservation, her prominence and influence 
allowed her to widen the traditional environmental debate in the UK to include wider, 
global issues.51 Her analysis also formed an early example of some of the emerging 
differences between the US version of the debate and the British version. The central 
argument of Spaceship Earth was presented in careful, non-sensational language, which 
was echoed in much of the later British contributions. Her view of whole-world systems 
(made more famous later by James Lovelock and his Gaia hypothesis) became widespread 
as support for environmental issues gathered pace through the late 1960s. 
 
The incongruence of industrial development and nature remained a central theme of 
environmentalism and created a clear, if indirect, link between the two. In the twentieth 
century, as the spread of industrial development slowed, the most tangible effect of 
industry remained in its polluting impacts. Air and water pollution began to concern 
environmental groups, and prompted the earliest environmental legislation. Arguably, this 
also had the effect of establishing a strong connection between energy and the 
environment, as the burning of fossils fuels, the production of town gas, and the expansion 
in transport grew into the issues of the later twentieth century. Concern about air and water 
pollution had been a feature of many urban philanthropic ventures since the nineteenth 
century but the direct relationship between energy and environmentalism was first seen in 
the 1950s when the National Smoke Abatement Society (NSAS) campaigned successfully 
for environmental legislation. The NSAS was formed in 1929 with aims made admirably 
clear by its name and had a diverse membership which included individuals, local 
authorities, and in an early example of energy tokenism, the National Coal Board (NCB).52 
Following the ‘great London fog’ of 1952, said to have been responsible for 4,000 deaths, 
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the government set up an inquiry that resulted eventually in the Clean Air Act of 1956.53 
Although the target of this legislation was not the coal industry per se, the legislation 
created ‘smokeless zones’ and created further problems for coal in its battle with ‘cleaner’ 
oil as both domestic and industrial consumers were forced through legislation to re-
evaluate their fuel choices.   
 
 The depletion of natural resources also developed into a central issue of 1960s 
environmentalism, which would find later expression in the landmark environmental 
publications of the early 1970s.54 The argument was closely related to the Malthusian 
perspective on population and food, and posited that a growing population, which in the 
developed West was also growing richer and consuming more, would eventually run out of 
the earth’s natural resources. Nobody could disagree over the finite nature of natural 
resources, and this made this ‘common sense’ element of the environmental position 
particularly compelling to the wider public. Concern over the depletion of fuel sources had 
a long history in Britain dating back to Jevons’, The Coal Question, in 1856, which 
speculated over the ‘probable exhaustion of our coal-mines’.55 One hundred years later the 
American geologist, M. King Hubbert, would posit the same dilemma for oil.56 The 
questions over the depletion of non-renewable resources were given greater prominence by 
the nuclear lobby that were keen to use the threat of a disappearing resource to ‘sell’ the 
benefits of new and bountiful energy supply. Supporters of nuclear power encouraged the 
growth in concern over the pollution emitted from oil and coal-fired power stations in a 
further effort to highlight the ‘clean’ efficiency of the ‘alternative energy’ of nuclear 
generation.57  
 
 By the end of the 1960s energy, though not yet a central theme of 
environmentalism had risen in prominence within the debate. It had entered through a 
variety of channels including warnings over air pollution, resource depletion, nuclear 
power, and energy security. However, environmentalists had little to offer in terms of 
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alternatives at this time. The nuclear question, which by this time was nearly twenty years 
old, produced contradictory and largely unscientific responses from environmental groups. 
However, as 1970 introduced the new environmentalism to Britain the question of energy 
was to become more central to environmental identity. 
 
Into the Seventies – Limits to Growth? 
 
Table 2.4 
Membership of environmental groups  
 
UK Groups 1970 1971 1975 1980 
Greenpeace - - - 10000 
Friends of the Earth - 1000 5,000a 12000 
World Wildlife Fund - 12000 - 51000 
Ramblers Assoc. - 22000 - 36000 
National Trust 226000 278000 500000 950000 
RSPB 38,000b 98000  321000 
RSNC  64000  140000 
CPRE   21000  27000 
US Groups     
Sierra Club 113000 - 147000 182000 
Environmental Defense Fund 11000 - 37000 46000 
Environmental Action 3500 - - 21000 
 
a-1976; b- 1967 CPRE – Campaign to Protect Rural England; RSNC – Royal Society for Nature 
Conservation: RSPB – Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
 
Sources: Bosso, C. J., ‘Rethinking the Concept of Membership in Nature Advocacy Organizations’, Policy 
Studies Journal, Vol. 31 (2003)  p.400, table 2; Connelly & Smith, Politics, p.69, table 3.1; Garner, 
Environmental, p.23, table 7.1; Robinson, Greening, p.45, table 1; Lowe & Goyder, Environmental Groups, 
p.133, table 7.2; McCormick, British Politics, p.33. 
 
 
 
The period 1970-1973 was a good time to be an environmentalist in Britain. Events 
on both sides of the Atlantic such as Earth Day 1970 in the United States58 and The 
Countryside in 1970 series (1963-70) in Britain signified the increasing interest in 
environmental problems. Growing political recognition of environmental issues was also 
evident with the establishment in Britain of the Department of the Environment (DoE) in 
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1970, four years before the Department of Energy (DoEn) would be created.59 This period 
also saw the formation of influential environmental campaigning groups such as Friends of 
the Earth in the UK (FoE UK) and a little later, Greenpeace.60  According to a range of 
views the new environmental movement reached an initial peak in 1972,61 culminating in 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), which took place in 
Stockholm during the summer of 1972.62 Though Table 2.4 shows that membership 
continued to grow through the 1970s. The Stockholm Conference gave international 
recognition to environmental problems and lent further credibility to the views of the new 
environmental movement. Furthermore it allowed the many grassroots activists who 
attended the conference, direct access to influential political figures.63 
 
 Coinciding with the Stockholm Conference was the appearance of the 
groundbreaking environmental text The Limits to Growth (LTG), which has been called 
‘the foundation-stone of Green political thinking’.64  Sponsored by The Club of Rome and 
produced by a team of scientists at MIT, LTG is perhaps the most famous of all 
environmental texts, despite competing with many other such publications in the period.65 
It has attracted many critical responses since its publication in 1972 and its impact has 
been exhaustively charted.66  Based on complex (for the time) computer models, its ‘eco-
doom’ conclusions called for immediate action and set the tone for Stockholm and after.  
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 In Britain, the new environmental movement was served by the appearance of 
several important magazines, as well as growing support from existing, well-respected 
publications such as New Scientist. The first of these, Resurgence, appeared in 1966 and 
was the creation of John Papworth who had been involved with CND and other pacifist 
groups since the 1950s.  It was (and remains) an eclectic mix of pacifism, anarchy, and 
poetry, which soon began to reflect the growth of new environmentalism in Britain.  By the 
late 1960s articles by influential figures such as Fritz Schumacher were appearing, as the 
magazine began to consider in more depth the issues around nuclear power. The growing 
awareness of environmental issues is reflected in the appearance by 1970 of two magazines 
explicitly devoted to environmental issues –Your Environment, which appeared first in 
December 1969, and The Ecologist in July 1970.  A small group that included the poet Ted 
Hughes started Your Environment. Although it was an exceedingly modest operation the 
magazine included contributions from key figures in the environmental movement, 
including the nuclear physicist Walt Patterson (later of FoE UK), who was heavily 
involved with the magazine from 1970.67 The Ecologist, although beaten to publication by 
Your Environment by a few months, arguably made a more telling and lasting contribution 
to new environmentalism in the Britain in the early part of the decade, shaping much of the 
ensuing debate.  
 
The Ecologist: ‘tub-thumping for the environment’ 68 
The coverage that The Ecologist devoted to energy-related matters fell into three broad 
categories; a) nuclear safety and waste, b) resource depletion, and c) alternative 
technology. The nuclear safety debate had widened in the 1960s, influenced by the 
publication of a range of titles in the United States, which reflected the growing 
polarisation of the debate.69 The position of new environmentalism – and The Ecologist - 
was clear in its firm opposition to civil nuclear fission power on the familiar grounds of 
safety, but also increasingly on the issue of waste disposal also. Concern about these issues 
grew and the announcements such as the plans to build nuclear power stations at 
Fessenheim in the Alsace region caused some reaction in Britain.70 However, the number 
of articles declined as the arguments lined up against nuclear energy arguably became 
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repetitive and, perhaps, ineffective. Britain’s nuclear programme had stuttered to a halt due 
to delays in completing AGR reactors and therefore it provided little ammunition to 
environmentalists. The main difficulty for The Ecologist in its opposition to nuclear energy 
in the period was its simultaneous acceptance of the realistic potential of nuclear fusion.  
As later editorials made clear, the magazine ‘concedes the possibility of unlimited 
energy’.71 Indeed Peter Bunyard wrote,  
 
In theory there is unlimited energy in the world. All man has to do is to build 
breeder reactors and to achieve thermo-nuclear fusion on a commercial 
scale.72 
 
 This view created a clear dilemma for the magazine and may explain partly why it 
chose to largely avoid the topic of nuclear energy in its editorials. This concession also had 
an impact on the magazine’s coverage of depletion issues, particularly the specific concern 
about the depletion of fossil fuels, which was largely absent from the pages of the 
magazine in favour of a focus on the more general depletion of ‘natural resources’. The 
March 1972 editorial provides a clear example of this, in which Robert Allen defended 
BFS from the stern attack by John Maddox, editor of the respected journal Nature.73 After 
challenging Maddox’s criticisms of the BFS view on population, Allen ponders the 
question of whether there are ‘enough raw materials for 10 billion people, all consuming as 
much as we do today?’ He immediately clarifies that ‘he is not thinking of energy 
resources’ before moving on to a discussion of metals.74 
 
 However, by 1973 increasing mentions of energy appeared in the editorial content 
of The Ecologist. This can be explained to some extent by presentational changes in the 
magazine as the single author editorial was (temporarily) abandoned and the wider 
interests of the editorial team were reflected more.75 However, this increase in coverage is 
matched by a similar increase in the coverage of energy-related topics in the feature article 
section of the magazine. In this particular year, in the pre-oil crisis period, we see the 
magazine’s first editorial devoted entirely to energy policy76, two editorials with a 
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significant contribution on energy policy77, and two further editorials that contain several 
references to energy.78 Peter Bunyard was the main contributor of this energy-related 
editorial material, as he was with the feature articles on energy in the period, and it was his 
editorial contribution in the March 1973 issue that raised the issue of energy policy for the 
first time in the magazine.  
 
 The short piece, entitled ‘It’s never too late to be a coalman’, is a response to the 
government announcement of additional support for coal mining in February 1973.79 
Bunyard used the announcement to compare the merits of Britain’s traditional fuel source 
with other sources, in particular oil and nuclear power. He suggested, perhaps rather 
presciently, that coal ‘will be the only source of primary energy on which Britain will be 
able to rely with any degree of certainty by the turn of the century’.  Bunyard justified his 
argument by pointing to the ‘limited’ resources of oil and natural gas in the North Sea and 
by describing the nuclear industry ‘in chaos’. He went further in his criticism of British 
energy policy in the North Sea by suggesting that ‘total costs of exploration, production 
and running costs over the next 10 years…are likely to run to a minimum of £2,500 
million. The 25,000 new jobs anticipated by the North East of Scotland Development 
Association will need an investment of £10,000 each.’80  This is an interesting departure 
for The Ecologist on two fronts. Firstly, it was the first appearance of a debate about a 
specific energy-related government policy, and secondly it was beginning to discuss the 
economics of energy.   
 
 The first editorial devoted entirely to energy policy appeared in the May issue of 
1973 (3:5), written by Peter Bunyard titled ‘The Energy Crisis’. Set against a background 
of ‘crippling strikes taking place within a year of each other in the power stations, the 
coalmines and in the gas industry’, which, he argued, give some idea of the impact of 
energy shortages in ‘our industrial society’, he offers a critique of the absence of energy 
planning in Britain. Although once again conceding the ‘unlimited energy’ available 
through nuclear power, this editorial offered a much more specific argument directed 
against the safety issues of nuclear reactors - in particular the American LWR. Bunyard 
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was more positive about the safety of the ‘gas-cooled, graphite moderated reactors used in 
Britain’ but he emphasized the indecision of the British nuclear programme which he felt 
would fail to provide ‘a viable alternative’ in the face of rising prices among other fuels. In 
many ways this editorial predicted the conditions that prevailed following the oil crisis that 
was to arise five months later. It imagined a scenario of rising primary energy prices, and 
inadequate nuclear capacity set against the ever increasing demands of society and foresaw 
an ‘economic depression’. Interestingly, Bunyard concluded the editorial with the 
suggestion that ‘now is the time to seek alternatives which lead to reductions in energy use 
and yet which will not necessarily lead to any diminution in the so-called standard of 
living’.   
 
 The Ecologist included coverage of alternative technology, mainly focused on 
renewable energy technology, from its launch. In a series of regular columns under the 
titles ‘Ecotechnics’, ‘Down to Earth’, or ‘Demo-Technology’, articles would describe a 
range of initiatives in alternative technology. These ranged in content from the basic and 
practical to the highly technical and would often in accordance with the magazine’s aims 
include a polemical element. The columns dealt with a range of issues, but were strongly 
focussed on energy-related technology. They advocated the development of wind turbines, 
solar power, and energy efficiency through small-scale developments that aligned with the 
growing Alternative Technology movement in Britain.81 These articles serve to 
demonstrate the lack of technical progress in renewable energy in the post-war era. The 
more technical articles in The Ecologist on the development of active solar technology do 
not show much change since Frank Schuman’s ambitious 1913 scheme in Egypt, and the 
features on wind turbines concentrate on the siting and installation of the existing decades-
old designs. However, these regular columns in the magazine do appear to have provided a 
valuable tool for the dissemination of the existing technical information in the early 1970s, 
and encouraged a continued interest in renewable energy among the environmental 
movement.  
 
In December 1973, the first issue of The Ecologist to appear after the oil crisis 
devoted its editorial to the situation under the heading ‘The energy steeplechase’. With an 
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accompanying cartoon by Richard Willson, Peter Bunyard set out the initial reaction of the 
magazine.82 It focused on the issue of security of supply and rising demand, but curiously 
made no mention of the rise in oil prices that was a main feature of the crisis. As might be 
expected the magazine saw the crisis as a general vindication of its position on the 
industrialised nations’ reliance on oil, and the thrust of the editorial centred on supply 
issues. However, following on from the comments of Goldsmith in the August 1973 issue 
concerning security of supply, the article offered an essentially cultural explanation for the 
crisis.83 Bunyard made repeated reference to the Middle East as ‘a part of the world which 
has never known peace since the dawn of civilisation’ and as ‘one of the world’s politically 
hottest and least stable spots’.  In the editorial he bemoaned the ‘sheer idiocy’ of basing the 
growth of industrialised economies on a resource that is found mainly in that part of the 
world. Bunyard also saw a clear link between the crisis and the nuclear programme and 
suggests that ‘technocrats are hoping that nuclear power will step smartly in’ to fill the 
energy gap. The short editorial concluded by suggesting ‘that there is only one answer and 
that is to embark immediately on policies to reduce demand for energy’ and closed with 
the warning that we are ‘enslaving ourselves’ to those that ‘control the energy circuits’. 
Once again The Ecologist returns to its advocacy of reducing the consumption of energy, 
the ‘virtues of restraint’84, with no real suggestion of how that could be achieved.   
 
In the same issue (3:12) Bunyard contributed a lengthy feature article, which 
appears to have been written prior to the oil crisis, titled ‘ENERGY- CRISIS or crunch?’ 
This article was a report on a jointly sponsored conference in London by the Financial 
Times and BOAC on ‘World Energy Supplies’. The article explored the growing 
possibility of an energy crisis, facilitated both through the ‘unity’ among the oil producing 
countries and the increasing dependence on oil of ‘western economies’. This situation is 
contrasted with the earlier crises of Suez in 1956 and the embargo of 1967, which Bunyard 
suggested failed amid a ‘buyer’s market’ for oil. The article discussed the contributions of 
some of the key individuals involved in energy strategy at that time, including 
representatives from the U.S. Government, the banks, the oil companies, and OPEC. In 
particular the contribution of Dr Nadim Pachachi, a previous secretary general of OPEC 
was telling. Aside from a predictable call for the Arab producers to pursue ‘a co-ordinated, 
unified policy to freeze…crude oil production at present levels until such times as Israel 
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withdraws fully from all the Arab territories occupied during the 1967 war’, he also 
criticised the West for its unrealistic ‘obsession with cheap energy prices’. This, he 
suggested, had forestalled the search for alternative energy sources, when ‘a price of seven 
to eight dollars per barrel’ would allow ‘non-conventional oil’ to compete successfully. 
Bunyard used the article to develop the magazine’s criticism of the lack of a clear energy 
strategy ‘…governments and the major energy industries have on the whole miscalculated 
the investment and resources they should have been putting into energy production over 
the past decade’.85 
 
By January 1974 the magazine with more time to consider the implications of the 
oil crisis produced a lengthier and more considered editorial devoted entirely to energy. In 
addition to a criticism of the Government, The Ecologist also acknowledged the 
significance of the decision by CEGB on reactor choice. Written by Goldsmith and 
Bunyard this editorial moved the oil crisis in to a context more familiar to readers of the 
magazine. Bunyard’s contribution, following on from his previous article, criticised the 
‘sorry Government’ handling of the economy amid soaring prices and problems with 
supply.86  Bunyard pointed out that an oil crisis at some stage was widely predicted and yet 
the government ‘dithers and vacillates when confronted with reality’. The editorial 
suggested that this weakness from the government creates a void into which ‘private 
enterprise- however selfish and ruthless’ can step. The site of platform building for the 
North Sea oil industry ‘despite strong local opposition’ and the requests of the CEGB to 
use the American LWR were used by Bunyard as examples of the government being led by 
big business. Bunyard also criticised government-backed programmes such as Concorde 
and the Channel Tunnel as further examples of its ‘laughable’ and ‘mindless plans for 
growth’. The editorial concluded by dismissing the ‘fiction’ that thermonuclear fusion 
could ‘solve man’s energy problems’. This is a complete reversal of the magazine’s 
repeated concession in earlier issues that ‘endless energy’ was possible and suggests that 
the magazine was beginning to shift from its previous position of a qualified acceptance of 
nuclear power.87 The energy debate was clearly beginning to deepen among 
environmentalists.  
 
                                            
85 Bunyard, P., ‘ENERGY- CRISIS or crunch?’ The Ecologist 3:12 (December 1973) 
86 Bunyard, P., ‘Taking the Government by the Nose’ The Ecologist 4:1 (January 1974)  
87 Peter Bunyard wrote ‘In theory there is unlimited energy in the world. All man has to do is to build breeder 
reactors and to achieve thermo-nuclear fusion on a commercial scale.’ Bunyard, P., ‘The Energy Crisis’, The 
Ecologist, 3:5 (May 1973) 
67 
Accompanying the editorial of Bunyard is a short piece from Goldsmith on energy 
and GNP.88 This piece is constructed around the research of Joel Darmstadter into the 
correlation between GNP and energy consumption, mentioned in chapter 1.89 Darmstadter 
was interested in the changing relationship between GNP growth and the growth in energy 
consumption in the United States. This had shifted from a positive relationship where GNP 
growth outpaced the growth in energy consumption between 1920 and 1965 to a negative 
relationship from 1965, when it appeared that efficiency savings, mainly in electricity 
generation, had ceased. Darmstadter speculated that the shift in the relationship was also 
caused by the high-energy consumption of the American consumer. Using these 
conclusions, Goldsmith suggested that limited conservation of energy resources would 
have a disastrous impact on society and the economy, by limiting the potential for GNP 
growth. He suggested that ‘the greatest priority today’ should be an attempt to maximise 
economic growth and minimise energy consumption. At first sight this seems an 
anomalous conclusion for Goldsmith to reach given his repeated criticism of industrial 
society. However, it is clear that Goldsmith believed that energy use will increase and will 
bring about the collapse in industrial economies that he so craved. 
 
In 1974 there were only two further editorials that discussed energy to a significant 
extent. The first of these was in the March/April issue (4:3). ‘The Caviar Chimera’ was 
written by Goldsmith and covers the familiar ground of a general critique of industrial 
society with a few pot shots along the way at some of The Ecologist’s traditional enemies 
such as the scientist Barry Commoner and the Labour politician, Anthony Crosland. In this 
article Goldsmith discussed the way in which the oil crisis caused a backlash against 
environmentalism in the US and led to ‘a veritable avalanche of anti-environmental 
measures’.90 After devoting two consecutive editorials almost exclusively to energy and 
the oil crisis The Ecologist largely abandoned the topic thereafter. The number of feature 
articles declined and lost the focus that had been gained during 1973.91 The reason for this 
is unclear but it would be reasonable to speculate on two factors that may have caused the 
change. Firstly, there was the recognition that energy policy, particularly nuclear, was 
mired in an esoteric technical debate that had little appeal to the readers of a popular 
magazine; the torch for this debate had clearly passed to FoE UK. Secondly, the political 
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turmoil of 1974 appeared too attractive a topic for the magazine, and political campaigning 
for the two General Elections in 1974 on behalf of the People’s Party seemed to dominate 
the direction of the magazine as its output reduced to ten issues a year. The peak of its 
influence in this early period that followed the publication of Blueprint For Survival in 
1972 appeared to have passed and the magazine appeared to struggle to discover a clear 
identity. The November 1974 issue (4:10) was a produced jointly with Resurgence and 
explored ‘new value systems’ based on ‘religions which have not become materialist’. 
Arguably, this might have seemed rather irrelevant to many of the traditional readers of the 
magazine, the majority of who listed New Scientist as their other regular magazine 
purchase.  
  
Technology: Soft, Appropriate, Intermediate, or Alternative? 
A key aspect of the social movements of the 1960s was their shared anti-industrialism, and 
growing distrust of government. This mood served to unite such disparate groups as the 
civil rights movement, the counter culture, the anti-Vietnam protesters, CND, and the 
broader new wave of environmentalists. Among the specific targets of this critique were 
science and technology, seen as particularly potent symbols of authoritative control in the 
post-war period.92  As previously mentioned, this is one explanation for the outstanding 
influence of Silent Spring.  One such reaction of particular interest to the study of 
renewable energy from the 1970s was the Alternative Technology (AT) movement.  Smith 
noted that the AT movement provides a rare example of a technologically focused social 
grouping, which was defined by pro-activity rather than pure critique (such as the anti-
nuclear movement).93  Many of the factors that combined to produce the new 
environmental movement were also present in the AT movement, and the AT movement 
was subsumed under the environmentalist banner.  Adrian Smith wrote that, ‘the AT 
movement emerged on a wave of environmental concern over the impacts of industrial 
society, and a radical, counter-cultural critique of its technocratic tendencies’.94  AT 
advocates were motivated by this essential critique of capitalism, but in contrast to many of 
their fellow travellers on the counter culture trail, they offered alternatives, both product 
and lifestyle, as well as critique. 
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 The AT movement had emerged in the 1970s as a specific socio-technological 
response to the widespread anti-industrialism that had begun in the 1960s. Langdon 
Winner saw the movement’s rejection of technological ‘progress’ as just the latest 
manifestation of a periodical social phenomenon that in the past had produced a range of 
reactions including key historical figures like Robert Owen, Peter Kropotkin, William 
Morris, and Gandhi, and social movements like the co-operative movement.95  This is a 
process that can perhaps also be discerned in the formation of the nineteenth century 
amenity groups in Britain as described above. For Winner, the counter culture of the 1960s 
was simply the latest wave of social disillusionment.  Emerging from these swirling 
influences a new critique of technology emerged which followed a tradition established in 
the 1930s by Lewis Mumford.96 Both Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man and 
Jacques Ellul’s ‘outrageously pessimistic’97 The Technological Society appeared in the 
mid-sixties, and both contained a bitter critique of the technocratic state.98 In the same 
period Barry Commoner published Science and Survival, which focussed specifically on a 
critique of the scientific establishment.99 Emerging from this background, the AT 
movement embraced the belief that technology should be ‘liberated’ from the manipulation 
of the ‘technocracy’ and handed back to society. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
importantly it should be ‘non-violent towards people and natural resources’.100 
 
 Perversely, the impetus for much of the early AT movement was created and 
developed through traditional commercial methods and channels. In 1968 Stewart Brand 
produced the first of many subsequent and highly successful editions of his Whole Earth 
Catalog, which presented readers with the opportunity to purchase from an array of small-
scale ‘back to nature’ technologies.101 In many senses the Catalog offered a comfortable, 
consumerist vision of a different world, at a safe distance from the increasing violence of 
public demonstrations in the late 1960s.  According to Winner, amid the apparent political 
and social disintegration of the globe its readers could imagine themselves as ‘hippie 
environmentalist spacemen in the tradition of Buckminster Fuller’.102 The Catalog 
                                            
95 Winner, L., ‘Building the Better Mousetrap’, in The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age 
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included articles about specific pieces of technology, accompanied by details of suppliers. 
The Ecologist also adopted this highly successful model in Britain early in the 1970s when 
it set up a company called Low Impact Technology Ltd.  It was run by Peter Bunyard and 
Andrew McKillop and sold a range of goods similar to the Whole Earth Catalog, such as 
‘Cinva Rams’ for making building blocks from compressed earth, solar panels, and 200w 
Winco ‘Wind Generators’.103 The magazine used its regular alternative technology 
columns to develop the market for its products amongst its readership. The company also 
undertook some experimental work of its own, but it is uncertain whether this research 
ever produced any finished products, let alone any commercial success.104 
 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has set out some of the context within which the UK renewable energy 
programme was created during the early part of the 1970s. The survey of the role The 
Ecologist magazine and the emergence of the AT community in the UK shows that 
awareness of energy issues and activity in renewable energy development was growing 
after 1970 and this change predates the oil crisis. Driven initially by fears of industrial 
pollution and then by concerns over the finite nature of fossil fuels, the new environmental 
movement in Britain came to influence the public debate over energy. By actively 
promoting and demonstrating the potential of renewable energy sources and ambitiously 
pointing to an alternative approach to the organisation of society the new environmental 
movement created a new section of public opinion that the Government addressed through 
its renewable energy programmes after 1974.  Although the example of other countries 
(most notably the United States) in establishing similar programmes was also an important 
motivation here, it is arguable that these other programmes were also created by an 
awareness of growing support for the development of alternative energy sources as the 
work of Lee and Sine shows.105  
 
 An important conclusion of this thesis is that this initiative was largely conceived 
as a token gesture, designed to demonstrate that the government was actively addressing 
the new post-oil crisis energy situation. I have suggested that the emergence of a new 
environmental movement in the UK from 1970 had an important impact in creating the 
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conditions for the government’s renewable energy programme, and in explaining the 
perceived need for such a ‘token’. The growth in awareness and recognition of 
environmental issues, demonstrated by the creation of the Department of Environment in 
1970 and UK government’s active participation in the UNCHE at Stockholm in 1972 
compelled the government to consider the ‘alternative’ forms of energy after 1974. This 
led directly to the creation of the Energy Technology Support Unit (ETSU) at Harwell 
early in 1974, and the launch of the UK renewable energy programme to which this thesis 
will now turn. 
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Chapter 3 
‘Energy 1974, and after’1 
 
This chapter will develop the theme of a post-war energy techno-institutional complex in 
the UK by focussing on the institutions involved in the UK renewables programme after 
1974. In the few months after the oil crisis the institutional structure of UK energy policy 
underwent significant changes. Before 1974 the formulation of energy policy was 
coordinated by the DTI. The Minister responsible for energy matters was aided by a Chief 
Scientist and an advisory body, ACORD (Advisory Council on Research and Development 
for Fuel and Power). In practice however, as has been argued, the nationalised energy 
industries and the UKAEA were largely left to formulate their own individual policy 
without reference to any centrally devised plan. In the post-war energy markets, where 
energy prices were low and stocks appeared plentiful this was, to some degree, 
understandable.  
 
 After October 1973 this complacency was shaken by the oil crisis which signalled 
an urgent need to formulate a coherent energy policy for the UK. In addition to the 
challenges of the oil price shock, the continuing discoveries of North Sea oil and gas 
reserves in UK waters, the ongoing industrial relations problems in the coal industry, and 
the perennial debates on reactor choice focussed unprecedented political attention on 
energy policy from 1974. A new Department for Energy was established in January 1974 
by the beleaguered Heath Government as a knee-jerk reaction to the oil crisis, despite the 
strong resistance of the Secretary of State at the DTI, Peter Walker.2  Britain had a 
Ministry of Fuel and Power until the late 1960s when it was swallowed up briefly by the 
Ministry of Technology (Mintech), and then eventually by the new ‘super’ ministry, the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), in 1970. Now, as a result of the worldwide 
escalation in the price of oil, a dedicated Department of Energy had re-emerged; surgically 
removed from the DTI.3 
                                            
1 TNA, PREM 16/253, ‘Energy 1974, and after’, Central Policy Review Staff report, March 1974. 
2 TNA, PREM 15/2103, correspondence, Walker to Heath, 12 November 1973.   
3 Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR), ‘The Department of Energy 1974-
1992’, http://www.berr.gov.uk/about/about-
berr/history/outlines/The%20Department%20of%20Energy%201974%20-%201992/page24456.html 
[accessed 18 June 2008] In 1957, fuel was dropped and it became the Ministry of Power with added 
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 The chapter will chart the emergence of the broader renewable energy R&D 
programme after 1974 within this changed structure of UK energy policy-making, before 
moving on in subsequent chapters to consider the wave and wind energy programmes in 
more detail. In particular it will focus on three of the key institutions/organisations 
involved in creating and eventually sustaining that programme; these were the Central 
Policy Review Staff (CPRS), ACORD, and the Energy Technology Support Unit (ETSU). 
Both the CPRS and ACORD predate the oil crisis, but both played a crucial role at 
different stages of the renewables programme. In contrast, the establishment of ETSU in 
April 1974 was a direct result of the energy crisis and occupied the central role in 
managing the renewable energy programme throughout the period.  
 
 In addition, this chapter will also emphasise the importance of selected key actors 
within UK energy policy who occupied important roles within the above named 
organisations. Although a myriad of energy-related committees and advisory groups 
appeared after 1974 the central thrust of renewable energy policy was influenced, at least 
initially, by a relatively few high-level individuals. This chapter will emphasise the 
influence of two powerful individuals who arguably held sway over UK energy policy in 
the mid-1970s; Lord Rothschild, head of the CPRS, and the Chief Scientist at the DoEn, 
Walter Marshall.  
 
Lord Rothschild’s Think Tank 
As part of the package of changes introduced by the incoming Heath Government in 1970 
in the White Paper, Reorganisation of Central Government (1970), a Central Policy 
Review Staff (CPRS) - more widely known as the ‘Think Tank’ - had been established 
under Lord Victor Rothschild.4 The CPRS was the first unit of its kind, based at the heart 
of Government, and set up to advise on a wide range of national policy issues. Heath saw it 
as an antidote to the often factional and uncoordinated thinking that existed at the heart of 
government, and enjoyed privileged (though occasionally problematic) access to the Prime 
Minister and the various Ministerial departments. Heath had used a similar advisory group 
whilst in opposition in the 1960s and was convinced of its value to government. 
 
                                            
4 Blackstone. T., and Plowden, W.,  Inside the Think Tank: Advising the Cabinet 1971-1983 (London: 
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 Lord Rothschild was appointed to head the CPRS after retirement, aged 60, from 
his former post as Research Coordinator of the Royal Dutch Shell Group, where he gained 
a close familiarity with the energy business.5 He also brought the force of his personality to 
the role. Rothschild, although undoubtedly a member of the elite classes, was in many 
ways an unconventional figure at the centre of government. He had no experience as a civil 
servant (although he had been Chairman of the Agricultural Research Council from 1948-
58) and was largely unused to the ways of Whitehall. Undeniably also his personal wealth 
‘removed him from the servitude of security in presenting his opinions’, and in its earliest 
incarnation the CPRS, and its views, were clearly seen as Rothschild ‘writ large’.6   
 
  In early December Heath held an informal reception at No. 10 with the 
Cabinet and Rothschild to introduce Rothschild and the work of the CPRS; he explained to 
the assembled that its main function would be ‘to help Ministers to make better decisions 
about the allocation of resources.’7  And by late February Rothschild had provided Heath 
with a ‘Proposed Work Programme’ for the CPRS.8 He had spent two months visiting the 
various government departments and talking with the Secretaries of State and senior civil 
servants, to get a sense of what they regarded as their most important and immediate 
challenges.  His enquiries produced a list that was broken down into five headings; 
‘General’, ‘Long-term, relating to social and economic policy’, ‘Research and 
development - medium term’, ‘Specific studies’, and ‘CPRS - “watching briefs”’. The list 
included fifteen specific items ranging on a spectrum from ‘Concorde’ to ‘Some 
interdepartmental implications of social policy’ that reflected the free-ranging brief given 
to the CPRS. Until this point the establishment of the CPRS and its role in government was 
theoretical, and Ministers had in principle accepted the usefulness of such a body at the 
heart of government. They had perhaps even enjoyed the chance to discuss with Lord 
Rothschild the particular challenges that each of them felt that they faced.  However, this 
was the first opportunity for the Cabinet to see exactly what work the CPRS proposed to 
undertake. Sir Burke Trend commented to Heath that ‘this may be a rather painful process; 
and a few tears may be shed in the course of it’ as the government departments got used to 
having the CPRS so closely involved in policy-making.9   
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 In the report Rothschild described ‘Watching briefs’ as those ‘subjects which, 
while continuing to be dealt with primarily by the Departments concerned, would engage 
the attention of the CPRS, who would hold a “watching brief” in relation to these activities 
and would take an active part in the interdepartmental discussion of them’.10 Included in 
this list of five items was ‘United Kingdom Energy Policy’. The CPRS noted that the DTI 
was about to launch ‘a major review of energy policy’ and suggested that the CPRS would 
‘be in touch with this and will be discussing the scope of the study with the DTI’.11 By 
September 1971, in a report on Government strategy, the CPRS was forming an initial 
view of UK energy policy. In a trenchant paragraph it observed, 
 
Energy policy. We have spread our bets too widely in the development of 
nuclear energy and wasted money. Looking ahead, the dominance of the 
Middle East in proven oil reserves looks capable of imposing a stranglehold 
over traditional sources of Western European energy supply. This may be 
eased for the United Kingdom by exploitation of the Continental Shelf in the 
short-term and in the longer term by nuclear energy. There are high stakes 
attaching to getting our national energy policy right in this changing 
position. 12 
 
This short paragraph provides a useful and telling snapshot of UK energy policy at the 
outset of the 1970s. It also demonstrates that the CPRS had a remarkably good grasp of the 
state of UK energy issues at the time.  Two years prior to October 1973 the CPRS had in a 
sense predicted the oil crisis. It also made the observation that North Sea oil and gas would 
be a short-term solution that would only delay the requirement for a coordinated policy on 
energy. At this stage, though, and despite its problems, nuclear power was still seen as the 
only long-term solution.  
 
An Energy Policy for Britain 
In late May 1973 the first full-length CPRS report on energy policy, An Energy Policy for 
Britain, bound in the trademark red covers of the CPRS, was presented to the 
Government.13 The report had been prepared with the help of the economist Michael 
Posner, who had worked at the Ministry of Power during the 1960s.14  For the report the 
CPRS adapted a framework of ‘energy scenarios’ from work Rothschild had done at Shell, 
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which presented three possible futures based on oil prices projected to 1985.15 The report 
then went on to construct a ‘Regret Matrix’, which advanced a range of current (1973) 
energy decisions that would be ‘least regretted’ in 1985. The main recommendations of the 
report centred on the improvement of the coal industry through ‘exploratory drilling’, a 
close look at licensing and depletion policy in the North Sea, and the continued 
development of the nuclear power programme.16   
 
 The DTI had produced its own energy report at around the same time which took a 
more traditional approach and contained some areas of difference. These tended to be 
focussed on statistical assumptions and projections though, and the DTI indicated that it 
was ‘in full accord’ with the CPRS ‘on a wide range of fundamental energy issues’.17 
Despite this, the central contention of the CPRS report – that the price of imported oil 
would rise substantially over the following 10 years – was largely dismissed, and one DTI 
official found the CPRS case ‘unconvincing’.18 Overall, the report was met with the most 
fatal of political reactions from the Government; faint scepticism mixed with general 
disinterest. Ultimately however, the timing of the report, just months before the oil crisis, 
came eventually to increase the stature and credibility of Rothschild in energy matters. 
Although Rothschild’s team appeared remarkably prescient in predicting the oil crisis they 
had in fact only reflected other long-standing and well-publicised concerns over global oil 
supply, particularly in the United States, referred to in chapter 2.19 Notwithstanding this, 
the report sealed the reputation of the Think Tank for expertise on energy policy in the UK, 
and it came to occupy an influential position on energy at a crucial time. Indeed, 
Blackstone and Plowden argued that the CPRS came to fill a void in energy policy 
expertise and as a consequence it ‘dominated’ the new DoEn at least until the appointment 
of Tony Benn as Secretary of State for Energy in 1976, who had less respect for such a unit 
(and for Rothschild personally).20 
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 Therefore, following the oil crisis the Government naturally asked Rothschild’s 
CPRS for what had become known as ‘a view’ on the new energy situation. In January 
1974 it produced a long report titled Energy Conservation quickly followed in March by 
another, Energy 1974, And After, both of which suggested that a combination of coal, 
conservation and nuclear energy (which became known as CoCoNuke) should form the 
core of any future UK energy policy.21 The first report made recommendations in three 
areas; ‘Transport’, ‘Electricity Generation’, and ‘Energy in the Home and in Industry’. For 
transport the CPRS had six recommendations, and for the section on energy in the home 
and industry there were eight. The section on electricity generation contained a single, 
though bold, recommendation; ‘The first stage of a full technical and economic appraisal 
of harnessing wave power for electricity generation should be put in hand at once.’22 This 
immediately led the new DoEN to commission such a report from the government’s own 
National Engineering Laboratory (NEL) at East Kilbride, and by February 1975 it had 
produced a positive report on the prospects for wave energy (see chapter 4).23  
 
 Tired out by the strain of his role at the heart of British politics during a tumultuous 
1974, Lord Rothschild stepped down as head of the CPRS late that year, and was replaced 
by Sir Kenneth Berrill. During his four years at the helm of the Think Tank he had 
presented ‘views’ to the Cabinet on a wide range of key issues. Most of these were never 
published and remained as confidential advice to the Government. It is apparent though 
that his opinions on energy were influential in guiding the new Department of Energy in 
1974. Equally clear was his role, described below, in setting up the new Energy 
Technology Support Unit that would manage the Government’s R&D funding in the 
‘alternative sources of energy’.  Furthermore, his enthusiasm and powerful advocacy for 
wave power (inspired, as will be seen below, by Gordon Goodwin at the DTI) was 
instrumental in launching the wave energy programme that dominated the renewables 
programme until 1982. To a great extent, much of the shape and direction of UK 
Government-funded renewable energy R&D programme was due entirely to the early 
intervention of Lord Rothschild.   
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The Advisory Council on Research and Development in Fuel and Power (ACORD)  
Prior to 1974 energy technology had been dealt with by the Energy Technology division 
(ENT) at the DTI. In this case ‘energy technology’ was mainly related to the three 
nationalised energy industries - coal, gas, and electricity; nuclear power was outside the 
remit of the DTI, and therefore, the ENT division. It was a relatively small section within 
the DTI and particularly during the period of low oil prices during the 1960s its role was 
not central to wider government policy.24 The ENT division operated in close association 
with ACORD, which had been established in 1960 as a successor to the Ministry of Fuel 
and Power Scientific Advisory Council.25 Despite its creation ten years prior to the CPRS, 
arguably it was not until after the oil crisis that the Council began to enjoy some real 
influence on UK energy policy; particularly, as will be seen, in renewable energy.  
 
 ACORD’s first Chairman, following his retirement as Chairman of ICI, was Lord 
Fleck - succeeded in 1965 by the metallurgist, Sir Charles Sykes.26 The members of the 
Council (who were unpaid) were appointed by the Secretary of State and were drawn from 
a range of energy-related fields. This would always include the three nationalised energy 
industries (coal, gas, and electricity) and the other major nationalised industries such as the 
British Steel Corporation (BSC). The Council also had representatives from national 
research bodies such as the Science Research Council (SRC) and the UK Atomic Energy 
Authority (UKAEA) and often a member to represent the universities. In addition, the 
Secretary of State could (and often did) appoint independent experts to the Council. The 
original terms of reference for ACORD, which followed closely those of its predecessor, 
were as follows, 
1. To advise the Minister of Power on Research and Development in 
relation to his statutory duty of securing the effective and co-ordinated 
development of coal, petroleum, and other sources of fuel and power 
in Great Britain, and of promoting economy and efficiency in the 
supply, distribution, use and consumption of fuel and power, whether 
produced in Great Britain or not: 
                                            
24 TNA, AB 88/217, ‘Notes for the Record’, R. L. R. Nicholson, 12 February 1974. The Chief Scientist at the 
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2. To advise the Minister of new scientific and technical knowledge or 
applications of knowledge throughout the world, which in the opinion 
of the Council should be taken into account in the performance of his 
statutory duties: 
3. To keep the whole field of fuel and power under continuous review 
with the object of identifying problems needing research and 
development and advising the Minister of these problems with a view 
to discussion with the industries.27  
 
 
 Despite this rather wide-ranging remit, until 1974 the primary function of ACORD 
had been to scrutinise the annual R&D programmes of the three nationalised energy 
industries and report formally on these to the Secretary of State. This role was carried out 
mainly through regular quarterly meetings and occasional site visits. ACORD was seen by 
some as a ‘paper tiger’ and for merely serving as a ‘rubber-stamp’ for the activities of the 
nationalised industries, and the industries commented that their proposed R&D 
programmes generally passed through ACORD with ease.28 Walter Marshall later 
considered this task ‘as an inescapable but tedious chore to be got out the way with the 
minimum time and effort.’29 This criticism was not helped by the fact that far and away the 
largest R&D spending among the nationalised industries, by the UKAEA lay outside the 
remit of the Council. Sir Harry Melville30, who succeeded Sir Charles Sykes as chairman 
of ACORD in October 1970, recognised and understood this criticism, and during his 
period as chairman he made a concerted effort to revise the organisation and remit of 
ACORD.31  
 
 In 1973 Melville sent a short paper offering some suggestions for change to the 
Department, requesting a meeting with the Minister. In his proposals he expressed some 
frustration at the limits placed on ACORD. He stated that the core of ACORD’s duties, the 
‘detailed examination of the R&D programmes of the nationalised industries...is not really 
necessary’. Instead he suggested that ACORD should comment on the ‘strategy for R&D 
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to see whether it is well founded’. He commented rather acerbically that ACORD was ‘to 
some extent isolated from the discussions on energy problems that presumably occur in 
DTI’.32 Although his request for a meeting with the Minister was successful, the outcome 
was that little or no change was implemented at ACORD.33 Denness, an official at the 
DoEn who also acted as a member of the secretariat of ACORD, had commented that ‘it is 
probably fair to say that we are not entirely happy with all the suggested changes’.  
Discouragingly for Sir Harry, Denness went on to recommend that ‘the Minister merely 
notes what he has to say, leaving it open for officials to report to the Minister at a later 
stage if and when it is considered that there should be fundamental changes in ACORD’s 
modus operandi’.34 The unmistakable impression given is that until the changes brought 
about in the organisation of UK energy policy after 1974, ACORD was clearly regarded by 
the ENT division as a very minor functionary in UK energy technology and as little more 
than a tool of the DTI. 
 
The Energy Technology Support Unit (ETSU) 
At the beginning of April 1974 the Energy Technology Support Unit was officially 
established by the new Labour Secretary of State at the DoEn, Eric Varley. ETSU formed 
the management hub of the UK renewable energy programme. It did not undertake any 
R&D work itself, but was given the task of identifying suitable renewables R&D, 
implementing and managing specific programmes, and advising the Secretary of State at 
the DoEn.35  As the scale of the programme increased through the 1970s, ETSU created 
and coordinated several ‘steering committees’ that were concentrated on what were 
regarded as the ‘most promising’ renewable technologies of the period. These included the 
Wave Energy Steering Committee (WESC) created by ACORD in June 1975, and the 
Wind Energy Steering Committee (WISC) created in 1978.36 Although central to the 
technical development of the programme it is debatable whether ETSU had any significant 
impact on policy. Certainly the reports it provided to the DoEn could affect the choice of 
technology, but these were routinely scrutinised by ACORD before reaching the Secretary 
of State and the Council was given the important task of ‘advising’ the department on 
renewable energy policy (see below). Despite this, the impact of ETSU must be carefully 
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considered in accounting for the evolution of the programme within the government’s 
wider energy policy objectives.  
 
 ETSU was officially established in April 1974 at Harwell, which was home to the 
Atomic Energy Authority Research Establishment (AERE) and was one of the UK and 
Europe’s biggest centres of scientific research.37 The Attlee Government had established 
Harwell in 1945 as a ‘research and experimental establishment covering all aspects of the 
use of atomic energy’.38  However, for some years prior to 1974 it had been forced to 
diversify into what it termed ‘non-nuclear’ work in an attempt to secure its future amid the 
continuing uncertainties of the UK nuclear programme.39 In what was a unique move for a 
government-funded research laboratory, Harwell began to seek out ‘industrial partners’ 
which would pay for specific R&D programmes.40  Despite strong and wide-ranging 
opposition to the scheme (some from within Harwell itself) under the influence of its new 
and ambitious young director, Walter Marshall, the plan appeared to work and a range of 
non-nuclear research programmes were set-up.41 These included work in ceramics, non-
destructive testing, desalination, and carbon fibres. By 1974, Harwell’s annual income 
from outside of the Atomic Energy Vote amounted to £8m, which represented about 40 per 
cent of its budget.42  
 
 In May 1972, Keith Dawson, who was to become the first Director of ETSU 
produced an internal study which he titled, ‘Proposal For An Advanced Energy 
Technology Institute’.43  Dawson was a senior scientist in the Applied Chemistry Division, 
and his proposal can be seen as a clear example of the diversification strategy to help 
safeguard the ‘future’ of Harwell.44  The ‘needs’ which his proposal was based upon 
provide a further indication that an awareness of the shortcomings in energy policy were 
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becoming more widespread in the period. Furthermore, they also strongly reflect the 
growing influence of environmental issues at the time, mentioned in the previous chapter: 
 
(a) the need to formulate an overall U.K. energy policy which takes into 
account all the economic, sociological, environmental and political 
factors (this requires the provision and evaluation of advice particularly 
on the new technology that will be needed), 
(b) the need to control the use of energy sources for environmental 
reasons, 
(c) the need to conserve existing fuel reserves to prevent an energy 
famine in the early part of the 21st century, which is not further ahead 
than the time which has elapsed since the end of the Second World War, 
(d) the need to diversify the U.K. energy sources for political reasons. 
 
 The proposal, which anticipates much of the later structure of ETSU, 
unsurprisingly saw Harwell as the only possible location for such a unit in the UK. ‘No 
other laboratory in the U.K. could take such a wide view of the situation, or bring such a 
powerful interdisciplinary approach to the range of problems involved.’45 The work that 
Dawson considered that such an Institute should undertake betrayed an understandable 
personal bias towards new energy technology based on chemicals, such as fuel cells, 
advanced batteries, and synthetic fuels.  No specific mention is made at this early stage of 
the renewable energy technologies (in particular wave energy) that would later become the 
focus of much of ETSU’s early work. 
 
 A meeting was eventually held at Harwell in November 1972 to discuss Dawson’s 
proposal.46 There had been some suggestion that the Institute could be launched as an 
Applied Nuclear Programme, which appeared to be an attempt to lend the unit some 
credibility of continuity with Harwell’s main function.  However, at this meeting it was 
made clear that ‘the Directorate would not support the presentation of this proposal as an 
Applied Nuclear programme’.47 The Harwell Directorate seemed anxious that any new 
venture should be distanced from the ‘weak commercial strategy’ of current research in the 
Applied Nuclear field.  It was agreed at this meeting that approaches should be made to 
DTI and Department of Environment (DoE) ‘contacts’ before any formal proposals were 
drawn up; however, the meeting was also reminded by Dr Dell of the pressing need for 
new programmes of work at Harwell. 
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 By early 1973, as the CPRS was preparing the launch of its first energy paper, the 
reach of Lord Rothschild on energy matters had extended to include Harwell. Rothschild 
made a direct approach to Walter Marshall ‘to consider what part Harwell as a laboratory 
might play in the formulation of alternative strategies for energy supplies’.48 The request 
from such an influential figure at the heart of government appears to have encouraged 
Harwell and further studies of its potential role in energy technology were produced.49  A 
new 8 page study by Dawson contained a recasting of the ‘needs’ which closely reflect the 
influence of Rothschild’s views on oil imports, 
 
There is a need to reverse the rise in dependence (currently 45% of total 
energy demand) of the U. K. on imported oil as an energy source for 
several reasons: 
(a) on a timescale of say 10 years, various factors will almost certainly 
lead to substantial increases in the price of oil, giving rise to adverse 
effects on the balance of payments and leading to a ‘dear energy’ regime 
which could affect many aspects of industry, 
(b) oil production will begin to decline within about 30 years and the gap 
between supply and demand will then increase rapidly, and 
(c) there are obvious political advantages to be gained by reducing the 
substantial dependence of the U.K. (and indeed Europe) on the Middle 
East as the primary source of oil. 
 
 This new set of ‘needs’ contrasts with the earlier version of May 1972 in several 
ways: first, it is clear that it was written in language that would have a more direct appeal 
to government, and in particular the DTI; second, although the ‘new environmentalism’ 
tone of the first version has been excised, in its place is a clear acceptance in (b) of the 
‘Limits to Growth’ thesis of rapidly depleting oil reserves. Clearly, Harwell’s ‘contacts’ 
within the DTI had had an influence on the presentation of the case for a new unit. 
However, much of the other content remained similar to that which Dawson had outlined 
in 1972.  The research focus remained firmly centred on the development of synthetic fuels 
and advanced batteries. However, the report did include, for the first time, a brief 
discussion of ‘New energy sources’, which covered solar, wind, and tidal schemes. 
Ironically, these ‘novel approaches’ were however quickly dismissed by Dawson as 
‘impractical or uneconomic on close examination’.50 
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 Marshall forwarded Dawson’s new paper to Rothschild in June 1973 and Dawson 
met with him shortly after the CPRS energy report had been produced. Rothschild’s view 
was that the situation was probably more urgent than Dawson had suggested, and he 
thought that ‘oil production could decline in considerably less than the 30 years…quoted’.  
During the meeting Rothschild indicated that he supported the idea of ‘an assessment team 
on energy matters’ being based at Harwell. Indeed, he had evidently given the matter some 
thought as he proposed to Dawson that such a unit should comprise a budget of £250,000 
p.a. and a staff of 10.51 Following on from the recommendations of the CPRS report, 
Rothschild believed that ‘electric road vehicles’ were a key element of any future energy 
R&D, and he emphasised this to Dawson.52  
 
 Clearly, by mid-1973 the establishment of an energy technology unit at Harwell 
had moved a significant step closer to reality, particularly with the recruitment of 
Rothschild to the Harwell cause.  There appeared to be a growing realisation of the 
uncertainty in future energy supplies, and due mainly to the efforts of Rothschild, this 
recognition was beginning to spread to Government.  Some evidence of this recognition is 
to be found in the report produced at the DTI in August 1973 into ‘new energy forms and 
applications’. The report was produced in response to the ‘possible need for the 
Department to adopt “a more positive stance” vis-à-vis the initiating and financing of 
research into new energy forms and applications’.53  There are clear links to the CPRS in 
the report as the author adopts the CPRS’s ‘SCARCE’ energy scenario as his framework.  
The 10 page report sets out to provide a brief summary of the state of R&D into ‘New 
Sources of Primary Energy’ both in the UK and worldwide, but remains largely fixated on 
coal and nuclear technologies. A short paragraph on solar, wind, and geothermal energy 
reaches similar conclusions to Dawson that these are ‘economically highly unattractive’.  
This is followed by another short paragraph on wave and tidal schemes which reaches 
similar conclusions, ‘Justification…would fall to be judged from the standpoint of an 
insurance option against the possibility of a nuclear mishap of such magnitude as to 
jeopardise acceptability of nuclear techniques for power generation’. The concept of an 
‘insurance option’ would reappear repeatedly throughout the UK renewable energy 
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programme  (see chapter 4).  The report concludes with the judgement that even ‘against a 
background of the CPRS “Scarce” scenario…the prospects are not such as to justify the 
mounting of new R&D activities’.54  
 
  Leonard Williams was a Deputy Secretary at the DTI with a special interest in 
energy matters, and he transferred over to the new DoEn in January 1974.  Whilst at the 
DTI, Williams had arranged a meeting with Keith Dawson to discuss his proposal for an 
energy technology institute at Harwell. The claim by Rothschild to Marshall that he had 
‘suggested the matter be discussed in a high place’ seems to have borne fruit for Harwell.55  
The meeting, on 6 December 1973, took place at the offices of the DTI in London. It was 
made clear at this meeting, by the official from the DTI, that Dawson’s proposals had 
‘fallen on fertile ground’ and the establishment of an ‘Advanced Energy Technology 
Centre’ was ‘introduced tentatively’.56 Five days later, Leonard Williams, visited F. J. 
Doggett, the Deputy Chairman of the UKAEA, to report that the DTI wanted to make use 
of ‘a team at Harwell (building up to 20-30 strong)’ to establish an energy ‘think tank’.57  
In a subsequent letter to Doggett from Williams there is some evidence that the impetus to 
establish the unit quickly stemmed from Government pressure to make positive statements 
on energy policy, as he suggests that it would ‘be of great advantage if we could make an 
early announcement of these new arrangements’.58 Walter Marshall wrote to Lord 
Rothschild to inform him of this approach and to thank him ‘for whatever part you have 
taken behind the scenes in bringing this about’, and rather fawningly assuring him that 
‘Harwell shall try and do a good job for you’.59  
 
 At the beginning of January 1974 a series of meetings were held involving the DTI 
(after 12th January the DoEn) and selected figures from Harwell. Now that an energy 
technology unit at Harwell had been agreed in principle, it was left to sort out the structure, 
and budget of the new unit. Williams negotiated with the Treasury staffing levels of 12-20, 
and for a likely budget of £300,000, but added that the new unit would cost £15,000 in 
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1973/4 and £200,000 in 1974/5. 60 Perhaps significantly, this was not far away from 
Rothschild’s earlier estimates. However, a clear public statement of the aims and 
guidelines of the new unit would also be required. Despite some misgivings about the 
control that the DTI would exert over the work programme at Harwell,61 Doggett wrote 
officially to Williams in early January welcoming the DTI proposals and agreeing that the 
unit should be established quickly.62 Marshall attended an initial meeting at the DTI with 
Williams on 8th January before flying to India on business for a few weeks. After this it 
was left to Roberts, Marshall’s deputy, and Keith Dawson, to sort out the details of the 
new arrangement. Progress was made at meetings held throughout January, and possibly as 
a further sign of the government’s anxiety to show evidence of action on energy some 
hints about the creation of the new unit were leaked to the press.  A short article, ‘Harwell 
may do coal and gas research’ appeared in the Daily Telegraph on 10 January.63  However, 
despite the wishes of the DTI to make a quick announcement, political events temporarily 
stalled the creation of ETSU. From mid-January rumours that Heath was going to call an 
early election abounded, and finally on 7 February the announcement was made that an 
election would be held on 28 February.64 Dawson, and ETSU, would have to wait a little 
longer.  
 
 Soon after the general election, as the new Labour government under Harold 
Wilson somewhat unexpectedly regained power, the creation of ETSU was back on the 
table at the DoEn.  The new Minister, Eric Varley (sponsored as an MP by the NUM) was 
at the helm.  The January meetings had hammered out most of the key issues surrounding 
the role of ETSU, and once the agreement of Varley had been obtained, the process of 
establishing the unit began.  In April the staffing levels and budget for ETSU were set, and 
the DoEn made the official announcement of the unit on 9 April.  For the remainder of 
1973/4 the budget was fixed at £15,000, and for 1974/5 it was agreed at £200,000. 
Dawson, as head of the unit was given the authority to allocate only 10 per cent of the 
budget without first consulting the Management Committee, which was chaired by 
Leonard Williams.65  It was also agreed that initially the unit should comprise around a 
dozen people, perhaps building in the future to twenty or so.  Naturally, Dawson was given 
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the job as head of ETSU, and he and L. E. J. Roberts (Deputy Director, AERE) were the 
Harwell representatives on the Management Committee.  
 
 The role that Dawson had envisaged for an ‘Advanced Energy Technology 
Institute’ in May 1972 had altered somewhat over the two years leading to the creation of 
ETSU.  His original focus on fuel cells, advanced batteries, and synthetic fuels, and his 
total rejection of renewables were substituted by a rather different set of initial DoEn 
priorities for the unit. 
 
‘(a) to assess and report on the applicability of wind and geothermal 
energy systems in the UK; 
(b) to assess and report on the methods of utilisation of solar energy as an 
energy source in the UK; 
(c)  to assess and report on the hydrogen economy and its competitive 
position with respect to SNG and methanol; 
(d) to maintain liaison with – and assess as required  - R & D work on 
waste heat and nuclear process heat applications; 
(e) to put in hand a study of energy utilisation in the industrial sector and 
advise on the investigational work and assessment work that would be 
required in order to arrive at a realistic appreciation of the scope for 
energy savings through changes in industrial practices; 
(f) to assist, at the request of the Department, in assessing proposals from 
outside sources for Government support of R & D projects.’66 
 
 The first two items on the list, in particular, make clear the DoEn’s objectives for 
ETSU, as Dawson’s original research focus was largely swept aside. Investigations into the 
potential of wind, geothermal and solar energy sources were to form the initial work of the 
unit.  Much of this is explained by the sensitivity within the DoEn over the rivalry that 
existed between the nationalised energy industries, and in particular, their own R&D 
programmes.  During the discussions which established ETSU consideration was given to 
the likely response of the coal, gas, and electricity industries to what might be seen as a 
duplication of existing research efforts: this would have an obvious potential impact on the 
R&D budgets of the nationalised energy industries. ‘The need for care’ was emphasised, 
so that the work of the unit should not ‘cut across the direct responsibility of the 
nationalised industries to mount...R&D programmes’.67 This anxiety gives some insight 
into the powerful position occupied by the nationalised energy industries. Moreover, the 
government was already spending vast amounts on energy-related R&D and the Treasury 
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was not keen on further spending within similar research fields (see Table 3.1).68 This led 
the DoEn to emphasise the difference between the work of ETSU and that which was 
already underway – or that which could be considered to form part of an existing research 
programme.  In addition to this the budget agreed for ETSU was relatively small when 
compared to other energy R&D in the UK. Much less consideration was given to the likely 
reaction of ACORD, and this is discussed in detail below. Dawson had envisaged a unit 
that would eventually take on practical research programmes within the organisation, but it 
was clear that at the levels of funding and manpower agreed by DoEn, that ETSU would 
remain largely an advisory body for the new Department.  
 
Table 3.1 
Department of Energy (DoEn) Research Expenditure, (1972-73) 
Electricity Council (incl. CEGB) £19,800,000 
UK Atomic Energy Authority £64,000,000 
Gas Corporation £8,964,000 
National Coal Board £4,800,000 
British Nuclear Fuels (incl. centrifuge) £4,000,000 
Safety in Mines Research Establishment £1,301,000 
South of Scotland Electricity Board £808,364 
North of Scotland Electricity Board £119,449 
Total £103,792,813 
 
Source: D. Fishlock, ‘Practical avenues for energy research’, Financial Times, 6 February 1974 
 
 
‘Harwell?’ 69 
Despite the location of ETSU at the heart of the UKAEA’s research establishment the 
choice attracted little comment at the time, other than by some members of ACORD which 
will be discussed below.70 This is perhaps partially explained by low expectations for 
alternative sources of energy and the limited interest in the programme at the time. 
However, as the programme began to falter in the early 1980s, particularly after the closure 
of the Wave Energy Programme, increasing speculation was directed at the independence 
of Harwell in controlling R&D into renewable energy (see chapter 4). The account above 
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of the establishment of ETSU shows that Harwell scientists always regarded it as the most 
suitable location for energy R&D and this was agreed at the time by New Scientist which 
pointed to the absence of any alternatives. It stated that the universities had ‘no obvious 
candidate’ to compete with Harwell, and moreover their ‘independence’ could also be 
brought into question.71 It was only following the protests surrounding the controversial 
closure of the Wave Energy Programme in 1982 discussed at length in chapter 4, that the 
role of ETSU at Harwell became more of an issue. Speaking in a day-long House of 
Commons debate on renewable energy in 1985, Alex Eadie, who had been Under-
Secretary of State at the DoEn during the 1970s said, 
 
The claim is that the wave energy activity at Harwell is independent. Perhaps 
the Minister will reply to that question. There is a feeling abroad that it is all 
wrong, that nuclear and wave research should be done together but that 
objectivity is being blocked. That might be a gross slander but that feeling is 
abroad in the industry. 72  
 
 This mood of suspicion was echoed in the same debate by Malcolm Bruce, who 
stated more directly ‘the suspicion cannot be avoided that Harwell has an interest 
ultimately in ensuring the continuation of nuclear-related research. It therefore does not 
appear to have the same commitment to securing the viability of alternatives’.73 In addition 
to the critical questioning of the role of Harwell in parliament, the wave energy community 
was also sceptical. Wave pioneer, Stephen Salter, was understandably frustrated by the 
closure of the programme and in evidence to a House of Lords inquiry into alternative 
energy in 1988 he wrote that ETSU had ‘uncomfortably close links with nuclear 
technology’.74 He was more outspoken that same year when he wrote in Environment Now 
that ‘The control of renewable energy must be taken away from the UKAEA. The UKAEA 
are not only ETSU’s landlord, but are also its paymaster’.75 
 
 Although the focus of criticism centred on Harwell as the location for the 
management structure of the government’s renewables programme, it is clear that the real 
question (addressed by Salter) was about the potentially negative influence of the UKAEA 
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on the programme. However, defenders of ETSU and Harwell pointed to two mitigating 
factors. First, ETSU did not carry out any R&D at Harwell itself. The programme was 
coordinated and managed by Harwell staff, and even the sternest critics such as Salter 
conceded that ETSU staff generally acted in the best interests of the programme.76 This 
was a view echoed later by Elliott in his extensive work on the UK renewable energy 
programme.77 Second, as discussed in detail above, the AERE at Harwell had for some 
time depended on non-nuclear work for its survival. And indeed the evidence above 
suggests that it was probably the intervention of Lord Rothschild that ensured that the new 
unit went to Harwell. This suggested that it would be in the interests of Harwell to 
maintain and increase the volume of work on renewable energy rather than see it ended. I 
would argue that the debate that emerged surrounding the choice of Harwell highlights the 
misunderstanding that arose during the period over the closure of the wave energy 
programme in particular. It suggests a UKAEA conspiracy to sink the wave programme 
just as it was showing economic and technical viability. This misses the point. The 
UKAEA was only one part, though a powerful part, of the much wider techno-institutional 
complex which acted as a perpetual barrier to renewable energy. 
 
ACORD and ETSU 
During the negotiations between Harwell and the DTI to create ETSU, as noted above, 
some consideration was given to the nationalised industries, and their possible reaction to 
the implications of the creation of a new government energy R&D unit.78 However, it 
appears that no such thought was given to the reaction of ACORD and the council learnt 
officially about the creation of ETSU from officials of the new DoEn at a council meeting 
on the 12 February 1974. E. C. Williams, who had been appointed Chief Scientist at the 
DoEn attended the meeting and was invited by Sir Harry Melville to outline the changes at 
the new Department of Energy. Williams explained that the new department was similar to 
the old Ministry of Power (familiar to many of the long-standing ACORD members) but 
with the important addition of responsibility for nuclear power. The Energy Technology 
division (ENT) would remain under the supervision of Len Leighton, who would in turn 
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report to Williams on ‘professional matters’ (Williams did not elaborate on what this might 
actually mean) and to another senior official, Peter Le Cheminant, on administration and 
energy policy. Despite the inclusion of nuclear energy within the ambit of the new DoEn, 
Williams explained carefully that he saw the ‘task of ENT division, in conjunction with the 
Council, as reviewing the whole energy technology field, excluding the UKAEA’s nuclear 
programme’. 79 
 
 Williams, joined by Leighton who was also in attendance at the meeting, then 
immediately announced the creation of ETSU, which he presented as ‘a simple extension’ 
of the ENT division.80  He explained that, 
 
...the changed situation on oil price and availability called for a fresh 
assessment of technological options in the energy field to determine whether 
or not the Government should re-enter directly the R&D field from which it 
withdrew some ten years ago when supplies of conventional primary energy 
were in surplus at low prices. 81 
 
Williams went on to say that the decision had been taken to ‘tap the capability at Harwell’ 
rather than extend the manpower of the ENT division to carry out this function on the basis 
of expediency; describing Harwell as ‘the UKAEA’s centre for non-nuclear R&D’.  Len 
Leighton backed Williams up by stressing the ‘need for such a unit’ and ‘the need to have 
more people looking at what Government should be doing on research on long-range 
problems’. He added, perhaps in an attempt to close off any final criticism, that Treasury 
approval had been received.82 
 
 For ACORD the announcement was a stark reflection of the limited role that it 
represented in advising the Secretary of State on matters concerning energy R&D in the 
UK. Sir Harry Melville was ‘incensed’ by the announcement, and the representatives of the 
nationalised industries were similarly perturbed by the news. Clearly, the members of 
ACORD saw this as a further weakening of their perceived position within energy policy 
in the UK. Grainger, the NCB representative, complained that the ‘comparatively narrow 
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experience of Harwell staff made them unsuitable for such wide-ranging assessments’.  He 
suggested instead that the ENT division should be expanded to fulfill this role. Professor 
Beer, an independent member of ACORD, accepted the creation of ETSU ‘on the grounds 
of expediency’, but he also alluded to Harwell’s role in suggesting that he would have 
preferred ‘a completely independent and objective body’ to be appointed. Indeed, the focus 
of criticism was not specifically about the creation of the unit per se, but on the choice of 
Harwell as its centre. Nicholson, who was attending the meeting on behalf of the UKAEA 
later summarised the objections, 
 
The Gas Council, Electricity Council, CEGB and the National Coal Board 
all had objections which fell into the following categories: - 
(a)  they are not being consulted; 
(b) AEA people at Harwell were not necessarily competent outside the 
nuclear field; 
(c) they would be biased. 83 
 
 In his notes of the meeting, Nicholson went on to write that he ‘challenged the 
members on their assumptions of ignorance and bias’ and pointed out that Harwell had 
undertaken R&D contract work for all of the nationalised energy industries in recent years.  
 
 In the correspondence surrounding the creation of ETSU there is no consideration 
of a role for ACORD in the alternative energy programme and the reaction of the council 
took Williams and Leighton completely by surprise. Leighton conceded to Nicholson after 
the meeting that the matter had ‘not been handled right both in terms of timing and the 
content of the letter’ (which had been sent to the nationalised industries prior to the 
meeting).84 Despite being forced to accept that there was little they could do to prevent the 
establishment of ETSU at Harwell, the members of ACORD did wring what would prove 
to be a crucial concession from Williams at the meeting. Nicholson recorded, 
 
The Department of Energy agreed to these strings, namely:- 
(1) that the Unit’s work would be reported to ACORD 
(2) that the Unit was a measure of expediency and that before it was used as 
a basis for building up a permanent energy policy unit, the whole matter 
would be further discussed at ACORD, among other places. (Mr. 
Leighton has said that the contract was for one year). 
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 Although the second point was largely disingenuous and could be understood 
largely as an apology to ACORD, the first of these ad hoc ‘strings’ had the effect of 
maneuvering the Council into a powerful position between ETSU and the DoEn.  After not 
being mentioned at all in the initial establishment of ETSU, ACORD would become the 
body which assessed and co-ordinated the work of the Unit. Eventually this would lead 
ACORD to become central to the controversial decision to close down the Wave Energy 
Programme in 1982 (chapter 4).  Integral to the increased profile of ACORD after 1974 
was the role of Walter Marshall, the aforementioned director of Harwell, and his towering, 
though brief, impact on the formation of the UK renewable energy programme.  
 
‘Marshall the energy’85 
Soon after the creation of the Department of Energy in 1974 Sir Harry Melville was 
replaced as chairman of ACORD by the rising star of the UK energy scene, Dr. Walter 
Marshall,86 and in the three years until he stood down as Chief Scientist in 1977 he 
dominated the UK energy scene.87  Marshall was respected both as a scientist and a science 
administrator. He was a brilliant physicist (elected to the Royal Society in his thirties) who 
began his career with the UKAEA at Harwell in 1954. There he rose very quickly through 
the management ranks becoming deputy director in 1966 and then, two years later (at the 
age of thirty-six), its Director. By the age of forty Marshall had been appointed to the 
board of the UKAEA.88 During the summer of 1974 Marshall accepted the offer from the 
Secretary of State to take up the post of Chief Scientist at the new ‘science-starved’ DoEn, 
on the condition that he could retain his role as Director at Harwell.89 Thus, one of the 
leading figures in the UK nuclear industry became the Government’s top scientific adviser 
(albeit on a part-time, unpaid basis) on energy policy.  In addition, Marshall insisted that as 
part of his new role at the DoEn he himself should assume the chairman’s role on both the 
new Offshore Energy Technology Board (OETB) and, as mentioned, ACORD.90 As Chart 
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1 shows this placed Marshall in a uniquely powerful position to influence the future 
direction of UK energy policy.  
 
Chart 3.1      
Advisory structure 1974-77 - Department of Energy and Walter Marshall 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Although Marshall was clearly a ‘nuclear man’, as explained above, the 
consideration of the UKAEA’s R&D fell (and would continue to fall) outwith the remit of 
ACORD. The UKAEA formed the DoEn’s largest sector of energy R&D - in terms of 
scale and investment - and accordingly, Sir John Hill the Chairman of the UKAEA, also 
enjoyed a close advisory relationship with the Secretary of State. In the past this had 
served to weaken ACORD’s influence on wider energy policy, but clearly Marshall 
occupied a unique position, not only as the DoEn’s Chief Scientist, but also as the UKAEA 
board member for research.  As such his influence briefly spread to every corner of UK 
energy policy. Writing in Nature in 1975, David Fishlock observed that Marshall and Sir 
John Hill had ‘...devised the kind of formula that can work only between two people in 
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closest rapport, to avoid mutual interference within each other’s parish in advising the 
Secretary of State for Energy.’91  This may indeed have been the case, but arguably the 
source of many of Hill’s views on nuclear R&D could be traced back the UKAEA’s board 
member for research.  
 
 The potential for conflict of interest was ultimately to cost Marshall his role as 
Chief Scientist in June 1977 as the Secretary of State for Energy, Tony Benn, grew 
increasingly sceptical about nuclear energy and particularly the role of the UKAEA.92 
Ironically, Benn had himself promoted Marshall to the post of Deputy Chairman of the 
UKAEA in 1975, despite Marshall’s own uncertainties of perceived conflict of interest, 
thus further increasing the nuclear profile of the DoEn’s Chief Scientist.93 During 1974, 
when Marshall was first appointed, public interest in the nuclear power programme was 
just beginning to emerge when, as Williams described, the debate shifted from ‘private to 
public’.94 Also in the same period, following the publication of the influential Flowers 
Report in 1976, many key individuals such as Lord Rothschild began to reconsider the 
wisdom of relying so overwhelmingly on nuclear energy for the future.95  Clearly, by 1977 
with the Windscale Inquiry looming, Marshall’s position was becoming increasingly 
untenable and he ‘stepped down’ from his role as Chief Scientist. Subsequently, he went 
on to become Chairman of the UKAEA in 1981, before being knighted in 1982 and 
moving on to become the CEGB Chairman the same year. In a comment perhaps designed 
to highlight Marshall’s predilections, Benn praised his contribution and the ‘high regard in 
which I hold Dr. Walter Marshall’ before emphasising ‘the role which he can and must 
play in the decisions which must be reached in the nuclear industry within the AEA’.96   
 
 The role of Walter Marshall in the formative years of the UK renewable energy 
programme serves as a useful example for the larger theme of this thesis: that of the UK 
energy TIC dominating and constraining renewable energy development. In 1977, after 
carefully pointing to Marshall’s pro-nuclear views, Benn went on to praise the work that he 
had done in advancing ‘the potential of alternative sources of energy’, and it is clear that 
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Marshall was crucial in pushing forward the early programme.97 The archives show that 
Marshall’s views on the potential of renewable energy were no more pessimistic than any 
of those involved in policy making at the time. Indeed, he was responsible for launching 
the Wave Energy Programme in 1975 and through his dual roles he recommended several 
increases in renewables funding. There is certainly no evidence of Marshall conspiring to 
end the renewables R&D programme. There are two straightforward explanations for this, 
of course. First, Marshall was director of Harwell and had been responsible for its 
‘survival’ diversification programme from the 1960s onwards. Not only did ETSU attract 
funding to Harwell, but it also served to raise the profile of the establishment as the UK’s 
centre for energy R&D. Second, Marshall was first and foremost a scientist, and he was 
interested in maintaining and promoting funding for scientific R&D in the UK. I would 
argue though that overlaying both of these explanations, there is a strong sense for 
Marshall of the unassailable dominance of the existing structure of energy supply in the 
UK, and in particular the UKAEA.  
 
Conclusions 
This thesis sets out to develop an argument that Government-funded renewable energy 
development in the UK during the period 1974-88 was dominated and constrained by an 
energy TIC. This chapter has shown how the institutional structure of the renewables 
programme was established within the TIC and controlled by interests close to the 
traditional energy industries, particularly the UKAEA. Despite the attraction of the simpler 
explanations for such domination, such as the roles of Harwell and Walter Marshall in the 
period, it has attempted to address the question of influence based on the actual evidence 
that this thesis has examined. This shows quite clearly that, despite earlier pessimism about 
the prospects for renewable energy, ETSU acted to evaluate the R&D efforts of the various 
programmes in a largely fair and balanced manner. A complex network of independent 
consultants was contracted to provide ETSU with progress reports on all aspects of the 
work of the device teams. As stated above, even the most outspoken critics of the overall 
programme regarded ETSU as, at least, scientifically rigorous. This would suggest that any 
outstanding breakthroughs achieved in renewable energy development in the period would 
have been favourably supported at Harwell. It also shows, as argued above, that Walter 
Marshall supported the initiative to explore all new forms of energy and this included 
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renewable sources. Clearly, there was science-based support for renewable energy R&D in 
the UK.  
 
 The evidence therefore appears to challenge the view that renewable energy was 
explicitly sabotaged by the energy TIC at the level of the programme itself. What remains 
is a view which posits that other factors acted to constrain the successful development of 
renewable sources in the UK. At one level these are factors of scale and scope and would 
include the level of funding that was awarded and the targets that were set. The following 
chapter will demonstrate that there is strong evidence to support the argument that these 
factors were crucial in limiting the effectiveness of the programme. These elements of the 
programme were more closely influenced by ACORD, and by the attitude of the DoEn and 
the Government towards energy policy. This thesis argues that it was this wider, macro-
level influence on the renewables programme that limited its success. 
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Chapter 4 
 The UK Wave Energy Programme, 1975-82 
 
‘The first stage of a full technical and economic appraisal of harnessing wave power for 
electricity generation should be put in hand at once’ 1 
 
This brief recommendation by Lord Rothschild’s Central Policy Review Staff 
(CPRS), and contained in its ‘Energy Conservation’ report to the government in the depths 
of the oil crisis in January 1974, set the pattern of renewable energy R&D in the UK until 
the early 1980s. The report set out to consider the possible solutions to Britain’s energy 
crisis, and as a part of that exercise, it had considered the contribution of ‘inexhaustible’ 
sources of energy, which included hydro-electric schemes, tidal power, wave power, solar 
energy, and nuclear fusion. Although paying some attention to each of these different 
energy sources in the appendix section of the 75-page report, the three pages that 
summarised the report’s recommendations contained only the brief statement above under 
the heading ‘Electricity Generation’. Reflecting the influence that the CPRS enjoyed in 
government circles (discussed in chapter 3), particularly during the early 1970s, this 
statement was repeated continually over the next few years as the justification for 
unprecedented levels of government spending on R&D on renewable energy, and in 
particular on wave power.  
 
 The UK renewable energy programme was focussed on wave energy throughout 
the 1970s.  Inspired by the early work of Gordon Goodwin at the Department of Industry 
(later of the DoEn) and the recommendation of Lord Rothschild's Think Tank, wave power 
was judged to offer the best prospects of all of the renewable sources of energy for the 
country. Serendipity played its part too, as the groundbreaking discoveries of Stephen 
Salter coincided with the urgent new interest in alternative sources of power. Wave energy 
quickly gathered supporters, in ETSU, ACORD, and the DoEn, who proved to be powerful 
allies for its development. Two of the DoEn’s Chief Scientists, Walter Marshall and Sir 
Herman Bondi, did much to advance the cause of wave energy and their influence 
extended to ACORD and the DoEn. Within the ENT division at the DoEn, Don Gore (the 
head of the unit) and Gordon Goodwin worked tirelessly to establish a wave energy 
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programme and senior figures at Harwell such as Freddie Clarke and more notably, Clive 
Grove-Palmer, became firm advocates for wave power. It appeared that wave energy was 
unassailable - and this chapter will present strong evidence to show the damage that this 
view was to have on wave energy development in the UK.  
 
 The cracks began to appear at the Heathrow Wave Energy Conference in 1978. 
High relative costs and technical challenges - perfectly understandable for such a new 
technology - began to weaken official support for wave energy. ACORD began to look 
more closely at wave energy, and at alternative sources of renewable energy development, 
particularly wind. Wind power was a mature technology in comparison to waves, the 
technical challenges less daunting and therefore the costs easier to estimate. The years 
following Heathrow proved difficult for the Wave Energy Programme (WEP). Despite 
massive improvements in the technology and concomitant reductions in cost, the failure to 
settle on a single device proved fatal for wave energy. The new Government after 1979 
had little patience for a long-term publicly funded R&D programme such as wave power 
required. It demanded results, something concrete that could be plugged in to the National 
Grid and produce electricity at something close to the cost of the conventional sources. The 
decisions of the March 1982 meeting of ACORD to close the wave programme reflected 
this change. 
 
 The UK WEP illustrates some of the key aspects in the evolution of Government-
funded renewables R&D in the UK. Before the ascendancy of wind energy in the early 
1980s, wave power appeared to offer the best prospects as an ‘alternative source of energy’ 
and quickly became what a later Select Committee would describe as the DoEn’s 
‘favourite horse’ during the 1970s. The programme therefore attracted much of the funding 
for renewable energy R&D and nearly all of the political and media attention during the 
1970s. It began amid the (almost) heady optimism of the mid-1970s programme and 
effectively ended in the harsher fiscal spotlight of the Thatcher government. Along the 
way, the unfolding story of the WEP highlights many of the challenges that all renewable 
energy technologies faced during this period. I will show that these challenges were 
created through an understanding of energy that was dominated by the traditional 
industries and seen within the problem frame of UK energy policy at that time. The 
principal theme of this view was the persistence of the traditional understanding of energy 
created by a belief in the history of great energy transitions: animal to coal, coal to oil, and 
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oil to nuclear. This was despite the fact that closer examination of history would have 
revealed that from the time of the first Industrial Revolution Britain had been a mixed-fuel 
economy. Despite this, throughout the period and beyond, policymakers always considered 
renewable energy sources in terms of their potential to replace an existing fuel source, be it 
oil, coal or nuclear energy. Renewable energy (in this case wave power) was therefore 
routinely understood and described as an ‘insurance technology’, an illuminating 
description which neatly summarises the overwhelming attitude to its anticipated potential. 
The widespread use of the term was clarified at length by ETSU in 1979 and is worth 
quoting in its entirety. 
 
The concept of insurance is important. Even if a country plans to achieve a 
particular pattern of energy supply and use, it might for a number of reasons 
find itself having to adopt some different pattern. Current assessments of 
future likely events and technical progress could be profoundly mistaken. 
There might be unexpectedly high world energy prices or restrictions on 
trade, including sudden embargoes, or restrictions on the use of certain energy 
sources. For example, nuclear power might be limited for environmental or 
social reasons, or concern about the effects of increasing levels of carbon 
dioxide in the world’s atmosphere could lead to limits being set on fossil fuel 
combustion well within a 50 year time horizon.  
 Different technologies can provide a hedge against different risks. A robust 
RD&D strategy must ensure that technologies that might need to be used as 
an insurance are brought to an appropriate stage of development, so that if 
required they can play their insurance role. To be important as an insurance a 
technology does not have to be cost competitive with those which it might 
have to compete in normal circumstances. Wave energy, for example, may 
never be competitive against nuclear power; but if for any reason nuclear 
power were not able to be used, wave energy could be an important 
alternative.2 
 
 As well as an interesting early reference to climate change and carbon limits, the 
quote above highlights the clear fact that nuclear power was the priority of UK energy 
policy throughout this period. This is well-established and unsurprising. Much less well 
understood, and more pertinent to my central thesis is the understanding of energy that 
underlies this policy priority: that energy policy could and should be based on a limited 
mix of fuels. Another key issue that the above statement highlights, and which was to 
become central to the debates over wave energy, was the concept of ‘an appropriate stage 
of development’.  After the initial enthusiasm for wave energy had subsided, particularly 
following the Heathrow Conference in 1978, the question of development became the 
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centre of debate in the WEP.  On one hand the wave energy device teams (and the WESC) 
were keen to develop the scale of the programme towards working wave energy devices by 
the mid-1980s, whereas the DoEn and ACORD were daunted by the inevitably huge costs 
of such an undertaking. As we shall see, by 1982 the government judged controversially 
that wave energy had reached a stage in its development that was ‘appropriate’ within the 
UK’s wider energy policy.  
 
 This was the background against which renewable energy was developed during the 
1970s. The WEP began as a serious attempt to examine the long-term potential of wave 
energy in the UK, but I will show that it was undermined by constantly shifting 
expectations which only accelerated after the election of the Conservative Government in 
1979. Rather than fully endorsing the view that the WEP was the victim of a nuclear-
inspired conspiracy in the early 1980s, I will argue for a more subtle explanation. My 
research shows that the wave energy community misunderstood the weight and 
pervasiveness of the government’s energy problem frame during the 1970s. The 
widespread publicity that the programme attracted, and the enthusiastic endorsement of 
many key figures within the energy policy community, led the supporters of wave energy 
to believe that it occupied a key position in the UK’s energy future. This was mistaken. 
Rather, all of the evidence points to the fact that wave energy was never seen as anything 
more than ‘insurance’ by the government. The early programme set out ‘to examine the 
potential of wave energy devices’ and by the early 1980s, in the view of the government, 
the WEP had largely fulfilled these initial goals. By general agreement the next stage of 
the WEP, demonstration in the open seas, required much more significant sums, and this 
was an investment that the Conservative government was simply not prepared to make for 
a rather uncertain insurance policy.  
 
The wave resource 
The UK - mainly in Scotland - has the best wave energy resources in Europe, and among 
the best in the world. However, the actual figures attributed to the potential of the resource 
varied during the course of the WEP, primarily to suit the argument - for or against wave 
energy - being advanced at the time.  However, by the mid-1980s it was assumed that 
offshore wave energy could provide in the order of 50 - 66 TWh per year of electricity, or 
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approximately 20 Mtce.3 At the time this represented roughly twenty-five percent of total 
electricity consumption in the UK, which in 1980 stood at 241 TWh.4  In contrast, the 
suggested total potential for wind energy in the UK increased greatly through the period, 
beginning early in 1973 with estimates in the region of 4 TWh, when wave was initially 
estimated at a staggering 900 TWh.5 By the mid-1980s developments in wind energy had 
raised these estimates to a figure much closer to that estimated for wave energy and wind 
was seen as having an onshore potential of around 45 TWh.6  The huge early figure for 
wave energy was produced in March 1973 by the Energy Technology Unit (ENT) at the 
DTI and was based on existing wave data.7 It extrapolated these figures from the entire 
1700 miles of UK coastline which resulted in such impressive looking numbers. This basic 
approach was also adopted by the more rigorous NEL report on wave energy that appeared 
in 1975 although in this case the total potential was estimated at 500 TWh.8 Clearly, these 
early estimates varied greatly from the eventual agreed potential for wave of around 50 
TWh.  How is this explained?  
 
 The very first estimates for renewable energy in the UK concentrated on the 
physical scale of the resource. The subsequent reductions in the figures for wave are 
explained by the investigation that took place during the first phase of the WEP to 
determine the technically feasible scale of the resource. Clearly, the working NEL 
assumption of an unbroken line of wave energy devices ringing Britain, ten miles out to 
sea, was not practicable. Moreover, neither was the implicit assumption that all of the 
energy contained in the waves could be captured and sent to shore without any 
transmission losses. Therefore, the first job of the new WEP was to determine this new 
figure and this is where we shall move to considering the first phase of the programme.  
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The Wave Energy Programme 
Although most accounts, including this one, identify Rothschild's CPRS report as the 
starting point of the UK’s wave energy R&D programme, there was already some impetus 
within the government to explore the potential of wave power. The DTI report referred to 
above was produced in March 1973 and provided some of the inspiration to the later CPRS 
study. Indeed, Rothschild consulted the author of the earlier report, Gordon Goodwin of 
the Energy Technology division (ENT) at the DTI, and used his investigations into wave 
energy extensively.9 Goodwin was a scientist by training, and became fascinated by the 
potential of wave energy in 1973. He played a key ‘behind the scenes’ role in developing 
wave energy in the UK (described in more detail in chapter 5). Prior to the official 
appearance of the CPRS report (although obviously aware of its content) the DTI had 
already commissioned the National Engineering Laboratory (NEL) at East Kilbride to 
produce a detailed techno-economic appraisal of the state of global wave power 
technology.10 The high public profile of Rothschild’s Think Tank attracted publicity to 
wave energy and provided the initial boost that it required, but it was the recommendations 
of the NEL report that provided the evidence required for the establishment of the wave 
energy programme after 1975.11  
 
The NEL report: ‘preliminary assessment’ 
The stated objective of the NEL report was to ‘assess the economic and technical viability 
of wave power generation in the UK’, but its focus was overwhelmingly on the technical 
challenges of wave energy.12 Although the report did suggest that electricity could be 
produced from wave energy ‘at about 1p/kWh’ within the summary of its findings the 
report conceded that it was unable to fully assess the economic potential of wave energy 
owing to the uncertain technical development of wave energy devices.  
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No undue emphasis should be placed on these cost estimates as the 
assessment did not and could not determine the costs of structures and 
components whose detailed design requires extensive investigation. 13 
 
Despite this, the recommendation of the report was that ‘The UK should maintain an 
interest in the development of power generation from sea-wave energy’. Notwithstanding 
its shortcomings, Ross, perhaps the strongest and most widely published critic of the UK 
WEP, described the NEL report as the ‘standard work’ on wave energy and it formed the 
basis for the Wave Energy Programme (WEP). Gordon Goodwin was less impressed 
however. Ross quotes an interview with Goodwin in the early 1980s where he describes 
the report in much more negative terms.  
 
We granted them £13000 to produce this and they had access to Salter’s 
work. It is horrible. It is rubbish. It is paper ideas. I had argued that water 
would not do what you expected. I thought we should get our feet wet. I was 
over-ruled and work went on at the NEL.14 
 
 Goodwin was enthusiastic about the potential for wave energy and had been 
instrumental in putting it on the agenda of the DTI, and subsequently the CPRS, through 
1973. He had written the March 1973 DTI study and had contributed to Rothschild’s 
report. However, his comments were made as the WEP was facing closure in the early 
1980s. Ross concluded that his harsh comments arose because NEL shifted through time 
from supporting the work of Salter at Edinburgh University towards a different wave 
device - the oscillating water column - based on a design originated by Masuda in Japan. 
Goodwin had been closely associated with the Salter team from late 1973 (see chapter 5). 
This then may partly explain his damning assessment of the NEL report. However, I would 
add the view that he was frustrated at that lack of progress in wave energy and placed some 
of the blame for this on the initial eighteen-month delay caused by the wait for the NEL 
report. The report undoubtedly set the tone for the WEP and following its 
recommendations in its first phase this focussed on ‘study’: device development in the labs 
and test tanks of the device teams - with no ‘wet feet’.  This first phase will be explored 
next.  
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‘Phase one: Study’  
In 1985, with the convenience of hindsight, a government report mapped out the evolution 
of the development of the WEP.15 This official version presented the NEL Report as the 
‘Preliminary Assessment’ stage lasting until early 1976 which then introduced a two-year 
‘Study’ phase of the programme. In late 1978 this was followed by ‘Reference Designs’; 
this part of the WEP, when device teams worked towards the design of a 2GW generating 
station, which, as it turned out would last until the programme was drastically reduced and 
effectively shut-down in March 1982. The government report termed the phase after 1982 
as the ‘Reduced Ongoing Programme’. At the time this was written in 1985, the 
government was still coming under criticism for what some saw as the premature 
abandonment of wave energy R&D, and the above can be seen on one level as a clear 
attempt to emphasise the structural logic of the WEP and to emphasise the government’s 
assessment that the programme had reached ‘an appropriate stage of development’. The 
clear gap in the otherwise detailed NEL study was in the cost of generating electricity from 
the sea waves, and this therefore had to be a priority for the programme. This section will 
focus on the ‘Study’ phase of the programme which began formally in April 1976 and 
lasted until the Heathrow Wave Energy Conference in November 1978. 
 
 Following the favourable conclusions of the NEL report in 1975 the formal 
decision was taken by ACORD in June of that year to establish a Wave Energy Steering 
Committee (WESC).16 The initial task of this committee was; 
 
• to draw up and agree a national programme of work for the study of wave 
energy 
• to advise on the implementation and management of that programme 
• to advise on the technical briefing of UK delegates to international meetings 
on wave energy 
• to report to the Chief Scientist, Department of Energy on matters relating to 
wave energy.17  
 
 WESC began to meet formally from August 1975. Despite the claim that ‘members 
of the WESC were drawn from industry, academic institutions, consultants, officials, and 
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ETSU’18, in fact, as table 1 shows, the initial membership was dominated by the last two of 
these groups,  ETSU and the DoEn. The pace of initial developments was quickened by the 
DoEn’s Chief Scientist, Walter Marshall, who was very anxious to work ‘urgently on 
progressing Wave Power R and D’.19 This was partly explained by his recent 
uncomfortable appearance in front of the Select Committee for Science and Technology 
(SCST) which, in common with many other aspects of energy policy, was sharply critical 
of the lack of progress in renewable energy technology.20 The initial challenge lay mainly 
in funding the programme, as the relatively new and small DoEn was slow in establishing 
its R&D budgets.21 Late in 1974 this had already led to the Salter wave energy device 
secure its initial funding from the rival DTI through the recently established Mechanical 
Engineering and Machine Tools Requirements Board (MEMTRB) (see chapter 5). 
Shortage of DoEn funds meant that the same body also initially funded the WESC.  
 
Table 4.1 
Wave Energy Steering Committee Membership, 1975-76 22 
L. E J. Roberts (Chairman) ETSU (Harwell)  
F. J. P. Clarke (Chairman - from July 1976) ETSU (Harwell)  
J. K. Dawson ETSU (Harwell)  
G. Goodwin DoEn 
D. Gore DoEn 
R. Hancock  NEL 
G. Potter Science Research Council (SRC) 
J. K. Wright CEGB 
C. Grove-Palmer (Secretary) ETSU (Harwell)  
 
 
 The ENT division at the DoEn had prepared a paper for the ACORD meeting in 
June 1975 which suggested funding for a  wave programme ‘should be about £400,000 per 
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annum at present, rising to perhaps £2 million in three or four years time’.23 The first 
option was to consider diverting some of the existing ETSU budget, however for 1975/6 
this had been agreed at a total of £300,000 - with perhaps only around £100,000 being 
available for the wave energy programme.24 At the early meetings of WESC it soon 
became apparent that a figure much closer to the ENT recommendation would be required 
for a two-year programme. Wave energy was continuing to attract publicity and this added 
to the pressure that Walter Marshall felt to demonstrate serious intent in energy R&D. By 
April 1976, when the official wave energy programme was launched £1m was the amount 
allocated by the DoEn for the two-year study. 
 
 By January 1976 the WESC had formulated a plan for the first stage of the formal 
Wave Energy Programme. This set out a two-year programme lasting until the end of 
1978, which was to include ‘nine major areas of work.’25 This included four ‘Specific 
Wave Energy Convertor Projects’ and five identified areas of ‘Generic work’. The original 
four wave energy devices included were: 
 
✦  Salter’s Duck (University of Edinburgh) 
✦  Cockerell’s Raft (Wavepower Ltd.) 
✦  Masuda’s buoy - the Oscillating Water Column (NEL) 
✦  Russell’s Rectifier (Hydraulics Research Station)  
 
 Each of these devices featured prominently in the NEL report, and as already 
mentioned in the case of ‘Salter’s ducks’ government R&D funding of £65,000 was 
already in place through the DTI (see chapter 5). The publicity that surrounded wave 
energy during 1974, and resulted in the funding for Salter, was also assisted by the 
prominence given to Sir Christopher Cockerell’s work on wave energy. Cockerell, through 
his work on developing the Hovercraft, was one of the best-known and respected British 
scientist/inventors and his presence undoubtedly attracted further attention to wave energy. 
Cockerell was optimistic about wave energy, and as early as October 1974 he had been 
interviewed by the BBC on its prospects. In the interview he suggested that the wave 
energy ‘which at the moment just bashes the shore and goes to waste’ could meet all of our 
                                            
23 TNA, EG 16/1, ET 4/10/012, FPRD(75) 26, Department of Energy, Advisory Council on Research and 
Development for Fuel and Power, ‘Wave Energy: Note by ENT division’.  
24 TNA, EG 16/80, Leighton to Marshall, 17 June 1975  
25 TNA, EG 16/64, WESC(75)P24, ‘A Programme for Wave Power. Summary paper for the Chief Scientist’, 
undated 
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electricity consumption needs. 26 Along with Salter, Cockerell and his raft device had been 
under development since late in 1973. Cockerell had formed a new company, Wavepower 
Limited, with some funding from British Hovercraft Ltd. to develop the device, and the 
DoEn had indicated early in 1974 that government R&D funding would be allocated to his 
new device.27  
 
 The other two wave energy devices that feature in the initial programme were also 
given their prominence in the WESC recommendations by the NEL report. The Masuda 
buoy was the most well established of all the devices proposed for the programme and the 
NEL report identified it as ‘the most promising scheme’.28 Yoshio Masuda had been 
developing his floating buoy wave energy device since the Second World War and it was 
therefore the only device to have achieved any commercial development. The remaining, 
and least well-developed device, known as the Russell rectifier, was based at the 
Government’s own Hydraulics Research Station (HRS) at Wallingford. Like the Masuda 
device the fundamental idea had been developed prior to the 1970s, owing its development 
to earlier work during the 1950s on wave energy by Walton Bott. Bott gained his 
experience in energy working on hydroelectric schemes in Scotland before relocating to 
Mauritius in 1953 to set up an electricity board.  Bott developed a shoreline wave energy 
device which was later taken up by Robert Russell, a scientist based at Wallingford. These 
devices, along with the Raft and the Duck, then appeared to WESC to be the most 
promising of the early wave energy devices.  
 
 The other element of the initial wave energy programme proposed by WESC was 
five areas of ‘Generic Work’ (see below). This would eventually result in the creation of 
the Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs) that were directly responsible for assessing 
different elements of the programme. This area of the programme was to prove crucial in 
developing and assessing the work of the device teams, though some, including Salter, felt 
that they sometimes slowed progress with unnecessary extra work (see chapter 5 for more 
discussion on this point).  
 
 
                                            
26 TNA, EG 16/51, ET 51/48/01, Transcript, BBC Radio 4, The World at One, ‘Energy from the Waves’, 7 
October 1974 
27 TNA, EG 16/13, Leighton to Gore, 12 February 1974 
28 TNA 16/13, NEL, Economic Assessment Unit, ‘Proposal for an Economic and Technical Study of Wave 
Power Generation’, 25 January 1974. p.5 
109 
✦ Wave data 
✦ Wave loading and the behaviour of Structures 
✦ Anchoring and Mooring 
✦ Energy conversion and Transmission 
✦ Environmental studies and external relations.29 
 
 The summary paper proposed the initial programme as a ‘feasibility study’ and 
went on to say clearly that ‘If, when the feasibility study has been completed, the idea of 
wave energy continues to look attractive, it will be necessary to build larger scale models 
for more extensive tank trials’ (my italics). WESC planned to ‘take at least two devices’ to 
this next stage, and have ‘at least one 1 MW prototype operating at sea within the next ten 
years’. Significantly for the future programme the WESC went on to suggest that the 
anticipated cost of such an ongoing programme ‘is unlikely to be less than £25m’.  This 
shows quite clearly that from the outset of the renewable energy programme considerable 
funding was anticipated in order that devices could be developed fully. As has been shown, 
wave energy was seen as the major contender in this period. This arose from the 
assessment of its potential contribution as a major energy source. In contrast to the small 
contribution traditionally expected from renewable energy, wave energy showed early 
promise as a potentially significant contributor to UK electricity consumption. Even bodies 
thought of as hostile to renewable energy sources such as the CEGB suggested that it could 
provide ‘nearly five times the average demand on the CEGB’.30 This helps to explain much 
of the early enthusiasm for wave power. 
 
 On April 29 1976 Alex Eadie, the Under-Secretary of State for Energy, responding 
to a written question announced the launch of the Government’s ‘national research and 
development programme into wave energy’. The WESC recommendations had been 
adopted without any alteration and a two-year £1m programme to establish the ‘feasibility 
of large-scale extraction of power from the sea-waves’ was formally created.31 In 
preparation for the announcement Eadie had made a public visit to see Salter’s work at 
Edinburgh during March that year and was personally impressed by the potential of the 
resource.32 Although WESC was careful not to indicate any favourites among the 
competing wave energy devices, the Salter team was allocated the largest slice of the 
                                            
29 TNA, EG 16/64, WESC(75)P24, ‘A Programme for Wave Power. Summary paper for the Chief Scientist’, 
undated 
30 Glendenning, I., ‘Energy from the sea’, Chemistry and Industry (1977) pp. 588-99 
31 HC Deb 29 April 1976, vol. 910 cc. 150-1W 
32 TNA, EG 16/50, ‘Alex Eadie to visit wave energy research project - Edinburgh University’ February 27 
1976; Frazer, F., “Ruling the waves’ The Scotsman, 2 March 1976, p.11  
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proposed budget.33 This was partly due to the advanced development of the duck in 
comparison with the other devices, but also reflected the high public profile of Salter as a 
wave energy pioneer.  
 
 The ‘study’ phase of the programme went very much according to the proposed 
WESC plan.  The National Engineering Laboratory at East Kilbride were given the task of 
developing the Masuda device, which after a brief spell as the ‘Pelican’ became more 
widely known as the oscillating water column (OWC) and each of the device teams set 
about the initial development task of producing designs for a 1MW generating station. 
Very early in the programme (in fact, prior to the official programme) the Salter team at 
Edinburgh formed a partnership with Lanchester Polytechnic and industrial partners, 
Ready Mixed Concrete (UK) Ltd. and Insituform (Pipes and Structures).34 They formed a 
limited company called Sea Energy Associates (SEA) to help develop the Duck concept 
which received separate funding from the WEP. This was an interesting example of an 
early university/industry/government initiative which is dealt with in greater depth in 
chapter 5.    
 
 By April 1977, only a year after the launch of the official programme, the DoEn 
announced an increase in funding to £2.5m. 35 Although this was partly due to the dramatic 
impact of inflation at the time (averaging around 16% in the period) it was also a reflection 
of the rapid development and testing of the wave devices.36 The earlier funding received by 
the Salter team meant that the WEP did not begin from a standing start, as the Edinburgh 
lab had already assembled a suitable testing tank for the four first generation devices. With 
the first 1:100 scale tests completed, the DoEn and some of the teams were keen to scale 
up their devices and get them into the open-water. Very quickly this was to lead to conflict 
between Salter and the Lanchester team, specifically over open water trials of Salter’s 
Duck in Loch Ness during 1977.37 Salter favoured more tank testing, but the Lanchester 
team led by Norman Bellamy (and encouraged by the WESC) was keen to test a 1:10th 
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scale model in open-water. This gave rise to some bitter exchanges, covered in more detail 
in chapter 5, which give some early indication of concern over the direction of the WEP. 
 
 By the end of the two-year study phase of the programme, and despite Salter’s 
strong objections, open water trials had taken place in Loch Ness of the Salter device and 
the Cockerell Raft in the Solent. Allowances had been made within the WEP budget for 
additional devices to be included, and by the end of the two-year programme more devices 
were beginning to receive DoEn R&D funding.  
 
Heathrow 1978 
A first Wave Energy Conference at Heathrow marked the end of the two-year study phase 
of the programme in November 1978  and attracted over 300 delegates, including many 
from overseas keen to hear about the initial successes of the UK wave energy 
programme.38 The conference brought together all of the wave device teams, the Technical 
Advisory Groups (TAGs), government, and the press to review the results of the feasibility 
study. Despite the commitment of the DoEn earlier in 1978 to fund the programme for a 
further two years, most commentators identify the Heathrow Conference as the crucial 
turning point away from wave energy in the UK.39 Unfortunately little archive material 
exists on what this thesis regards as the pivotal moment in the period. This account 
therefore will rely on the conference programme and the personal recollection of some of 
its participants.  
 
 Although the conference produced clear evidence of tremendous technical advances 
in wave energy data and devices, the estimated costs of generating electricity that were 
unveiled at Heathrow deflated early enthusiasm. The crest that the wave energy 
community had been riding right up until the conference dipped into a trough from which 
it could not recover. One purpose of the feasibility study had been to identify the most 
promising wave energy devices for further funding and development, and the device teams 
all had plenty of technical progress to report on at the conference. However, the study 
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phase of the programme was also given the task of estimating the likely cost of wave 
power - something that the NEL report had been unable to do. It was these results - the 
economics of wave power - that caused significant and lasting damage to the reputation of 
wave energy.  
 
 The omens were bad for wave energy when Freddie Clarke, chairman of the WESC 
and research director at Harwell, opened the conference on the 22 November in somewhat 
gloomy terms, ‘...there is usually a stage in the research and development of technology at 
which the problems loom larger than the solutions and things appear to change from month 
to month and possibly from week to week. Wave energy is currently at this stage.’  He 
gave a very brief review of the first two years of the programme, in which he highlighted 
what he regarded as its three main achievements. The first of these was the ‘team of some 
150 people all over the country...who are gaining a grip on this new and difficult 
technology of wave power.’  The second was the shift from ‘elementary testing in 
laboratory to very sophisticated testing that simulates in miniature real sea conditions’ 
adding that the ‘films of these are very striking indeed.’ This technological development 
was ‘a substantial step forward in our knowledge’ but in introducing his third point he 
judged that it was ‘still not great enough’. The last ‘achievement’ was what Clarke termed 
‘a proper engineering evaluation of concepts’. This final point referred to the role that 
Rendell, Palmer and Tritton (RPT), a key consultant to the WEP, played in assessing and 
evaluating the devices in the programme. He explained that RPT, working closely with the 
teams, had produced ‘so-called reference designs, and have costed them. So it is that we 
are today able to give some costings for the first generation of wave energy machines.’ 40 
He then concluded his opening remarks under the heading ‘The high costs of the early 
designs’. Whilst conceding that some ‘important designs and concepts’ were hoping for a 
figure of 10p per kWh, he estimated average generation costs in a ‘very high’ range of 20-
50p per kWh, compared to the average electricity generation cost at that time of 2p per 
kWh. This was a million miles from the 1p per kWh that the NEL report had tentatively 
suggested in its report.  
 
 Speaking later in the conference, Clive Grove-Palmer the WEP manager was more 
upbeat about the prospects for wave energy. Both revealing the hubris of the wave energy 
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community and anticipating the unfavourable reaction to the Heathrow figures, he rather 
naively suggested that although the ‘cost analysis’ could be seen as ‘a hatchet job’ he 
thought that ‘...there is nothing quite like the thought of an execution to concentrate the 
mind.’  Ross later wrote that most of the journalists and foreign buyers had left the meeting 
after the first day when the technical challenges and high predicted costs for wave energy 
were unveiled and emphasised.41 Certainly in the media there was evidence of a notable 
shift away from the largely positive views on wave energy immediately following 
Heathrow.  Writing in the Observer Jeremy Bugler, referring to the RPT report suggested 
that ‘A 3-volume gale hits the wave energy men’.42 In The Scotsman, Frank Frazer 
focussed on the ‘environmental and social aspects of wavepower’ with the ‘routing [sic] of 
pylons across the Isle of Skye’.43 In a letter to Salter on the publication of the Heathrow 
proceedings, Grove-Palmer observed that it ‘...presents a rather gloomy picture of the 
prospects for wave energy and that fact has not escaped the press.’44 
 
 It appeared from Grove-Palmer’s remarks at Heathrow that the goodwill of the 
Government and public support for alternative energy had been taken too easily for 
granted. Four years of R&D on wave energy, including the previous two years of official 
backing had lent the programme a feeling of invincibility. Much of this was perfectly 
understandable, of course. In the early part of 1978, following the success of the early 
programme and before the two years of the ‘study phase’ were completed, the Government 
had agreed funding for a further two years of wave energy R&D; at an increased rate. And 
Glyn England, chairman of the CEGB which was often seen as a strong advocate for the 
expansion of nuclear power, speaking at Fawley power station in July that same year said,  
 
As we see it at present wave power is the most promising of the renewable 
energy sources...Averaged over the year there is about 80 kilowatts of 
power in each metre of wave front approaching Britain from the North 
Atlantic. This implies a total annual availability of 120,000 megawatts 
(120 gigawatts) of power along Britain’s Atlantic Coast. However, not all 
the power could be harnessed. There would inevitably be substantial 
power losses in conversion, and transmission losses, too, so that probably 
only about one third could actually be got to the electricity consumer. 
Nevertheless this is still a substantial amount of power - enough, in fact, to 
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supply the whole of Britain with electricity at the present rate of 
consumption. 45  
 
 Added to the official endorsements of wave power was the positive, widespread 
and ongoing media coverage that wave energy received prior to the Heathrow Conference.  
The launch of the WEP was covered extensively in the UK and abroad.46 This coverage 
reflected the official enthusiasm for wave energy and continued throughout the ‘study’ 
phase of the programme, as progress was covered positively by the press and trade 
journals. This included gushing reports of the opening of a new £100,000 wave energy 
tank at the University of Edinburgh,47 and the first open-water trials of the Duck at Loch 
Ness in 1977.48  
 
Phase two: ‘Reference Designs’ 
In the first phase of the programme the WESC operated within a set of loosely defined 
long-term targets for the wave energy device teams. Their initial report to the Chief 
Scientist in 1976 had suggested that the teams should work towards having a 1MW 
prototype ‘operating at sea’ by the mid-1980s.49  More clearly defined were the short-term 
two-year technical targets of the programme, and ironically, the Heathrow Conference 
provided evidence that these had been achieved successfully. This element of success led 
to a reconsideration of the scale of the target that the teams were set, and when the funding 
was increased early in 1977 the ‘reference design’ that the teams were working towards 
was also increased dramatically to 2GW (2000 MW) power station.50 In addition to 
reflecting the success of the device teams, this new target says something about the attitude 
of the DoEn towards new energy sources. Echoing the comments by the CEGB on the 
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scale of the resource it illustrates the government’s pressing need for alternative energy 
sources to demonstrate their potential as major fuel providers according to the dominant 
energy paradigm. Although accepted with little comment at the time (again, perhaps a 
reflection of the hubris of the wave energy community) the change in the scale of the 
reference designs created problems for the device teams from the Heathrow Conference 
onwards. During this new phase of the programme the consultants RPT were set the task 
by the WESC of estimating the cost per kWh of the much larger station. Later, Salter 
would repeatedly complain that this was like trying to estimate the cost of air travel in the 
1980s based on data available in 1910.51  
 
 By the end of 1978, at the start of the next phase of the wave energy programme, 
the range of devices receiving DoEn funding had increased significantly. Joining what 
became known as the four ‘first generation’ devices, were a number of new devices listed 
below.  
✦ the Flexible Bag (University of Lancaster) 
✦ the Clam (Lanchester Polytechnic and Sea Energy Associates) 
✦ the Triplate (Royal Military College of Science) 
✦ the Cylinder (University of Bristol) 
 
 The greatly increased number of devices indicated a number of things. First, from a 
technological point of view it was an illustration of the rapid spread and transfer of new 
technology within UK research establishments. This was aided and encouraged by the 
wide press coverage but must also have indicated the existence of some form of 
technology R&D network within the UK. Certainly also the number of devices increased 
in proportion to the funding available for wave energy within the DoEn. Interestingly the 
device teams rarely, if ever, complained about the extent of funding available. On the 
contrary, after the official programme was established Salter wrote regularly that his 
research was ‘well provided for’. Rather, bitter complaints were reserved for the 
administrative process that accompanied the funds discussed in detail below.  
 
 A second important issue that arises from the increase in devices is the uncertainty 
that this indicates from WESC, particularly about the potential of first generation devices. 
Chapter 1 discussed the long history of wave energy converters, in particular the large 
number of wave device patents - a point emphasised in the NEL report. In that history of 
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devices a wide variety of approaches had been taken to extracting energy from the sea 
waves. Famously, Salter had invented his basic but highly efficient Duck device within a 
few short months by going ‘...round to Woolworth’s...[and buying]...sixpen’orth of 
Balsa...’52 adding another method to the already long list of wave energy devices. In short 
it appeared that there were a number of methods for extracting power from the waves, and 
in each case the fundamental principle and design of the devices was arguably the least of 
the technological challenges facing the teams.53  
 
 It was the ease with which new wave energy conversion devices could be devised 
that made the initial study phase of the programme a success, as each concept was tested in 
the controlled environment of the laboratory tank. The Heathrow Conference had gone 
beyond the test-tank to imagine each device operating in the open sea - and this is where 
the real challenges lay. Donald Swift-Hook, a senior CEGB scientist who worked on wave 
energy in the 1970s, later argued that the actual device selected was almost irrelevant: each 
device converted wave energy at high efficiencies. The key lay in collecting the energy and 
transmitting it to the National Grid.54 Although perhaps understandably disagreeing with 
his point over the irrelevance of converters, Salter was aware of this general issue and this 
helps to explain his resistance to what he viewed as premature testing in open water at 
Loch Ness in 1977.55 However, the WESC decision to include yet more wave energy 
devices shows some misunderstanding of the importance of this point. Unfortunately, the 
decision to include additional devices also resulted in some nervousness and criticism from 
ACORD over the scope of the programme, and this led directly to a series of retreats from 
the WEP that ultimately resulted in the closure of the programme by 1982.  
 
 The first official signal of a retreat from the WEP resulted from the ACORD 
meeting in March 1980. At this point it may be worthwhile to describe the way in which 
the overall DoEn management of the programme was structured, which Salter referred to 
as a ‘tortuous chain of command’.56  As outlined in chapter 3, ACORD had the task of 
advising the DoEn on its energy R&D programmes. Although, controversially nuclear 
energy lay outside the remit of ACORD, after 1974 the renewable energy programme was 
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added to its advisory responsibilities. ETSU provided the next link in the management and 
advisory chain and it reported on the range of individual renewables programmes to 
ACORD on an annual basis. WESC reported progress on the WEP to both ETSU and 
ACORD. Ultimately, it was ACORD who would make recommendations to the Secretary 
of State, and they had a strong influence on outcomes as was discussed in chapter 3. The 
difficulties arose in the timing of progress reports and advice. Salter described it thus: 
 
The cycle of events began with the Treasury Financial Year in April. 
There had to be time for the Department of Energy officials to consider the 
ACORD advice and for ACORD to approve its own minutes. This meant 
that the advice must be given at an ACORD meeting in February. The 
proposals put forward to ACORD had to be discussed by one meeting of 
WESC and modified for approval by a second. This meant that WESC 
must have all the information it needed in early December. The most 
important piece of information required was the report by the Consultants. 
If they worked flat out they could finalise reports on a number of devices 
in about a month, but this meant that they must bring down the chopper on 
the work of the device teams by the beginning of November. Everything 
they saw was a flash photograph of the position in October. There is no 
chance of a device team saying “There. It is finished. Nothing can improve 
it. We have spoken.” The drawings and graphs carried long streaks as the 
paper was wrenched from beneath their pencils at 23.59 on October 31st. 
 
 After April the Department of Energy would tell the Programme 
Manager how much he would have to spend. This would be unlikely to be 
the same as the amount he wanted and so he would have to talk with 
device teams, Project Officers, Consultants and TAGS and arrive at a new 
revised programme. If he worked with the tireless devotion for which 
programme managers are selected he might have this done by the end of 
May, ready for discussions by WESC in June and for modifications and re-
approval in July. The sums of money involved exceeded the amount which 
could be authorised without signature by officials of the Department of 
Energy, who are of course on holiday in August. But when they returned 
in September it took no time at all to authorise and issue the formal 
contracts from the Harwell contracts branch. It was just possible to get one 
out by mid-October, leaving two weeks for the ordering of equipment and 
the recruitment if not the training of staff before the consultants’ axe 
descended.  A single hiccup in any part of the procedure could make the 
official working time go negative and often did. When the contracts 
arrived they could be amazingly complicated.  In one the work programme 
was split into four time periods and four different work topics giving 
sixteen different pots of money and no certainty that it could be transferred 
between them. 57 
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 Even allowing for the frustration that Salter felt as part of the device teams at the 
sharp end of this process, it clearly placed severe constraints on the work of the WEP. 
Bellamy, of the SEA/Lanchester Polytechnic team shared Salter’s concerns. In April 1978 
he wrote to Clarke,  
 
What is not acceptable is the inflexibility of the yearly go/no-go decisions 
on device team existence which particularly applies to educational 
institutions. Even with the intention of continuity from year to year, the time 
scales of reports leading to proposals leading to contracts cannot be 
achieved without disruption. Something should be done to put future 
programmes on a businesslike basis. 
 
 Despite the complaints of the device teams and the efforts of WESC and the Chief 
Scientist, Sir Herman Bondi, the Treasury were firm that the basis of government funded 
R&D should remain on yearly contracts. They pointed out that ‘This policy is adopted for 
all Government R&D work of this nature, including entire weapons systems costing 
several hundred millions of pounds to develop.’  Although confessing not to ‘be fully 
aware of all the details’ of the WEP, the Treasury went on to explain that yearly contracts 
‘allow the Government to limit their involvement in the event of (i) public expenditure cuts 
or (ii) a desire to terminate the work either because the technological feasibility of 
completing the work becomes doubtful or because the market prospects change adversely 
to such an extent that continued funding cannot be justified.’58 This was to prove to be an 
uncanny prediction of the fate of the WEP.  
 
 After what can now be seen as the high point of the WEP between 1976 and 1978, 
the disappointing economic assessments of wave energy presented at the Heathrow 
Conference and the proliferation of devices eventually caused ACORD to look more 
closely at the programme. Increased funding for 1978/79 of £2.9m had been agreed by 
ACORD early in 1978 (before Heathrow) but clearly the enthusiasm for waves was 
beginning to wane.59 The case for wave energy was not helped by the publication later in 
1979 of the Heathrow Conference Proceedings, the appearance of the DoEn’s Energy 
Paper 42 on the wave energy programme, and the election of a new government committed 
to cuts in public expenditure. Unfortunately for the device teams, despite significant 
                                            
58 TNA, EG 16/80, ‘Continuity in Wave Power Contracts’, Heathcote (Treasury) to Chief Scientist (DoEn) 
19 May 1978 
59 TNA, EG 16/80, Skipper (Head, Chief Scientist’s Branch, DoEn) to Kemp (Treasury), 14 March 1978. 
This new funding included £300,000 for a collaborative project ‘with the Japanese and others through the 
International Energy Agency’.  
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improvements in cost per kWh since Heathrow, Energy Paper 42 reproduced the earlier 
higher figures from Heathrow. However, by the time these publications appeared, and prior 
to the election of the Thatcher government in May 1979, the March 1979 meeting of 
ACORD had approved an increased budget of £4.9m for wave energy in 1979/80.60  
 
ACORD March 1980 
Wind energy, which had been largely dismissed up until this point, began to look more 
favourable to the DoEn and by the March 1980 meeting of ACORD official impatience 
with wave energy was increasing. From June 1978, under invitation from Sir Herman 
Bondi, a Wind Energy Steering Group (WISC) had begun to meet (also under the 
chairmanship of WESC chairman, Freddie Clarke) to develop a wind energy programme 
(see chapter 6).61 Despite this, in January 1980 ETSU produced its fifth annual report for 
ACORD which was full of praise for the ‘considerable progress’ made by the WEP during 
1979. Referring to the ‘very high’ costs estimated at Heathrow (and repeated in Energy 
Paper 42) it noted that ‘all these factors have been improved significantly during 1979’. 
Instead of the wide 20-50 p/kWh range, costs on a range of devices had been reduced to 5-
15 p/kWh, with the promise of further reductions.62 These figures were repeated in the 
WESC report for ACORD, and both reports painted a very promising picture for wave 
energy.  
 
 Alluding to another primary criticism of the WEP by ACORD, the WESC report 
also stated that ‘...a diversity of devices is still seen as an important feature of the ongoing 
programme…’.63 However, by 1980 ACORD judged that the programme had become too 
diverse and Grove-Palmer was asked to return to ACORD in June 1980 with a radically 
revised wave programme featuring only two devices. At the time, Sir Hermann Bondi 
observed that there existed a fundamental difference between WESC and ACORD on the 
approach to wave energy. ACORD saw the programme in terms of wave devices, whereas 
WESC saw it as a set of broader technical and economic challenges that were being 
addressed through the work of all of the device teams.64 The structure of the WEP reflected 
                                            
60 TNA, EG 16/80, ‘Alternative Energy Sources’, Bondi to Permanent Under Secretary (DoEn), 9 March 
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61 TNA, EG 16/150, WISC(78)M1, Wind Energy Steering Committee, Minutes of the 1st meeting held at the 
Department of Energy, London on 14 June 1978 at 10.00 hours  
62 TNA, EG 16/305, Fifth Annual Report of the Energy Technology Support Unit, J. K. Dawson, January 
1980 
63 Ibid.  
64 Watt, Towards, p.46 
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the WESC objectives, as the consultants and TAGs surveyed all of the device 
development. Arguably, misunderstanding over this point also caused the WEP to begin to 
unravel.  
 
 Nevertheless, Grove-Palmer returned to ACORD with a new proposal featuring just 
two devices, the Flexible Bag and the Oscillating Cylinder. After some discussion ACORD 
added a third device, the Oscillating Water Column, which was being developed by NEL. 
Accordingly, from 1980 funding for three devices, the Rectifier, the Triplate, and the Raft 
was stopped completely, while the remaining teams, the Duck and the Clam, continued on 
(with greatly reduced funding) as contributing elements of the wider wave energy 
programme. The ongoing WEP was therefore eventually agreed by ACORD as a two-year 
programme concentrating on three devices. In September 1980, John Moore, the Under-
Secretary of State for Energy opened the WEP’s new test tank facility at Cockerell’s 
Wavepower in Southampton. Despite the decision a few months earlier to drop 
Wavepower’s Raft from the list of devices under development (the tank would continue to 
be used by the programme) Moore reassured his audience that ‘I am confident that if 
solutions are possible our wave energy researchers will find them. Whatever other 
problems they may face, lack of Government support will not be among them.’ 65 
 
ACORD March 1981 
Despite John Moore’s words, by the time of the next ACORD meeting on wave energy in 
March 1981 the WEP appeared doomed. Rumours, strenuously denied, appeared in the 
press that the decision had already been taken to close the programme.66 Added to 
diminishing official faith in wave energy as a method of providing for future energy 
demand, the advocates for waves had suffered a blow in 1980 when the Chief Scientist, Sir 
Herman Bondi, was replaced as Chief Scientist (and therefore also as Chairman of 
ACORD). Sir Herman was known to keenly support the development of renewable energy 
sources, and was convinced about the potential of wave energy. He was replaced with Dr 
Anthony Challis from ICI. Although a chemist by training Challis was brought into the 
DoEn for his commercial experience. As well as Bondi’s enforced departure from the 
                                            
65 Ross, Power, p.136. My italics 
66 Ross, Power, pp. 136-138. Ross recounts an exchange in the Financial Times in May 1981 between the 
journalist David Fishlock and the Chief Scientist, Anthony Challis. Challis responded to Fishlock’s report 
predicting the closure of the wave programme. ‘Fishlock’s report is well off track. […] ...there are grounds 
for cautious optimism’  
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scene, Freddie Clarke also left WESC during 1980.67 Thus, by the time of the March 1981 
meeting wave energy had lost two of its most influential supporters.  
  
 By this stage the earlier confidence of WESC in the long-term future of the 
programme had been shaken by the 1980 ACORD reaction. In the short time between 
reaching agreement on a new two-year programme (in June 1980) and the March 1981 
meeting of ACORD there had been little opportunity to demonstrate any significant 
progress in wave energy that might reassure the committee. Despite the two-year 
programme (lasting until 1982) Grove-Palmer was now aware that ACORD was rapidly 
losing patience with wave energy, and he recorded after the 1981 meeting that ‘there was a 
substantial body of opinion which was in favour of stopping the programme now.’68 
Despite the majority view on ACORD favouring immediate closure, approval was given to 
complete the two-year programme eventually agreed in 1980. Grove-Palmer immediately 
held a meeting with the device teams which laid out clearly the challenges ahead.  March 
1982 was looming as a crucial date for the WEP as ACORD had insisted that a 
‘recommended way forward’ for the programme be presented by then. After consultation 
with WESC, Grove-Palmer saw that the programme now had only three options. 
 
(1) Building a demonstration module at near full size of a system which 
could produce power of value to the UK National Grid, or 
(2) Build a demonstration module at near full size of a system which 
could provide interest to smaller power consumers, or 
(3) Stop work on wave energy.69 
 
 His discussion paper for the meeting emphasised that by March 1982 ‘there would 
be no request for a further extension to try and get more answers before making a decision 
about the future’ and he warned the device teams that ‘the decision date is not the subject 
of discussion it has been fixed.’ Coming less than three years after Heathrow a new cost 
target of below 5p kWh was set for March 1982 and WESC and the device teams worked 
on achieving this. Clearly, Grove-Palmer now felt that the best prospects for maintaining 
                                            
67 He was replaced as Chairman of WESC by Dr Peter Iredale, who had been the head of Harwell’s long-
standing Marine Technology Support Unit (MATSU).  
68 SA, ‘Objectives, Criteria and Weightings; A note for discussion on 3 March 1981’, Grove-Palmer, 2 
March 1981, p.2  
69 SA, ‘Objectives, Criteria and Weightings; A note for discussion on 3 March 1981’, Grove-Palmer, 2 
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the WEP lay in seeking funding that focussed on a single device, and he implored the 
device teams to work together on selecting what he termed ‘the chosen one.’ 70 
 
 WESC were understandably concerned over the short time available before the 
1982 meeting to put a convincing case for wave energy before ACORD. Therefore, in 
December 1981 Grove-Palmer arranged for all of the device teams to give a presentation to 
the new Chief Scientist, Dr Challis.71 Clearly the intention was to win over Bondi’s 
replacement (as Chief Scientist and chairman of ACORD) and demonstrate the progress 
and potential for the wave energy programme prior to the March meeting. Grove-Palmer 
stressed to the teams that they must emphasise reductions in cost achieved since 1979 (5 -
15p kWh) and ‘explain why you believe that your device has the potential to become 
economically viable’. He also asked that the teams ‘discuss why you believe that your 
device should be the one first selected to be used as the basis for a sea-trial of a megawatt 
sized module’.   
 
ACORD March 1982: ‘Reduced Ongoing Programme’  
The Wave Energy Programme was officially closed down at the ACORD meeting on 19 
March 1982, although as discussed the signs had not been good for the WEP for some 
time. The meeting itself took place in the wider context of a greatly reduced DoEn budget 
for renewables, of which the programme managers were made aware. Funding of over 
£17m in 1981-82 was to be restricted to around £11m in 1982-83: cuts would have to be 
made. As was the custom for ACORD meetings, each of the individual programmes 
submitted reports to the council through ETSU which outlined the progress made in the 
previous year and a suggested programme (and accompanying budget) for the next year. 
As a result of the ending of the two-year programme, and the recently difficult passage of 
its proposals through ACORD, wave energy was given particularly close attention. It had, 
after all, been the DoEn’s favoured renewable technology for the previous seven years. 
The minutes of the ACORD meeting show that the council considered three approaches in 
reaching its decisions.72 The first was to ask that the budget be increased to allow the 
present programmes to continue, the second to make ‘pro rata cuts across each 
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programme’, and the third to select ‘a number of more-promising renewable energy 
technologies’. Recognising the ‘constraints to which all parts of the public sector were 
being subjected’ and with the prompting of the chairman, Dr Challis, the council agreed 
that the third option ‘offered the best opportunity to formulate sound recommendations on 
the future of the development of renewable energy sources and technologies for the UK.’  
 
 With its task established the council then went on to consider a daunting list of 
twelve programmes in turn; Passive Solar Design, Solar Water Heating, Active Solar 
Space Heating, Geothermal Aquifers, Geothermal Hot Dry Rocks, Biofuels: Combustion, 
Biofuels: Anaerobic Digestion for Animal Waste, Biofuels: Anaerobic Digesters for 
Vegetable Materials, Biofuels: Thermal Processing, Onshore Windpower, Offshore Wind, 
before concluding with its discussion of Wave Power.73 For proposal after proposal of the 
smaller budget programmes, and perhaps anticipating the savings to be made by closing 
the wave programme, ACORD recommended that ‘work should continue broadly along 
the lines planned at or about the proposed level of expenditure.’ It was only when the 
council reached the final three programmes on its agenda that the recommendations started 
to vary.  
 
 The wind energy programme had been gathering pace for some time, and in the 
months leading up to the ACORD meeting agreement had been reached with the DoEn to 
fund a very large 3MW demonstration turbine on Orkney (see chapter 6). The council 
noted that ‘onshore windpower seemed currently to offer the best prospects for bulk 
electricity generation of any of the renewable energy sources being studied by the 
Department.’ However, they were much less sure about offshore wind, judging it to be 
‘technically and economically more risky’ than onshore wind.  The onshore windpower 
programme was therefore approved, and given priority over the offshore programme, 
which should only then be developed ‘budget permitting’.  
 
 Finally, the council turned to the wave power programme, though by this time, an 
observer would have noted two things. First, wind power had been recognised by ACORD 
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as the ‘most promising’ of the renewable technologies, and second, by the time the council 
came to consider Wave Power the DoEn renewables budget had, theoretically at least, been 
allocated. The numbers for wave energy disappointed ACORD. Despite much larger 
earlier (and later) estimates, the size of the resource was now put at ‘about 20 TWh’. Much 
less than Glyn England of the CEGB had spoken of in 1978. Frustratingly for the device 
teams, the council was also unimpressed by the latest cost estimates for wave energy, 
which now fell in the range of 4 - 12p kWh. The teams had been given a ‘target’ of 5p 
kWh for 1982. But despite this representing a huge improvement over the three and a half 
years since the Heathrow Conference, the council was unmoved. Obviously referring to 
wind energy, the council judged that it ‘did not accept that wave power could become 
economically competitive against other electricity generating technologies expected to be 
available over the strategic review period (1981-2025)’. Clearly, wave energy was 
doomed. 
 
 The final, and arguably most significant, criticism of the WEP focussed on the 
wave energy devices. As shown above, Grove-Palmer and WESC had been aware that the 
ACORD review would require evidence that a single device had been identified that could 
be taken forward to sea-trials.  Unfortunately, the ENT report on the WEP supplied to 
ACORD was equivocal on devices.74 It identified two devices - the ‘Edinburgh Duck and 
the Lanchester Clam’ - as having ‘a clear lead’ but was quick to point out the 
‘development problems’ of each. 
 
The Edinburgh Duck depends on the proving of the reliability of the 
sophisticated, but complete, power take-off system, while the Lanchester 
Clam has less, but not insignificant, need for component development but 
offers rather more expensive power. 75 
 
 It was therefore not surprising that the council would decide that ‘no single device 
had emerged as having all the required technical features’. However, subsequent comments 
cast doubt on whether a clearly identified single wave energy device would have made any 
difference to the ACORD decision.  
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 Members also considered, as part of the wave power review the 
implications for the other parts of the renewable energy R & D programme 
if it were decided to go ahead to the full-scale demonstration of a wave 
power device in the open sea, estimated to cost £10 million. The Council 
agreed that in order to make way for further wave power work, 
Departmental support for other more promising renewable energy 
technologies would have to be abandoned. This would result in a change of 
balance in the Department’s efforts which the Council considered would 
have unacceptable consequences for the development of renewable energy 
sources for the UK. 76  
 
 
 Clearly, wind power had now galloped onto centre stage as the ‘Department’s 
favourite horse’. In the end it provided what wave energy had failed to; a single, clear, and 
large-scale example of the technology in action, producing electricity. ACORD 
recommended starkly, ‘that no new development work on wave power should be supported 
from the Department’s R&D budget’.  Although they were keen that the results of the 
seven-year WEP should be ‘prepared for publication...in a tidy form so that the work 
supported to date would be available to Government and the private sector should it be 
decided to re-consider the role of wave power in the UK energy economy’.  Some funding 
trickled on for the WEP (around £300k) to allow for the ‘tidying up’ of the programme, but 
after a difficult few years Government-funded wave energy R&D was finally ended in 
March 1982.  
 
 
Conclusions 
ACORD were aware that there would be much ‘public interest’ over their 
recommendations. This proved to be the case and their decision created controversy; and 
has continued to do so. Criticisms focussed on the ‘facts’ of wave energy as presented to 
ACORD and the exclusion from the meeting (for the first time) of the WEP programme 
manager, Grove-Palmer. Allegations of secrecy and ‘stitch-ups’ abounded. The device 
teams were incensed that the reports supplied to ACORD had been withheld from them, 
and it was only several months after the decision had been taken that they became 
available. They argued that crucial figures had been deliberately miscalculated and in the 
case of the Duck a key consultants’ report had allegedly been changed after it was written. 
In Parliament during the 1980s wave energy was discussed in two heated debates and 
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criticism of the Government’s decision to end the programme was strong, as MPs asked, 
when the WEP had achieved the cost targets set why did ACORD pull the plug? Looking 
closely at the evidence surrounding the ACORD decision it is clear that many of the 
criticisms of the process are valid. Based on a year to year assessment of wave energy, the 
programme should have been continued. Significant technical progress had been made and 
cost targets achieved.  
 
 This then leads to a wider explanation for the closure of the programme that has 
been advanced: the nuclear conspiracy theory. Some commentators have suggested that the 
WEP was ‘scuppered’ by the powerful nuclear industry, fearful of the increasing viability 
of wave energy. The evidence for this is largely circumstantial and contextual. ETSU, and 
therefore WESC, was situated at Harwell, as discussed in chapter 3. The Chief Scientist, 
Walter Marshall, was clearly a ‘nuclear man’. Nuclear energy R&D funding dominated the 
DoEn’s R&D budget throughout the period. Nuclear debates had, as Williams wrote, 
moved from the private sphere to the public arena during the 1970s and public awareness 
and criticism of nuclear power was growing.77 There is no doubt that the nuclear industry 
was increasingly sensitive to criticism from the 1970s onwards. Again, although direct 
evidence is harder to locate there is some validity in this argument.  
 
 However, despite the validity of the more conventional explanations for the closure 
of the WEP I would suggest that this chapter presents clear evidence for two alternative 
interpretations: one at the meso-level, one at the macro-level. First, at the meso-level, from 
the outset the device teams were clear that a long process of R&D would be an essential 
element of the programme. Despite the proliferation of wave energy device patents from 
the past, developing a viable large-scale wave energy device would require a substantial 
programme of theoretical work and tank-testing before any device would make it to the 
open sea.  However, rapid early progress resulted in open-water trials in Loch Ness and the 
Solent during 1977 and the disastrous Heathrow Conference followed this. I believe that 
this shifted the expectations of ACORD and the DoEn. Despite earlier acceptance of the 
caution advocated by the device teams, the government now had examples of wave energy 
in the water and evidence (at Heathrow) for the high estimated costs. From this point the 
attitude of ACORD and the DoEn towards wave energy changed. It was no longer a 
promise of ‘what is to come’, but rather a demonstration of the technical and economic 
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limitations of wave power as a viable future energy source for the UK. Patience with R&D 
evaporated and ACORD sought results - a clear ‘winner’ among the devices and an 
economically viable wave machine in the open sea. The WEP could not provide this, 
however, wind energy could. 
 
 The second, macro-level, resides in placing the events of the WEP within a broader 
understanding of the dominant energy paradigm of the period. Despite the gradual shift to 
oil in overall postwar UK energy demand, electricity generation was still dominated by 
coal burning, as it had been for nearly a century. Thus the pattern of production in 
electricity was firmly based on one big fuel source. From the 1950s nuclear energy held 
out some promise as a complement, and ultimately replacement, for coal. The CEGB, who 
made the decisions about which type of power stations to build, needed to have long-term 
confidence in the available fuels. Their initial hesitancy over oil-fired and nuclear power 
stations through the 1950s and early 1960s illustrates this point. Thus, UK energy policy 
became dominated by the view that fuel supply must be secure, dependable, and most 
importantly large scale. This framed the development of renewable energy, in this case 
wave power, within an energy policy that demanded proven reliability and scale. By March 
1982 the DoEn lost confidence in wave power to meet this demand. 
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Chapter 5 
Case Study: Salter’s Duck and Sea Energy Associates  
  
The discussion of the creation and organisation of the UK renewable energy programme in 
Chapter 3 was followed in Chapter 4 with a close analysis of the evolution and eventual 
demise of the UK Wave Energy Programme (WEP). This chapter will explore some 
further elements of the programme by considering the individual case of the wave energy 
pioneer at Edinburgh University, Stephen Salter. This will focus on the involvement of 
private industry in the WEP by considering the creation and evolution of Sea Energy 
Associates Limited (SEA); a company formed with the financial backing of Ready Mixed 
Concrete Limited (RMC) to exploit the commercial potential of wave energy. Salter’s 
involvement and interest in wave energy spanned the entire WEP coinciding with the very 
earliest formation of the UK renewable energy programme in 1974. Indeed, in many senses 
it was his initial research, culminating in the publication of an influential 1974 article in 
Nature that helped to kick-start the WEP.1 His invention, the Duck, was featured among 
the four ‘first generation’ wave energy devices in the programme and he remained a key, 
and persistently vocal, part of the WEP through the 1970s and 1980s.2  
 
The Salter Duck 
When Stephen Salter, an academic at Edinburgh University, wrote to Peter Walker, the 
Secretary of State at the DTI, in December 1973 about his developments in wave power 
technology he could not have anticipated the content of the yet to be published CPRS 
report, Energy Conservation, which would give the potential of wave energy such a 
prominent endorsement.3 In his letter he modestly offered some idea of the ‘promising’ 
nature of his research, before solemnly wishing Walker best wishes ‘in your present 
difficulties’.4 In an oft-repeated anecdote, Salter would explain that just a few months 
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earlier, with a heavy cold and amid the gloom of the oil crisis he had been inspired by his 
wife ‘to solve the energy crisis’.5  
 
What she wanted was something which would provide the vast amounts 
needed, which would be clean and safe, would work in the winter in 
Scotland and would last forever. It is a good thing for an engineer to have 
the design objective clearly specified.6  
 
 He quickly set to work on his domestically inspired design challenge. Gordon 
Goodwin later commented on Salter’s ‘extraordinary position of an established lecturer 
with no lecturing responsibilities’ and this allowed him the freedom to pursue his ideas 
with vigour (and the resources of the University of Edinburgh).7 He already had a ‘lavishly 
equipped toolroom and electronics laboratory’ and his work within the University’s 
research departments also allowed him access to a small test tank with a basic wave-
maker.8 After some preliminary research on the characteristics of waves and some 
calculations on the likely scale of the resource, he began to experiment with devices to 
extract energy from the sea waves (see fig.5.1). Beginning with a simple ball-cock float 
device (fig.5.1, 2.1A), he estimated that he was able to extract around 15 per cent of the 
available energy. Later, by hinging the mechanism below the surface of the water (fig.1, 
2.1B) he was able to improve this figure to nearer 60 per cent.  As he wrote later ‘It looked 
as if the to and fro movement was better than the more obvious up and down’. After some 
experimentation with flaps in the water, Salter had a couple of initial designs which he 
called the Kite (fig.5.1, 2.1D) and the Tadpole (fig.5.1, 2.1E) after each of their shapes. At 
this point Salter realised that he needed to know much more about waves. Britain’s sea-
faring traditions mean that it was well served with wave data, and Salter met with Laurie 
Draper, from the British Oceanographic Data Service, who was by coincidence visiting 
Edinburgh around the time. Earlier in that same year, Draper had also advised Goodwin on 
the potential of wave energy. Greatly encouraged by his discussions with Draper, it was at 
this point that Salter wrote to the DTI. 
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Figure 5.1 
The evolution of Salter’s wave power device designs  
 
 
 
Source: Salter, S., ‘Looking Back’, in Cruz, J (ed.), Ocean Wave Energy: Current Status and Future 
Prospects (Springer: Heidelberg, 2008) Fig. 2.1, p.9 
 
 Salter’s letter to Peter Walker included a brief four-page summary of his work so 
far on wave power. At that time Salter was working in the Bionics Research Laboratory at 
Edinburgh’s School of Artificial Intelligence, and he later speculated about the likely 
bewildering effect that this might have on the reception that his letter received.9 Before 
Christmas 1973 Salter received a prompt and courteous reply from the DTI thanking him 
for his letter, and noting that ‘the points which you make, and the figures quoted in the 
accompanying paper, are both interesting and striking’.10 Happily for Salter, his letter and 
report were then passed to Gordon Goodwin, who also had responsibility within the DTI 
for dealing with what he called the ‘oddball enquiries’.11 Despite being put off by what he 
dismissed as some ‘distracting facetiousness’ within Salter’s report, Goodwin recognised 
                                            
9 Ross, Power, p.43. In an interview with Ross, Gordon Goodwin confirmed that he treated Salter’s letter 
with skepticism at first, owing to its unusual sounding origins. He went so far as to telephone the Edinburgh 
University switchboard to check that Salter existed and ensure that he was not the victim of an elaborate 
departmental hoax. 
10 TNA, EG 16/13, DTI to Salter, 17 December 1973 
11 Ross, Power, p.43 
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the ‘sound and original thinking’ that it contained: particularly, as Salter’s initial claims for 
the potential of wave energy appeared to confirm his own earlier estimates.12  
 
 ‘As a matter of urgency’ Goodwin visited Salter at Edinburgh in late January 1974 
to see for himself the developments that had been made.13 He was greatly impressed by 
Salter’s work and reassured (and it appears, relieved) that many of his own calculations of 
device efficiency produced for the CPRS report were confirmed by Salter during this visit. 
During the period between writing his initial letter and Goodwin’s visit, Salter had been 
working steadily on improving his designs. With the help of colleagues, such as the 
mathematician Denis Mollinson at Heriot-Watt University, he had been working towards 
an ‘optimal shape’ for his device. Quite quickly he arrived at a basic varnished balsa wood 
model that he initially called the ‘pregnant Duck’ (fig.5.1, 2.1F). To his delight and 
amazement he found that this shape could achieve a staggering energy conversion 
efficiency of around 90 per cent.14  
 
 Goodwin’s account of his visit betrays both a scientist’s enthusiasm (Goodwin was 
trained as a biologist) for the potential of wave power technology, and some mixed 
personal views about Salter’s own understanding of that potential. He describes Salter as ‘a 
man of impressive ability’ and ‘outstanding talent’. Noting that ‘some of the pieces of his 
work I saw were of astonishing quality, both in conception and finish.’  However, he then 
goes on to write ‘At this point the adulation has to stop, as Mr Salter’s imagination appears 
to stop, at the boundaries of his device.’  Introducing what was to become a recurrent 
theme in the development of renewables in the UK, Goodwin explains that Salter,   
 
…tends towards the grandiose and panacea like in his thinking and has 
difficulties in appreciating that any major undertaking has to fit in with 
existing economic structure, must be costed on a totally comprehensive 
basis, and has to compete with other dominant calls upon National [sic] 
resources. 15 
 
 Notwithstanding this critical view of some aspects of Salter’s thinking Goodwin 
judged that Salter ‘had a great deal to offer’ and recommended to the Department that 
                                            
12 TNA, EG 16/13, Note for the file, ‘Wave Power’. ‘…as a matter of incident much of his approach 
paralleled my own ideas on the subject of wave energy extraction’  
13 TNA, EG 16/13, Note for the file, ‘Wave Power’ 
14 TNA, EG 16/48, ‘Light from the Face of the Deep?’ 
15 TNA, EG 16/13, Note for the file, ‘Wave Power’ 
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Salter be given support to carry out his research ‘either directly or through NEL’.16 During 
his visit he made Salter aware that a report on wave energy had been commissioned from 
NEL and encouraged Salter to consult with them. Following the visit, responding to a 
specific request from Salter, Goodwin set out in a  subsequent letter the ‘official’ position 
of the new DoEn on his work; ‘we are impressed by your work and hope that you will be 
kind enough to keep us informed of the progress you make’. Salter had also asked for 
confirmation that the DoEn ‘would be happy’ to let the DoEn’s position on his work ‘be 
known publicly’, and Goodwin was able to confirm this.  
 
 With a delay in any possible funding from the DoEn, Salter was keen to be allowed 
the freedom to pursue alternative sources of funding. This is an example of Salter’s keen 
awareness of the value of publicity for his work, which was to recur throughout the WEP. 
Another recurring, and arguably more crucial theme, in Goodwin’s letter was the focus on 
the economics of wave power. He took the opportunity to remind Salter of the ‘next 
essential step in the furtherance of your ideas...a comprehensively based costing of the 
power that could be produced by such a scheme’.17 For the moment however, it was clear 
that the commissioning of the NEL wave power study placed constraints on the DoEn 
when it came to the funding of wave R&D projects until the study had produced its 
recommendations.   
 
‘Distracting facetiousness’? 
Goodwin clearly found some of the content in Salter’s four-page outline of his initial 
findings irritating. This probably refers to the brief introduction and the closing sentence of 
what otherwise was an overwhelmingly impenetrable (for the non-science trained reader) 
document. The final sentence in the report could perhaps be charitably forgiven as a weak 
attempt at humour. Here, among the acknowledgements, Salter thanked ‘Sheikh Ahmed 
Zaki Yemeni and OPEC for their continuing support’. Evidently Salter had more 
confidence in this particular joke as it was later repeated in the conclusions of his highly 
regarded Nature paper.18 Probably more annoying to Goodwin was Salter’s - again, widely 
repeated - reference in the introduction to the environmental arguments for renewable 
energy. Salter had written, ‘There are people, until recently regarded as eccentric, who 
                                            
16 TNA, EG 16/13, Note for the file, ‘Wave Power’ 
17 TNA, EG 16/13, Goodwin to Salter, 12 February 1974  
18 SA, Salter to Piper, 28 May 1974. In this letter to Nature over corrections to his article, Salter thanks the 
editor for ‘leaving me my Sheikh.’  
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question our practice of treating as income those resources which our descendants will 
regard as capital.’19  
 
 As discussed in chapter 2, a key strand of the new environmental movement of the 
early 1970s was the famous ‘limits to growth’ thesis advanced by the Meadows team at 
MIT, and in the UK by The Ecologist magazine’s, Blueprint for Survival.20 Each of these 
publications strongly rejected the ‘solution’ to energy resource depletion offered by 
nuclear power on the grounds of safety and waste disposal, and the fledgling 
environmental groups, such as Friends of the Earth UK (FoEUK) campaigned against 
nuclear energy.  Therefore in the early part of the 1970s (and until very recently) to adopt 
an environmental stance was equated with being ‘anti-nuclear’, and arguably this is the 
message that Goodwin would have taken from Salter’s opening statement.  
 
 Despite this, what would become notable throughout the government’s early 
renewable energy programme was the absence of explicit references to environmental 
arguments. Arguably less surprising is the total lack of criticism of nuclear energy, 
although during the 1970s and 1980s the two issues - renewable energy and nuclear energy 
- seemed inextricably linked through constant economic comparison. Earlier comments 
(see chapter 3) made it clear that the renewables programme was an ‘insurance’ against 
failure in nuclear development. Therefore, this lack of criticism is explained on one hand 
by the pervasive involvement of the UK nuclear community in the renewable energy 
programme, both by location (Harwell) and influence (ETSU and Walter Marshall). 
However, it is also explained by the continuing official faith in nuclear energy as the 
energy of the future, despite a problematic history of development.21 Therefore, before the 
widespread awareness and acceptance of climate change emerged in the 1990s the official 
drivers for renewable energy resided mainly in their potential to meet UK energy needs in 
a cost-effective way and (as explained in chapter 3) more specifically as an ‘insurance 
option’ against failure in the nuclear programme. 
 
                                            
19 TNA, EG 16/13, ‘Wave Power: by Stephen Salter, School of Artificial Intelligence, University of 
Edinburgh’ This phrase reappeared in the introduction to Salter’s funding applications to the Science 
Research Council and the Wolfson Foundation in 1974. TNA, EG 16/13, ‘Power for the Sea Waves – A 
Proposal to the Science Research Council’, S. Salter,  March 1974;  
20 Goldsmith, Blueprint; Meadows et al., Limits. 
21  Williams, Decisions. 
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 During November 1973, as he was forming his ideas on wave energy, Salter had 
attended a conference at the Royal Society in London on ‘Energy in the Eighties’ 
addressed by among others, Peter Walker (perhaps planting the idea for his subsequent 
letter). At the conference Salter came across a copy of a pamphlet, World Energy - Facts, 
Issues and Opinions, written by Amory Lovins of the recently formed UK branch of 
Friends of the Earth (FoEUK) that had been actively promoted by the new environmental 
group during the conference.22 He sought out Lovins at the conference and discussed his 
ideas for wave energy.23 Salter wrote later that the pamphlet ‘influenced me profoundly’. It 
clearly satisfied his academic and scientific sensibilities with its ‘meticulous detail’ and 
‘hundreds of references’ and set out ’how long [energy] might last, and what might be the 
side effects’. It was a pivotal moment for Salter. He wrote that after reading the pamphlet 
‘energy research was no longer a bit of a joke for me to fill in between projects. It was 
time, if the light water pressure-vessel designers will forgive the expression, to get 
cracking’.24   
 
 Salter’s private correspondence particularly through the 1970s is peppered with 
references to his strong anti-nuclear beliefs.25 In one letter he stated plainly that ‘...my 
motivation for carrying out this research project is based on my fear of nuclear power’26 
and in another that this was ‘...a strong motivation to the whole of our team…’27 His 
resistance to a nuclear future was repeatedly made plain, built on a growing public 
awareness of the problems of nuclear energy, focussing on safety, decommissioning, and 
waste disposal. But he was persistently meticulous in his care to avoid any public 
statements or connections with anti-nuclear groups or sentiments.28 He received repeated 
invitations to address environmental groups, but declined all of these politely, always 
stressing the sensitive nature of his position within the UK energy establishment; ‘to attract 
the attention of the very powerful nuclear establishment in this country would be unwise at 
this stage and so I am not able to say everything that I feel about the nuclear industry.’29 
                                            
22 Patterson, W., ‘A Decade of Friendship: The first ten years’, in Wilson, D. (ed.), The Environmental 
Crisis: A Handbook for all Friends of the Earth, (London: Heinemann, 1984) p.145 
23 SA, Salter to Lovins, 29 April 1974  
24 TNA, EG 16/13, ‘Wave Power: by Stephen Salter’. My italics. At the time the American- designed Light 
Water Reactor was at the centre of the debates over reactor-choice for the UK. It was regarded by its critics 
as unsafe.  
25 Some examples among very many include, SA, Salter to Davies, 7 January 1975; Salter to Morgan-
Grenville, 20 January 1975; Salter to Cookson, 12 May 1976; Salter to Orlowski, 26 September 1975 
26 SA, Salter to Cookson, 12 May 1976 
27 SA, Salter to Boles, 15 July 1976. 
28 SA, Salter to Cookson, 12 May 1976. ‘I would be very reluctant for this to be stated publicly…’  
29 SA, Salter to Orlowski, 26 September 1975. 
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Despite this care, from the moment of his first contact, it was perhaps clear to some within 
the DoEn that Salter was motivated by somewhat differing aims than those of the wider 
programme. Equally clear was Salter’s eloquence and skill in dealing with the media. This 
would help to explain Goodwin’s repeated insistence on ‘cost-effectiveness’ and his 
discomfort with Salter’s quasi-environmental statements.  
 
Initial funding 
By March 1974 Salter, realising that no research funding was likely to come directly from 
the DoEn in the meantime, submitted proposals for funding to the Science Research 
Council (SRC) and to the Wolfson Foundation.30 The SRC proposal sought funding of 
£66k over three years, whilst an almost identical proposal to the Wolfson was for £74k 
over the same period.  Salter sent copies of the proposals to Goodwin and provided him 
with regular updates on his work. He mentioned some of the individuals that he had been 
consulting with, such as Michael Longuet-Higgins (‘the top wave man’), as useful names 
to mention if Goodwin felt ‘able to influence SRC’.31 By early July, after seeking the 
advice of the DoEn, the SRC responded to Salter’s proposal with an offer of just £6,900 
over 2 years, which Salter declined.32 The SRC were frightened off by the large capital 
investment that Salter’s proposals involved (£30k) and suggested that he should undertake 
a ‘more thorough examination of the theoretical aspects and engineering feasibility’ before 
launching the larger-scale experiments that his proposal suggested. This was a 
disappointment for Salter and Goodwin, who both felt that the NEL report would provide 
much of what the SRC recommended and that what was needed from Salter was a more 
experimental approach.33 Disappointingly for Salter and Goodwin, the Wolfson 
Foundation reached similar conclusions.  
 
 Whilst awaiting the outcome of his grant proposals Salter had continued his wave 
power research at Edinburgh. The establishment of ETSU had heightened interest in 
renewable energy during the mid-part of the year, and Salter had published what proved to 
be a much-cited article on wave power in the respected journal Nature in June 1974.34  
                                            
30 TNA, EG 16/13, ‘Power for the Sea Waves – A Proposal to the Science Research Council’, S. Salter,  
March 1974;  
31 TNA, EG 16/14, Salter to Goodwin, 2 April 1974 
32 TNA, EG 16/14,  SRC to Salter, 9 July 1974 
33 Ross, Power, p.46. Goodwin also noted later that the SRC had previously provided substantial funding 
(£2.5m) for a project by a team at Edinburgh (featuring Salter) which had ended in a rather embarrassing 
failure. 
34 Nature, ‘Wave Power’, S. H. Salter, 249, 21 June 1974, pp. 720-4 
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This was picked up by some of the popular media newly obsessed by energy, and articles 
began to appear on the government’s investigations at NEL into wave power potential.35 
Attracted by the publicity, and by the recommendations of the CPRS report, the CEGB 
also began to consider the possibilities of wave power around the same time. Don Gore, 
Deputy Chief Scientific Officer at the DoEn (and Goodwin’s immediate superior), wrote to 
Salter in June 1974 to advise him that Donald Swift-Hook from the CEGB’s Marchwood 
Laboratory in Southampton was heading a programme of research into the potential of 
wave power.36 He suggested to Salter that this could result in some CEGB funding for his 
research. 
 
 When the news of Salter’s largely unsuccessful applications to the SRC and the 
Wolfson Foundation emerged in July, the DoEn acted swiftly to locate other sources of 
funding for his research. Undoubtedly the main motivation for this was the belief – mainly 
from Goodwin and now Gore – that wave power research had some value, but political 
considerations were also important.  With the recent launch of ETSU and the media 
interest in wave power inspired by the publication of the CPRS report (also in June 1974), 
it was important that the DoEn was seen to be moving forward in its efforts to seek 
solutions to the energy crisis: and it was to ETSU that Gore turned first. In a revealing 
letter he referred to the ‘sordid’ difficulties that surrounded the funding of the NEL report 
(due to the reorganisation of the DTI at that time) and the continuing problems in finding 
funds for the ‘kind of work’ that Salter was doing.  He indicated that Salter had claimed 
that he would have to halt his research on wave power and that the respected New Scientist 
wanted to publish a ‘sob article, no doubt inspired by Salter, on the lack of Government 
support’. Gore asked Dawson for ‘a few thousand pounds (Salter suggested £8,000)’ from 
the ‘ETSU or Harwell budget’, and revealed that he has already had the approval, in 
principle, of Walter Marshall.37 A few weeks later Dawson replied, highlighting the 
limitations of the ETSU budget, but with an offer of £4,000 and the chance of further 
funding when subsequent ETSU budgets were set.38  
 
 Realising that only limited funding could be extracted from the limited ETSU 
budget, the ENT division of the DoEn decided on an alternative approach. Len Leighton 
                                            
35 The Daily Mail, ‘Britain probe wave power’, Daily Mail reporter, I July 1974; The Guardian, ‘Coupling of 
swells’, Anthony Tucker, 5 July 1974 
36 TNA, EG 16/14, Gore to Salter, 25 June 1974 
37 TNA, EG 16/14, Gore to Dawson, 25 July 1974 
38 TNA, EG 16/14, Dawson to Gore, 19 August 1974  
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wrote to Maddock, the Chief Scientist at the DoI, in July to make him aware of the 
situation with Salter’s SRC application, and to advise that NEL had agreed to work with 
Salter on any future wave power R&D that he might undertake.39 NEL was a highly 
regarded section of the DoI at this time. Salter himself had already written to Maddock in 
February as part of his personal campaign to raise awareness of wave energy.40 After 
advising that they themselves had no funds for this type of project, Leighton suggested to 
Maddock that the natural result of any developments would result in ‘hardware 
development in the engineering field’ and would therefore be ‘right in your court’.41 The 
DoEn had earlier expressed some anxiety over retaining control over wave power R&D 
amid the gathering publicity that Salter’s work was receiving, and this approach to a ‘rival’ 
department illustrates the risks that Gore, Goodwin, and others were prepared to take in 
order that the research be continued.42  
 
 In the event, the positive response of NEL to Salter’s work proved to be decisive.43 
In August 1974 a series of meetings were held at NEL in East Kilbride and at Salter’s lab 
at Edinburgh University, attended by representatives from the DoEn and the DoI at which 
Salter gave ‘a particularly impressive demonstration of his experimental approach and of 
his self made equipment.44 Another creation of the Heath government, along with the 
CPRS (see chapter 3), had been the Requirements Boards. These were set up within key 
government departments to control the funding of new projects. For wave power the 
Mechanical Engineering and Machine Tools Requirements Board (MEMTRB) was 
regarded as the most relevant body, and accordingly they were invited along to these initial 
meetings. Verbal assurances of support from DoI were given to Salter at the meeting itself, 
and by October 1974 the official announcement was made that he was to receive support of 
£66k over three years (the amount he had originally sought from the SRC) through the 
MEMTRB. This represented the start of government-funded wave power R&D in the UK, 
                                            
39 TNA, EG 16/14, Leighton to Maddock, 31 July 1974 
40 SA, Salter to Maddock, 24 February 1974. The letter was a typical example of Salter’s self-deprecating 
approach. He begins ‘The present paper shortage has been attributed to the great number of inventors sending 
in helpful suggestions for the solution of our energy problems, which could perhaps be solved by their 
efficient incineration.’ 
41 TNA, EG 16/14, Leighton to Maddock, 31 July 1974  
42 TNA, EG 16/14, Gore to Leighton, 26 June 1974. In a handwritten addition to the letter, Gore expresses 
the fear that the involvement of the CEGB and ACORD may mean that the DoEn ‘may not be seen as being 
in a key position’.  
43 TNA, EG 16/14, Leishman (NEL) to Gore, 25 July 1974; Summerfield (MEMTRB) to Leishman (NEL), 
12 August 1974 
44 TNA, EG 16/14, Note for the file ‘Wave Energy –Support for S H Salter at Edinburgh University’, 9 
September 1974. This note contains Goodwin’s brief account of the two meetings. 
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achieved in large part by a partnership of Salter’s impressive technical ability and 
ingenuity and Goodwin’s indefatigable search for funding.  
 
Leading from the rear:45 Gordon Goodwin 
Gordon Goodwin was a key figure in the development of wave power in the UK, and his 
role raises the question of ‘influence’ and ‘influential figures’ in the renewable energy 
programme. In previous chapters I have emphasised the roles that high-status figures such 
as Lord Rothschild and Walter Marshall played in the development of wave power. Both 
of these individuals, by nature of their contrasting positions, were able to bring about the 
creation of the WEP, and as such they could both be judged as influential. In the case of 
Marshall, much of this influence was due to his wide-ranging responsibilities as Chief 
Scientist, chair of ACORD, and director of Harwell. In this sense he acted both as a 
symbolic and physical link between groups and was able to bring pressure to bear on a 
number of diverse groups. I would suggest that Goodwin played a similar, and arguably 
more important, role in this regard. Although in comparison to Marshall, he occupied a 
junior position within the DoEn, Goodwin’s long civil service experience provided him 
with a network through which he was able to steer and establish the early wave 
programme. 
 
 In contrast with Salter, who actively sought publicity for the benefit of his work on 
wave power (and for a brief period in the 1970s became a familiar face in the media) 
Gordon Goodwin remained a behind-the-scenes figure throughout the WEP. Ross provides 
an interesting portrait of Goodwin ‘a man withdrawn and taciturn’ in his book, Power from 
the Waves, where he describes him as ‘the best ally of wave energy inside the Civil 
Service.46 Certainly from the evidence it appears that within government Goodwin had 
waged a subtle one-man campaign for wave energy since he compiled his first report for 
the DTI early in 1973. As noted previously he was largely responsible for the inclusion, if 
not the prominence, of the recommendation for wave power R&D included in the CPRS 
report. All of the existing correspondence in the archives on wave energy from the 
commissioning of the NEL report to the closure of the programme features significant 
input from Goodwin. Despite misgivings over aspects of Salter’s personality, he worked 
                                            
45 TNA, EG 16/14, ET 51/03, Goodwin to Gore, 16 August 1974. In an illuminating comment, referring to 
the way forward for wave energy Goodwin stated ‘I would wish to lead from the rear however.’ This reflects 
some personal modesty perhaps, but also emphasises an awareness of the importance of his role in advancing 
the case for wave power.  
46 Ross, Power, pp. 43-51 
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tirelessly through 1974 to secure funding for his wave energy research, and it is largely 
through his creative approach, and the enlistment of more senior support within the DoEn, 
that funding was eventually secured. Following the establishment of the WEP this effort 
was no longer required, but Goodwin remained a key figure at the heart of wave energy 
throughout, via his insider position as a member of WESC and his role as secretary of 
ACORD.  
 
‘We are on our way’47 
The announcement of funding for Salter attracted a good deal of attention. Both he and Sir 
Christopher Cockerell were interviewed on BBC Radio 4 news programmes, and various 
stories appeared in the press.48 Salter already knew Cockerell reasonably well having spent 
some time as an apprentice engineer at British Hovercraft.49 On the 7 October 1974 The 
Times reported the news of Salter’s funding on the front page of the newspaper.50 
Cockerell had also been working on devices to harness wave power for around the same 
time as Salter, although he later commented rather sourly that Salter had the advantage of a 
university laboratory to advance his work, whereas he had been left to fund any initial 
research privately. During 1974 Cockerell had been in touch with the DoEn, providing 
them with updates on the progress of his design for a floating raft device. As early as 
February 1974 the DoEn had noted that he would soon be in touch looking for funding, 
and indicated that this would likely be forthcoming.51   
 
 In this period prior to the founding of the WEP, other wave power projects had also 
joined the research effort, drawing on a range of funds. In a memo dated 16 August 1974 
Goodwin outlined the institutions that were either ‘actively working in this field or have 
test facilities and an expressed interest in making a contribution’.52 They included; 
 
 
                                            
47 SA, Salter to Austin, 6 August 1975. ‘W****w**d B**n says that wave power is the next best thing after 
nuclear. We are on our way.’  
48 TNA, EG 16/51m, BBC R4 ‘The World at One’, interview with Sir Christopher Cockerell, 7 October 
1974; TNA, EG 16/49, BBC R4 ‘Today’, interview with Salter, 29 October 1974;  The Sunday Times, 
‘Harnessing white-horse power’, Bryan Silcock, 13 October 1974; The Guardian, ‘Power research waved 
on’. Anthony Tucker, 29 October 1974;  
49 SA, Salter to Ross, 29 May 1978. Salter wrote that British Hovercraft ‘taught me just as much as 
Cambridge’.  
50 The Times, ‘Government approves project for power form sea waves’ Michael Bailey and Pierce Wright, 7 
October 1974 
51 TNA, EG 16/13, Leighton to Gore, 12 February 1974  
52 TNA, EG 16/14, ET51/03, Goodwin to Gore, 16 August 1974 
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o NEL - East Kilbride 
o CEGB Marchwood Laboratories – team led by Dr D Swift-Hook 
o S. H. Salter - University of Edinburgh 
o Gifford & Partners – test tank work in collaboration with British Hovercraft 
Corporation (Sir Christopher Cockerell)  
o NPL Ships Division - Feltham 
o Hydraulics Research Station - Wallingford  
o British Hydrodynamics Research Association – Cranfield  
o Admiralty Research Laboratories - Teddington 53 
 
 The extent of interest gives some indication of what Gore described as the 
‘infectious nature of wave energy R&D’.54 Ironically, given the difficulty in securing funds 
for Salter, most of these projects would have been funded indirectly by the Treasury, 
through each institution’s annual budget. The most notable example being the CEGB team 
under Swift-Hook which by this time had allocated £50,000 for a ‘practical programme’ on 
wave energy that sought to ‘supplement rather than duplicate’ the work of Salter and 
NEL.55 Therefore, even before the official launch of a wave power programme the 
government funded R&D effort in wave energy had expanded. In this way the WEP can be 
understood as an obvious next step in co-ordination.  
 
 With government funding in place Salter was able to continue development of what 
had now become known, more simply, as the Duck (fig.5.1, 2.1F).56 Having arrived with 
speed at an optimal shape for his wave energy device, the Edinburgh team now turned its 
attention to fine-tuning the other aspects of the device. Their three-year plan was focussed 
mainly on perfecting and extending the single Duck to a ‘multi-vane’ model arranged 
along a single spine or ‘backbone’. Typical of the month-by-month plan was the entry for 
May-July 1976 ‘Analysis, Writing, Thinking, trying anti-bending moment tricks’. Also 
included was the plan to build a dedicated wave maker, which would be housed in a new 
building at Edinburgh University.57 Arising from its pole position in wave energy R&D, 
Edinburgh was to have enviable test-tank facilities throughout the WEP - often much to 
Salter’s annoyance, as this inevitably created a stream of requests to use the facilities or to 
                                            
53 Ibid. 
54 TNA, EG, 16/14, ET 51/03, Gore to Leighton, 26 June 1974 
55 Ibid.  
56 Salter et al, ‘The architecture of nodding duck wave power generators’, The Naval Architect, January 1976. 
‘The reason for the choice of the term ‘duck’ is not entirely frivolous; new ideas need new names and it is 
well to keep them short and descriptive.’ p.21  
57 SA, First Year Interim Report on Edinburgh Wave Power Project “Study of Mechanisms for Extracting 
Power from Sea Waves” September 1975, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Edinburgh 
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simply look.58 Salter wrote that, ‘There seem to be more than 365 people in the world who 
feel entitled to a day’s outing to look at wave models.’59 The constant parade of observers 
was eventually to include television crews, Government ministers, Select Committees, and 
even royalty (the Duke of Edinburgh).  
 
 In his first-year report dated September 1975 the Edinburgh team showed good 
progress on the agreed plan, despite the illness (causing temporary paralysis below the 
waist) of David Jeffrey, Salter’s trusted assistant. Salter reported that much of the work on 
apparatus scheduled for early 1976 had been completed, and that the ‘second-phase’ of the 
work on the wave maker building (scheduled initially for January 1977) could be brought 
forward. High inflation was having an impact on the programme, and he noted that he had 
been forced to ‘defer orders since June to avoid overspending’. Included in his report was a 
section on ‘new cost planning’. With perhaps a nod to Goodwin, Salter ended his report 
with a low-key reference to economics, couched in recognisably civil service terms, ‘On 
the basis of one year’s work I can say that the possibility of economic power from sea 
waves has not been excluded.’ 60 
 
Commercial partners: Sea Energy Associates 
At the end of the 1980s, as the Government was clearly backing away from further public 
expenditure on renewable energy, much was made of the need for ‘industry’ to become 
‘increasingly involved in research, development and demonstration activities, eventually 
taking these functions over from Government.’ 61This was somewhat misleading as 
commercial involvement had been a notable aspect of the UK renewable energy 
programme from the 1970s, particularly, as will be seen in chapter 6, for wind energy.  
Wave energy was also developed from the outset with the aid of a range of partners from 
‘industry’. Previous chapters have referred to a ‘government’ programme, and indeed the 
WEP was managed and derived the majority of its funding from the DoEn budget. 
However, throughout the programme commercial capital and expertise featured 
prominently - particularly within the two leading wave device teams of Salter and 
Cockerell.  
                                            
58 SA, Salter to Dundas (Information Officer, Edinburgh University) 16 January 1975 
59 SA, Salter to Gregory, 25 February 1975 
60 SA, First Year Interim Report on Edinburgh Wave Power Project “Study of Mechanisms for Extracting 
Power from Sea Waves” September 1975, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Edinburgh 
61 Department of Energy, Renewable Energy in the UK: The Way Forward, Energy Paper 55 (London: 
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 Sir Christopher Cockerell had formed one of the earliest wave energy firms, 
Wavepower Limited, by February 1974; made up of a consortium of McAlpines, Gifford 
and Partners, British Hovercraft, and Cockerell himself.62 When the WEP was launched in 
1976, Wavepower Ltd formed a public/private partnership with the DoEn, which along 
with SEA Ltd routinely attracted the largest portion of the programme’s budget. Salter also 
recognised the advantages that could be gained, both financially and technically, through 
the inclusion of industrial partners and from early on he sought out suitable candidates. 
 
 Salter complained (to an industrialist) in 1972 that his ‘big problem’ was ‘finding 
intelligent sympathetic industrialists’.63 From late 1973 he had been in touch with a 
number of commercial firms, seeking funding and support for his wave work.64 This 
included a disastrous exchange with Shell which resulted in Salter travelling to the Shell 
research facility in Rijswijk in the Netherlands only to be mistaken, to his great 
displeasure, for a job applicant.65 However, by mid-1975, after ‘some rather disappointing 
discussions with Lithgows, Langs [sic] (and […] Taylor Woodrow)’ 66, he had managed to 
secure interest in supporting his work from Ready Mixed Concrete (UK) Ltd (RMC). As 
Salter proposed that the full-scale Ducks should be constructed from concrete this was 
perhaps a logical tie-in for all concerned. The contact arose through an ‘inventive’ 
engineer at the civil engineering firm, Edmund Nuttall Ltd., called Eric Wood.67 
Stimulated by the publicity for wave power during 1974 Wood was inspired to make 
contact with Salter and explore the possibilities of collaboration and commercial 
exploitation. He was responsible for developing the contact with RMC, and for bringing 
Norman Bellamy (his cousin) based at Lanchester Polytechnic, into wave energy.68  
However, the latter step would prove to be the source of bitter disagreements with Salter 
that would eventually end the SEA partnership.  
 
                                            
62 TNA, EG 16/13, Leighton to Gore, 12 February 1974 
63 SA, Salter to Huffan Ltd., 27 November 1972 
64 Some examples include, SA, Salter to Trelevan (Annfield Engineering) 9 January 1974; Salter to Rodgers 
(Shell), 6 December 1973; Salter to Marsh (Procter & Lavender Ltd., 28 January 1974; Salter to Wright 
(John Laing) 8 August 1975; Salter to McCullough (I. J. McCullough Inc. USA) 10 August 1975; Salter to 
Davies (Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd.), 15 January 1976  
65 SA, Salter to Rodgers (Shell), 6 December 1973; Salter to Starling (Shell), 11 April 1974; Salter to Bellis 
(Shell), 17 June 1974. In his letter to Bellis, after insisting that he be recompensed for his time at his ‘normal 
consulting rate of £30 per hour’ , he concluded by asking “I would like to know the name of the person who 
instigated the visit and what precisely he hoped to achieve’.  
66 TNA, EG 16/80, WESC(76)P81,  ‘Organisation of Wave Power Programme by C. O. J. Palmer’, 1976. 
Grove-Palmer notes that none ‘were agreeable to putting in their own funds’.  
67 TNA, EG 16/80, WESC(76)P81,  ‘Organisation of Wave Power Programme by C. O. J. Palmer’, 1976. p.3 
68 Salter interview 
143 
 Prior to the announcement of the DoEn’s £1m wave energy programme, Wood and 
Bellamy had themselves submitted a joint proposal for funding to MEMTRB. This had 
also been the source of Salter’s earlier funding, and the initial deliberations of the Wave 
Energy Steering Committee (WESC) clearly identified this as the primary funding source 
for UK wave power development. However, the minutes of the meeting which considered 
the Wood/Bellamy proposal record that it received a fairly hostile reception. Goodwin 
noted,  
 
In seeking their presentation the WESC representatives had the evident 
goodwill of both the board secretariat and the chairman. Despite this the 
board came close at times to a unanimous rejection of the proposals and 
quite an amount of this goodwill was used up. 69  
 
 
 Eventually MEMTRB approved funding by ‘reluctant consensus, but by no means 
unanimous, agreement’. In the end, this uncomfortable meeting was perhaps unnecessary 
as the DoEn soon after took over wave power funding. However, it established the 
credibility of Wood and Bellamy and resulted in the formation of Sea Energy Associates 
Limited. 
 
 During the Wood/Bellamy presentation to MEMTRB the issue of commercial 
interest in wave energy was raised, as the Chairman read a letter from RMC ‘declaring 
their interest in contributing a 50% stake’. The reaction of the meeting illustrates a 
developing awareness of the advantages of early industrial partnerships in government-
sponsored R&D and an example of the declinist thinking that pervaded Britain during the 
1970s. 
 
The Chairman suggested that industrial participation might be premature. 
There was a chorus of disagreement with this sentiment as being quite 
opposed to the objectives and function of the board. It was strongly asserted 
that industrial failure to exploit innovatory ideas was a marked feature of 
poor UK economic performance.70 
 
The possibility of commercial involvement immediately raised the question of patent 
ownership. During his earlier visit to London when he experienced his renewable energy 
                                            
69 TNA, EG 16/64, WESC(75)P31, Note ‘Presentation to MEMTRB of LPI application’ , G. A. Goodwin, 1 
December 1975  
70 TNA, EG 16/64, WESC(75)P31, Note ‘Presentation to MEMTRB of LPI application’ , G. A. Goodwin, 1 
December 1975 
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epiphany Salter had filed a provisional patent for his wave device, which he subsequently 
assigned to Edinburgh University in May 1974.71 Edinburgh University wrote to Peter 
Young, Director of RMC, in October 1975 to assure him that ‘the University certainly 
considers that it is the legal owner of the original Salter patent’ and although they 
confirmed that they had applied for Government funding none ‘was forthcoming’ to 
support his original work.72 RMC were obviously reassured and by December 1975 the 
registered company, Sea Energy Associates Limited (SEA), had been formed. Although 
initially wholly owned by RMC, agreement had been reached that 49 per cent of the shares 
would be transferred to another company ‘probably to be called Marenco’ which would be 
jointly owned by another commercial partner, Insituform Ltd. (a division of Edmund 
Nuttall Ltd.), as well as Salter, and Norman Bellamy.73  Young confirmed that,  
 
RMC have agreed to support (subject to certain safeguards) research 
expenditure totalling £230,000 over the first two years, and are, in principle, 
prepared to support much higher expenditure to finance the construction of a 
quarter scale model commencing in the third year and, of course, assuming 
satisfactory technical progress to that stage. Expenditure from year three 
onwards will run into many hundreds of thousands of pounds. It is hoped 
that the Government will contribute 50% of the expenditure referred to 
above during the first two years’ development programme.74 
 
 Despite the seeming good fortune in attracting commercial interest and significant 
capital at such an early stage in wave energy development, Salter had a prickly relationship 
with industry. He explained in a letter ‘...as an engineer I enjoy a love-hate relationship 
with technology. It only goes sour when the commercial people become too powerful. We 
must find ways of saving the good bits.’75 Therefore it was perhaps not surprising that his 
involvement with SEA was quickly to prove troubled and acrimonious. Crucial to Salter, 
as the comment above suggests, was retaining control of the R&D, and this quickly 
emerged as the source of his disagreements within SEA. Perhaps only his distrust of 
Government involvement outweighed his distaste for ‘commercial people.’ During 
negotiations with RMC he wrote to a friend ‘Wave Power is racing ahead and if we can get 
some private finance the Government will contribute an equal amount and allow us to keep 
                                            
71 SA, Salter to Grove-Palmer, 28 March 1977  
72 SA, Midgley to Young, 8 October 1975. This was an issue that was to reappear for Salter as the WEP was 
wound down after 1982.  
73 SA, Young to Midgley, 19 December 1975 
74 SA, Young to Midgley, 19 December 1975 
75 SA, Salter to Morgan-Grenville, 20 January 1975 
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control. Otherwise they will finance the whole of it and take over themselves.’76 The 
involvement of RMC appeared at the time to have achieved this goal for Salter.   
 
 By late 1975 the Government’s involvement in wave energy had accelerated with 
the establishment of WESC, followed soon after by Alex Eadie’s announcement of a £1m 
wave energy programme (as discussed in chapter 4). Research funding for wave energy 
shifted from the convoluted and difficult process that was necessary to fund Salter initially, 
to an explicit Government programme for wave power. Salter’s earlier fears over 
Government involvement seemed to have been realised and he wrote ‘The vested interests 
of the establishment have jumped onto the bandwagon fairly hard and things seem to be 
getting out of control. I am reminded of the poem about somebody riding a tiger.’ He went 
on to state that with the involvement of RMC ‘we could go independent if necessary’.77 
However, it was unthinkable at the time that the high-profile Salter device would not 
feature prominently in any new Government wave energy programme. Despite continued 
development by Cockerell’s team and new work by NEL on the Masuda device, Salter 
remained at the leading edge of UK wave power R&D. Accordingly, early in March 1976, 
and prior to the official launch of the wave power programme, an innovative private/public 
contract was eventually drawn up between SEA and the DoEn.78  
 
 It was clear that the inclusion of a commercial partner was something of a 
departure for the DoEn, ‘The existence of [SEA] made it necessary to negotiate 
commercial terms quite different from those which would be normal for a University type 
contract.’79 After a ‘protracted series of negotiations’80 a jointly funded programme was 
agreed with each party contributing £202,000 (later increased to £230,000 due to inflation) 
over two years for the ‘development and exploitation of wave power devices based 
substantially on the Salter and SEA patents’.81 The DoEn pressed for control of the 
intellectual property rights, but ‘conceded’ these to SEA on the basis that ‘it was an 
                                            
76 SA, Salter to Brown, 8 August 1975 
77 SA, Salter to Disney, 5 July 1976 
78 TNA, EG 16/50,ET 51/013, Note of a Meeting on 4 march 1976 at Harwell on Salter’s Ducks 
79 TNA, EG 16/100, WESC(76)P59, Contracts for Wave Power 
80 TNA, EG 16/100, WESC(76)P59, Contracts for Wave Power. ‘The difficulties which have been 
encountered in negotiating and drawing up the wave energy contracts for R & D work have been most severe 
in the case of SEA,…’  
81 TNA, EG 16/50, ‘Wave Power: Revised Draft Heads of Agreement’, undated.   
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unimportant matter so long as HMG had free use for their own purposes and adequate 
control over the rights to grant licences.’82 A WESC report stated, 
 
It would be difficult to summarise the whole agreement in a few words but 
it is sufficient to say that: (a) HMG now has secured a position in which 
there will be a fair return on the National investment if it should prove 
possible to make any profit out of the SEA/Salter system; (b) HMG has the 
right to veto overseas licensing if they consider it unnecessary; (c) ETSU 
will have Project management control to ensure that the objectives of the 
feasibility study are achieved. 83 
 
A meeting of SEA Ltd. took place in June 1976 as the initial WEP was being put 
together and reveals some sensitivity about the role that SEA would play in the new 
programme. The minutes stated that, 
 
...difficulty with dealing with various other investigating bodies and 
advisory groups acting on behalf of the Wave Power Steering Committee 
was discussed. It was agreed that these parties had no contractual standing 
with SEA and that in future these bodies should not be given any 
commercially useful information. It was stressed that many of the parties 
investigating had their own commercial interests and that several of these 
parties were certainly being more commercial than SEA in keeping their 
secrets close to their chests. 84 
  
 A key issue arose at this meeting that would ultimately prove to be the cause of 
Salter’s relationship with SEA, and more specifically with Bellamy’s Lanchester team, 
descending into acrimony. Bellamy tabled a paper at the meeting entitled ‘Revised Wave 
Power Development Programme’.85 Bellamy was keen to construct ‘a model of working 
ducks’ immediately, rather than first concentrating efforts (as Salter preferred) on further 
development work on some aspects of the ‘backbone’ of the device within the testing 
tanks. For Bellamy ‘engineering experimentation’ was important at this stage of the 
programme. Salter was also keen to test the device in open water and favoured ‘a one 
metre diameter model sited near Inch Keith on the Firth of Forth’ but Bellamy was 
insistent that a larger-scale model in ‘a more protected inland water where current 
problems would not be met and where the working environment would be safer’ was the 
best way forward. He had already begun conducting tests on 1:60 scale 6-metre string of 
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83 TNA, EG 16/100, WESC(76)P59, Contracts for Wave Power 
84 SA, Minutes of Technical Meeting of Sea Energy Associates Ltd. held at Lanchester Polytechnic at 11.00 
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Ducks at Draycot reservoir, but he was keen to extend this to a 1:15 scale model 50-metre 
string.86 He mentioned Loch Ness as a possible site, though he acknowledged the 
unwelcome slant that the choice of this site may give to the publicity.87 The minutes record 
that ‘the matter was not completely resolved’.  
 
 In the months following the meeting Salter and Bellamy made some attempt to 
resolve their differences. For his part, Salter stated that he was ‘wholeheartedly in accord’ 
with Bellamy on several points. The main one being that ‘our ultimate aim is to produce 
cheap electricity’. However, in what was to become a familiar Salter argument over wave 
R&D, he went on to point out that he made a ‘crucial distinction’ between ‘the ultimate 
aim, and the objectives in the earlier stage of development’.88 Salter’s stated strategy from 
the outset had been to ‘maximise credibility in the shortest time’.89 His comments also 
reveal that Goodwin’s insistence on the crucial role of sound economics in wave power 
had taken hold.  
 
What we must aim for now is to maximise information. And we must do 
this precisely in order that, later on, we can be efficient in the sense that we 
can do the job as cheaply as possible. So we must distinguish between 
sophistication in the early stages in order to gain information and 
sophistication in the final design. If we are sophisticated now we shall know 
how to be cheap later. I consider this principle is the key to the success of 
the project. Do you accept it? 90  
 
Evidently, as events would prove, Bellamy evidently did not accept this principle. Much 
later, in 1979, after the SEA partnership had disintegrated, Salter reminded the 
Maidenhead Wave Energy Conference of the deceptive attraction of ‘simplicity’ in new 
technology.91 Referring to Bellamy’s contention (with whom, by this time, relations were 
very poor) that ‘simplicity should be the over-riding design principle’, Salter responded in 
typical fashion. After a lengthy quote from the Oxford English Dictionary defining 
‘simplicity’, he wrote,  
 
                                            
86 TNA, EG 16/80, ET 172/20/01, Report to ACORD Programme Committee from the Wave Energy 
Steering Committee, December 1976. p.3  
87 This proved, not unexpectedly, an accurate prediction. For an example see, Ross, D., ‘It’s shocking...after 
years of entertaining the world, they’re taking Nessie’s power away’, Daily Express, 29 November 1976. 
88 SA, Salter to Bellamy, 27 December 1976 
89 TNA, EG/49, Salter to Midgley, 30 July 1975 
90 SA, Salter to Bellamy, 27 December 1976. Underlining in original 
91 DoEn, ETSU R9, ‘Wave Energy Steering Committee, Proceedings of a workshop on wave energy, 
Maidenhead, 16-18 December, 1979’.  
148 
It seems to me that ‘simple’ is not a simple word. While I do not argue that 
simplicity is for simpletons, I believe that it is an irrelevant factor, I want to 
get things right whether rightness comes from simplicity or complexity. The 
history of technology has many examples of designs which were ‘right’. 
Very often, these ‘right’ designs are elegant.92 
 
 By the time that Salter had written to Bellamy in December 1976 the decision over 
Loch Ness had already been taken by SEA. During a visit to Lanchester Polytechnic earlier 
that month, Alex Eadie, no doubt keen to demonstrate visible early progress on wave 
energy, had announced that trials of the Duck would take place in Loch Ness during the 
summer of 1977.93 Salter thought that this was a grave error and he was placed in a very 
uncomfortable position by the announcement. He wrote, ‘I am sorry about the Loch Ness 
announcements which resulted from a visit by Eadie to the Lanchester people. It is much 
better to say what you have done rather than what you hope to do but it may get all of the 
monster headlines out of the way early on.’94 The SEA partnership had been formed 
around Salter’s device and the Loch Ness trials would be of his Duck design, yet in the end  
- and through his own choice - he had little involvement with it. He continued work at 
Edinburgh on improvements to the backbone of the Duck and the construction of a new 
wide tank, whilst, as predicted, the press and television were drawn to Loch Ness to see 
‘Salter’s Ducks’.  
 
 After the establishment of the WEP and two years of funding from the DoI, the 
control of Salter’s team passed from NEL (Jim Leishman at NEL had been managing 
Salter’s team) to WESC and Clive Grove-Palmer. Salter’s second-year report for the DoI 
had shown evidence of continued progress and he had been able to report once more ‘we 
can say that the possibility of economic power from the sea waves has still not been 
excluded.’95 He wrote in January 1977 that ‘the duck is still the favourite device’ and 
reported that ‘we have a budget of £180,000 for the next two years with a contribution 
from an industrial group which brings the total up to nearly £500,000.’ 96 Clearly, despite 
his difficulties with Lanchester and the Loch Ness trial, his confidence in the future of 
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government backing for wave energy research remained high and he wrote ‘There are quite 
strong political pressures to give us a higher budget and immense amounts of goodwill.’97  
Through 1977 Salter focused on the construction of a new wide testing tank at Edinburgh 
which he saw as the next logical step in the development of a robust and economic wave 
energy device.  
 
 Grove-Palmer had officially agreed his proposals for the wide tank in March 1977 
and construction began late in 1977. Up until this point the Edinburgh team had been 
testing designs in a borrowed narrow wave tank that resembled an elongated fish tank. This 
had allowed 1:100 scale testing of a single device, but clearly could not accommodate the 
testing of a string of devices that would be required. Salter had designed the Duck as a 
modular device, which could then be incorporated into long strings, forming wave power 
stations of varying size. This would allow strings of Ducks to be added or removed from 
future installations. Many of the early wave devices (such as the Raft) shared this modular 
design, and it was regarded as a positive feature of wave energy. From the beginning Salter 
had been pushing to build a wide testing tank at Edinburgh. He regarded this as an 
essential step in perfecting the design of wave power devices, contrary to the views of 
Bellamy at Lanchester who, as stated above, pressed for the development of scaled-up 
devices in the water. It was clear to Salter that of equal, if not greater, importance than the 
wave device design itself was the design of the mechanism that would couple the devices 
together. In the case of the Duck this was the spine or backbone. The wide tank would 
allow Salter to develop a reliable backbone at 1:150 scale, which he regarded as an optimal 
testing scale. Salter had earlier hired a 1:10 scale tank for a week to test his Duck design 
but concluded that ‘Everything was far slower and more expensive but, for shapes like 
those of most wave devices, no more accurate [than the 1:100 tests]’.98 
 
 Funding for the wide tank was capped at £100,000 as this was the amount that 
Grove-Palmer, as WESC programme manager, could approve without seeking further 
approval from ACORD and the DoEn; not to mention the inevitable delays that the pursuit 
of greater funding would create. The Salter team had therefore to ‘design backwards from 
£100,000’.99 A new building had to be constructed at Edinburgh University to house the 
wide tank, but with the purchase of scrap parts and a great deal of ingenuity the team was 
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able to stay within the tight budget. The tank was eventually filled with 350 tons of water 
in January 1978 and was ‘officially’ opened in July 1978 by Alex Eadie, just prior to the 
Heathrow Conference.100 It comprised of 89 wavemakers and could reproduce (at 1:150 
scale) an area of sea 3 km wide and 1 km long (see fig. 5.2). In the wide tank, using around 
90 1:150 scale Ducks, the Salter team would be able to reproduce a scale model of the 
2GW wave power station that the WEP had set as its ‘reference design’ (see chapter 4). In 
the event it was a rival team that first used the tank from February 1978.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
100 Fishlock, D., ‘Wave-testing tank holds the key to future energy source’, The Financial TImes, 12 July 
1978; Faux. R. ‘Wave power testing tank opened for research’, The Times, 12 July 1978; Linklater, J., ‘Scots 
aid UK to plug in waves power’, Glasgow Herald, 12 July 1978  
151 
Figure 5.2:  
The Edinburgh wide tank  
 
Source: Salter, S., ‘Looking Back’, in Cruz, J (ed.), Ocean Wave Energy: Current Status and Future 
Prospects (Springer: Heidelberg, 2008) Fig. 211., p.27  
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Salter was distracted from his focus on device development during the construction 
and equipping of the wide tank. In addition, his attention was repeatedly drawn to the 
problems of SEA, Lanchester, and the Loch Ness Trials. Recognising the difficulties, 
Grove-Palmer wrote to SEA in March 1978 that ‘The Ducks project is in danger of going 
off the rails and something must be done quickly to put it back on course’. He noted that 
there was ‘an almost total lack of communication between SEA and Salter.’ 101 Despite the 
attempts to resolve their differences it was clear that Salter and Bellamy had fundamentally 
irreconcilable views on the direction of wave energy development. After the 
announcement of the Loch Ness trials, soon after the formation of SEA, Salter took little 
part in the SEA/DoEn project. The Edinburgh team continued to receive separate DoEn 
funding (£35,000 per annum) for its tank work, and Salter devoted himself to this aspect of 
the work. As early as June 1977 Salter was writing about a ‘crisis in the organisation and 
planning of the [SEA] project’.102 Soon after he began to openly question the ‘competence’ 
of the Lanchester team and warned Peter Young, the RMC director of SEA, that ‘we are 
headed for an expensive disaster’. He elaborated, 
 
I am sure that you must be aware that on several occasions we have 
questioned the competence with which the various Lanchester activities 
have been conducted. Each of the steps from computer simulation to 
Draycote to Loch Ness have followed an identical pattern. They find that a 
problem is harder than they supposed and, instead of solving it, they 
abandon it and move on to a yet more ambitious goal. The present Loch 
Ness model has the wrong shape of duck with the wrong moment of inertia 
and centre of gravity, a spine which is too stiff, inadequate control of spine 
alignment and power take-off and unreliable information on the directional 
characteristics of the waves. 103 
 
 By December 1977 the ‘crisis’ had evolved into a ‘rift’104, and finally become a 
‘split’.105  By May 1978 Salter stated plainly that ‘I have no faith in the competence of the 
Lanchester team and cannot be involved in any of their future work.’106 For him the 
ultimate folly of the Loch Ness trial lay in the harm that it could do to the image of wave 
power. The RMC people involved in SEA agreed with Salter that the Bellamy trials at 
Loch Ness were over-ambitious, but regarded this as a mistake in the time-scales 
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envisaged for the work; ‘...we have been trying to go too fast’.107  Certainly the Loch Ness 
trials were dogged with difficulties and delays. Problems between NEL, who were 
collaborating on aspects of the project, and Lanchester, meant that vital parts for the trial 
were severely delayed.  When these parts did arrive, winter conditions had also arrived on 
Loch Ness, and the bad weather (which included parts of the loch freezing over) hampered 
the SEA team further. This pushed the work - to have been completed in the summer of 
1977 - into the next year, and by May 1978 an extension to the SEA/DoEn project was 
agreed by WESC. An additional £330k was allocated to the trials and the proposed 
completion date was extended until 31 October 1978. Significantly, WESC required that 
SEA make certain alterations to the model - the centre of gravity and moment of inertia - 
which echoed some of Salter’s earlier criticisms.108   
 
 Through the summer of 1978 WESC made repeated attempts to heal the rift 
between Edinburgh and Lanchester, noting that ‘Salter and Bellamy have not been working 
fully in harness’. They urged that the Loch Ness trials should go ‘hand in hand’ with the 
wide tank work at Edinburgh.109  However, it was clear that Salter would not be persuaded. 
During 1978 the SEA/Lanchester trials continued at Loch Ness and the interim results of 
the tests were reported at the Heathrow Conference in November that year (see chapter 4). 
The technical challenges that had been thrown up by the trials formed a major part of the 
rather gloomy prospects for wave energy which were presented at the conference. In 
particular, the SEA team had encountered real challenges with the bending ‘spine’ of the 
device, and in the power ‘take-off’ mechanism. These were problems that Salter had 
recognised, and judged would be best tackled at 1:150 scale in the new wide tank.  
 
 Following the Heathrow Wave Energy Conference official enthusiasm for wave 
energy dipped. The technical challenges and associated costs revealed at the conference 
served to dent the initial surge of optimism shown by government and, consequently, by 
private industry. The ‘immense amounts of goodwill’ that Salter had referred to, only one 
year earlier, vanished quickly. Shortly after Heathrow, after the first two years of the SEA 
project, RMC reviewed their involvement in wave energy. They were clearly concerned by 
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the technical challenges revealed by the Loch Ness trials, and probably disappointed and 
disconcerted by the lack of commitment that Salter had shown the project.  
 
 A meeting of SEA was arranged for January 1979 to discuss a way forward for the 
project, and a paper circulated by Peter Young of SEA/RMC prior to the meeting made the 
position abundantly clear.    
 
This paper has been written in an attempt to assess the commercial future of 
wave power and SEA Ltd’s chances of benefiting from it. RPT’s 
[consultant] latest cost estimates are analysed and it is concluded that wave 
power is unlikely to be competitive as a source of electrical power for the 
grid within a commercially viable time scale. An alternative route - energy 
farming - is discussed, but with wind and tidal energy likely to be more 
competitive in this scenario it seems again that time is not on our side. The 
conclusion is that we should not invest further funds in wave power and that 
any future commitment should be on a fully funded basis, hopefully with a 
management fee to provide a worthwhile profit. 110  
 
SEA were concerned about the emerging understanding of the development time-scales for 
wave energy, and how this would affect their investment. Young elaborated,  
 
Patents last for 15 years. Some of ours are already one or two years old. We 
should therefore be in a position to cash in within 8 years at most if we are 
to see much return. With the sort of problems now being thrown up, and the 
speed at which ETSU functions, it appears unlikely that a full-scale 
prototype of any device will be built within 8 years, let alone one on which 
we have patent rights.   
 
The meeting signalled the end of RMC’s involvement in wave energy, and the winding 
down of SEA Ltd. The arrangement had lasted for nearly three years and had focussed on 
trials of the Duck at 1:10 scale in Loch Ness. The DoEn and RMC had invested heavily in 
the project and the results had been largely discouraging. Bellamy reported at the January 
meeting that ‘The work had demonstrated beyond doubt that a duck string could absorb 
substantial amounts of power’, but the cost predictions and reliability figures loomed large. 
Also, by this stage Bellamy was losing interest in Duck development and had submitted 
separate funding applications to WESC for his new ‘Clam’ wave device. So, from early 
1979 the Duck would return to the test tank of Stephen Salter and his team at the 
University of Edinburgh.  
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Conclusions 
This chapter has examined an early attempt at the commercial development of wave 
energy. It has shown how this began in 1975 with Stephen Salter’s search for industrial 
partners to aid in the development process, and resulted in the formation of Sea Energy 
Associates Ltd in 1976. Despite regular complaints over the administration of DoEn 
funding, Salter remained generally satisfied (throughout the early WEP) that the levels of 
that funding were adequate, and even generous, for his R&D work on the Duck. Therefore 
his motivation for including commercial partners can be seen to have been derived mainly 
from awareness that large-scale engineering expertise would ultimately be required for the 
successful development of wave energy in the UK. At full-scale the Ducks would be 
constructed of concrete and each Duck would be in the order of 3 metres across. Ready 
Mixed Concrete Ltd. appeared to be an ideal partner; not only for their expertise in 
concrete but also their willingness to invest significant amounts of time and capital in the 
project.  
 
 Very quickly it emerged that Salter and SEA had fundamentally different ideas 
about the way in which the Duck should be developed. Although Salter focused his 
disagreements over the direction of the project on the Bellamy team’s ‘competence’ - it 
was clear that RMC, anxious over patent exploitation, were also keen to hasten the 
development process. As has been seen, Salter maintained that the future viability of the 
Duck would be best served by thorough laboratory testing prior to up-scaling and testing in 
the open water. This fundamental disagreement sealed the fate of the SEA partnership 
almost from the outset. 
 
 Another key theme that emerges in this chapter was the influence of new 
environmentalism, in particular ant-nuclearism that lay at the heart of Salter’s motivation 
to develop a renewable energy source. Though clearly stimulated by the oil crisis (and Mrs 
Salter) to consider renewable energy sources, it is plain that Salter was greatly influenced 
by his early encounter with Amory Lovins and the new UK branch of Friends of the Earth. 
The challenge for Salter was to create a renewable energy device that would serve as a 
genuine alternative to the continued expansion of nuclear power in the UK.  This long-term 
hope, that Goodwin had termed ‘grandiose and panacea like thinking’ for the potential of 
renewable energy arguably caused Salter to approach the development of wave energy in a 
careful and considered way, which was at odds with the frantic pace encouraged by short-
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lived enthusiasm of the DoEn; and the clash with Bellamy over the Duck trials at Loch 
Ness illustrates this well. This chapter emphasises that Salter remained committed 
throughout the WEP to protecting the credibility of wave power as a valid alternative to 
nuclear power.  It would perhaps to be too ambitious to claim that, at the time, Salter had a 
sense that the energy TIC would ensure the failure of renewable energy technology by 
forcing the pace of development towards unrealistic targets; although this is certainly a 
view that he reached later.111 
 
 What damage, if any, did the SEA project do to the UK WEP? The evidence 
suggests that the Heathrow Conference was a major watershed in wave energy in the UK. 
Chapter 4 showed that the cost estimates and technical challenges unveiled at the 
conference did lasting harm to the image of wave energy, and began a gradual process of 
retreat culminating in the closure of the WEP in March 1982. Before Heathrow, the Salter 
Duck was the leading wave energy device, attracting much of the funding and media 
interest in renewable energy. The disappointing results from the widely publicised Loch 
Ness trials served to emphasise the unexpected scale of the challenges that faced the 
programme and, as such, harmed the future of UK wave energy development. In this, 
Salter’s anxiety over the damage that premature 1:10 scale testing could inflict was proved 
correct. 
 
 Previous chapters refer to the ‘hubris’ of the wave energy community prior to 
Heathrow. This boundless confidence in the potential for wave energy among developers 
and those close to the WEP was encouraged before 1979 by consistently positive 
statements on wave energy from within the government and the CEGB. I would argue that 
this led many developers towards the perfectly understandable belief that the DoEn would 
remain committed to wave power in the medium to long term whatever the challenges. 
Consequently, this belief encouraged leading developers such as SEA and Cockerell’s 
Wavepower Ltd, to push forward to larger-scale sea trials without due consideration of the 
potentially damaging impact of short-term failures; a risk that Salter alone had recognised. 
In Power from the Waves Ross argues that despite drawbacks there was some merit in this 
approach, as it allowed developers an opportunity to uncover some of the challenges of 
                                            
111 Interview, Salter, S., July 2008 
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larger-scale power generation.112 However, this overlooks the lasting damage that 
perceptions of failure had on the wider wave energy programme.  
 
 
                                            
112 Ross, Power 
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Chapter 6 
Rising Wind 
‘Variability, unpredictability and high capital costs make [wind] a non-runner’1 
 
This chapter will consider the gradual evolution of the UK wind energy programme from 
its inception in 1978 until the privatisation of the electricity industry in 1989. Despite the 
surprisingly vast numbers of wave energy patents mentioned in previous chapters, the 
technology of wind energy was much more firmly established by the 1970s than that of 
wave energy. Various projects from the late nineteenth century and throughout the 
twentieth century, most notably in the US and Denmark, had advanced the development of 
efficient and effective wind turbines.2 Perhaps owing to this the technical challenges of 
wind power generation were significantly less than for wave power: a fact emphasised 
starkly for wave by the proceedings of the Heathrow Conference.  
 
 The previous two chapters dealt primarily with the evolution and eventual closure 
of the UK wave energy programme (WEP) between 1974 and 1982. It was seen that during 
the early years of the WEP, wave energy was routinely considered by the DoEn as the 
front-runner among the potential renewable energy technologies in the UK. Chapters 4 & 5 
showed how this position of preeminence began to shift after the abortive Heathrow Wave 
Energy Conference of November 1978. Prior to this, as the quotation above illustrates, 
wind energy had been given a much lower priority and effectively discounted within the 
government’s wider renewable energy programme. However, the cost estimates and 
technical challenges for wave energy revealed at Heathrow, plus a substantial wind energy 
programme in the US, placed wind energy in a much more favoured position from 1979 
onwards. 
 
 In a sense, the appeal of wave energy had lain in the scale and uniqueness of the 
technological challenge that it presented to the UK government. In this way it resembled 
the early nuclear programme. Edgerton and others have argued that the nuclear programme 
was driven by the enthusiasm and specialist technical expertise of engineers. Politicians 
could not be expected to fully understand nuclear technology and therefore the UKAEA 
                                            
1 TNA, EG 16/13, DTI, Energy Technology Division, ‘New Forms of Energy in the UK’, 21 March 1973 
2 Although interestingly the ancient competition between vertical and horizontal turbines remained to be fully 
resolved (see chapter 1). 
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developed as a uniquely powerful and autonomous organisation within the UK energy 
scene.3 Wave energy presented a similar array of complex technical challenges (only 
understood fully by a limited number of ‘engineers’) which required a similarly huge and 
long-term capital investment. However, with nuclear energy continuing to represent, 
however uncertainly, the UK’s energy future the government was ultimately not prepared 
to gamble on another speculative and expensive energy technology. This chapter shows 
that wind power soon came to be seen as a much safer and perhaps cheaper renewables 
option for the UK.  
 
The UK Wind Energy Programme 
In the early years of the UK renewables programme the development of wind energy was 
routinely rejected. This was despite the fact that the original ETSU objectives included 
wind energy (and not wave) as a primary area for R&D (see chapter 3).4 However, as 
previously discussed, the weight of the 1974 CPRS recommendation strongly influenced 
the initial shape of the UK renewables effort in this regard.  This was not helped by the fact 
that the influential Lord Rothschild was also quoted as being sceptical about the prospects 
for wind energy in the UK.5  It was not until 1978, four years after the creation of ETSU 
that a Wind Energy Steering Committee (WISC) was set up. How can this initial hesitation 
to explore the potential of wind energy in the UK - arguably the most ‘conventional’ of the 
alternative energy sources - be more fully explained? 
 
 Some explanation for the initial reluctance to invest in wind energy in the UK can 
be traced back to the attitude of ACORD before 1978. At a meeting in December 1975 the 
council considered an early ETSU report on ‘The Prospects for Wind Energy in the UK’.6 
The report had considered only ‘large machines’ and the council noted that the 
accompanying ‘Wind-maps’ showed that the areas of ‘greatest wind’ were ‘away from the 
areas of greatest demand’. More pointedly ACORD observed that periods of calm meant 
that wind could not be considered a ‘firm power source’. This was despite the fact that 
wave energy shared both of these characteristics. The council though appeared to accept 
                                            
3 This was the focus of Benn’s criticism of the UKAEA from the late 1970s onwards.  
4 TNA, AB 88/218. Leighton to Todd, 10 April 1974 
5 TNA, AB 88/290, 1089/13, ETSU visit notice: Note for the record. 17 July 1974. Dr Bruckner, a visiting 
US scientist interested in wind energy systems, commented on a visit to ETSU for support that he had 
approached Lord Rothschild and was ‘disconcerted by [Lord Rothschild’s] unfavourable view on Wind 
Power’.  
6 TNA, EG 16/1, ET 4/153/019, FPRD(75) 9th Meeting, Department of Energy, Advisory Council on 
Research and Development for Fuel and Power, Minutes of meeting 9 December 1975.  
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that a suggested capital investment of between £2m - £5m would ‘save’ one million tonnes 
of oil per annum, or the equivalent of ‘one or two’ coal fired power stations. However, 
further objections were raised which perhaps better explain the delayed investment in wind 
energy development in the UK. First, the council anticipated that the ‘environmental 
aspects’ of erecting 10,000 ‘of these machines’ would create ‘intense opposition’.7  
Second, the meeting noted that the US was proposing to spend $30m on wind technology 
over 5 years and it might be better to await the outcome and ‘buy in’ US technology.  
Although the council observed that it might be unacceptable to the IEA ‘if the UK put in 
no effort’ rather interestingly it noted that ‘wave power work might be offered in 
exchange’.8 The meeting concluded that there was no need to establish a steering 
committee for wind energy ‘until more accurate cost estimates were available which 
indicated a valid option’.9  
 
 Clearly, the minutes of the 1975 meeting show that ACORD had little interest in 
the development of wind energy, and ETSU appeared to do little to encourage its 
development in the UK. Interestingly many of ACORD’s objections could be applied 
equally to wave energy but the momentum created by Lord Rothschild had forced wave 
energy into the renewable energy spotlight. Indeed many of their key objections on 
location, intermittency, and uncertain costs were perhaps even more telling for wave 
energy than for wind: though this may have been intended as a thinly veiled criticism of all 
renewable energy sources from ACORD. Despite this, perhaps as a stalling tactic within 
the wider UK renewables programme, ACORD asked that ETSU revise their proposals for 
wind energy.  
 
 By April 1976 an ad-hoc group led by ETSU, and including representation from the 
Energy Technology Unit (ENT) at the DoEn, produced a report titled ‘A Strategy for 
Energy R&D in the UK’.10 ETSU had been established for two years by this time and took 
the opportunity to reflect on its initial experience, and to develop a wider energy R&D plan 
for the medium term in conjunction with the DoEn. It was a comprehensive and lengthy 
                                            
7 TNA, EG 16/1, ET 4/153/019, FPRD(75) 9th Meeting, Department of Energy, Advisory Council on 
Research and Development for Fuel and Power, Minutes of meeting 9 December 1975. The figure of 10,000 
wind turbines appears in several of the early discussions of wind energy. This appears to have been based on 
nothing more than the estimates that the UK had once had around 10,000 windmills in operation.  
8 Ibid.  This provides further evidence of the widespread confidence in the potential of wave energy R&D in 
the UK during this period.  
9 Ibid.  
10 TNA, EG 16/55, ET 4/1/018, FPRD (76) 16, ‘A Strategy for Energy R&D in the United Kingdom, 
ACORD draft.  
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report which covered all UK energy sources, and included an overview of the renewable 
sources. The section on wind energy immediately followed a positive assessment of the 
potential of wave power; ‘probably the most attractive naturally occurring energy source in 
the UK’.11 The report suggests that the ‘upper limit’ for a UK wind energy programme 
would (again) be ‘10,000 generators each of 1MW rating’ (a figure derived from the earlier 
ETSU study) and that this would represent an annual energy saving of 8 mtce. This 
contrasts with the figures given for wave in the report which suggest an energy saving of 
15 mtce in 2000, rising to 50 mtce by 2025. However, the environmental aspects of wind 
energy were stressed once again and described as ‘considerable’. The report states that ‘a 
modern aerogenerator has more in common with an electricity transmission tower than 
with the picturesque, old-fashioned windmills.’12 
 
 This report is a clear example of renewable energy sources set within the dominant 
UK energy problem frame. Wind and wave were considered in terms of their potential 
contribution to a national energy mix which contains a limited number of energy sources. 
Coal, oil, and nuclear energy were the main components in this mix, and the renewable 
sources were seen as insurance mainly against a so-called ‘Limit on Nuclear’ scenario. 
Therefore, their contribution had to be shown as significant and cost-effective (compared 
to nuclear) to be worthy of consideration. In the mid-1970s the uncertainty that surrounded 
wave energy helped to suggest that it had the potential to fulfill these conditions, whereas 
wind energy (where the technology was much better established) appeared initially to fall 
short of the requirements. This helps to explain both the initial rejection of wind energy 
and its eventual appearance in the UK renewables programme as the technical challenges 
of wave energy grew over the course of the Wave Energy Programme (WEP) described in 
chapter 4. 
 
 Despite the lack of enthusiasm for wind energy within ACORD and the DoEn, 
ETSU continued to investigate its potential and published what proved to be the seminal 
report on wind energy in the UK, Energy Paper 21, in June 1977 ‘The prospects for the 
generation of electricity from wind energy in the United Kingdom’.13 This first 
                                            
11 TNA, EG 16/55, ET 4/1/018, FPRD (76) 16, ‘Strategy’, Appendix 2, pp. 20-21  
12 Ibid.  
13 TNA, EG 2/325, Energy Paper 21, ‘The prospects for the generation of electricity from wind energy in the 
United Kingdom’, A report prepared for the Department of Energy by the Energy Technology Support Unit, 
Harwell (London, HMSO: 1977)  
162 
comprehensive study of the potential for wind energy overturned the earlier assumptions 
about its potential in the UK and concluded, 
 
Whilst no clear economic case can be made at the present time for utilising 
wind energy for the large scale generation of electricity, the potential 
contribution from this source has a significance that is too large to ignore. 
Further, aerogenerators can produce energy in its most useful and high grade 
form, namely a.c. electricity: in which form it is readily and efficiently 
transmitted and converted to light, heat and motive power. Also, it is 
compatible with the existing distribution system fed by conventional power 
plant.14  
 
 The report stopped short of recommending what it called ‘a large development 
programme’ but did suggest that in addition to continued support for ongoing wind energy 
research at the university level, the DoEN should support the commercial development of 
‘medium size aerogenerators of around 100kW’. ETSU noted that this would ‘ensure a 
British presence in the potential home and export markets for this form of energy saving 
equipment.’15 Energy Paper 21 represented the first detailed consideration of the potential 
of wind energy in the UK and led directly to the first commercial wind energy proposal. 
 
Hawker Siddeley Dynamics proposal: 1977 
Prior to publication of Energy Paper 21, ACORD had considered and approved a draft of 
the ETSU report in its meeting of November 1976 and the conditions for industrial 
participation were established.16 In January 1977 an ‘independently formed industrial 
group’ led by the British multinational Hawker Siddeley Dynamics Ltd submitted a 
proposal to the DoEn which sought to ‘resolve’ some of the ‘uncertainties’ surrounding the 
exploitation of wind energy in the UK.17 The consortium included leading industrial 
partners, Electrical Research Association Ltd, Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co. Ltd, 
and Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd. Also included was a small contribution totalling 
£10,000 from the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) and the North of Scotland 
Hydro-Electric Board (NSHEB). The proposal did not aim to produce a prototype turbine, 
but rather to seek the ‘configuration and cost of a machine optimised for minimum energy 
                                            
14 TNA, EG 2/325, Energy Paper 21, ‘Prospects’, p.50. My italics 
15 My italics. This illustrates the continued identification of renewable energy sources with the preservation 
of conventional fuel sources.  
16 TNA 16/118, FPRD(77) 12, Department of Energy: Advisory Council for Research and Development for 
Fuel and Power, ‘Wind Power: Note by the Chairman of ACORD Programme Committee’.  
17 TNA, EG 16/118, Hawker Siddeley Dynamics Limited (Mechanical Equipment and Systems Division, 
‘The Development of large wind turbine generators: A proposal for a joint industry/Government 
programme’. Technical Proposal No. 379, Issue 1, January 1977.  
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cost’ and the ‘total costs associated with site construction and grid connection of an 
installation at several representative sites’. The costs of the study were estimated at 
£160,000 (including the contribution from the Boards) and government funding of 
£75,000, matching the total contribution of the industrial partners, was requested. The 
proposal from the consortium firmly rejected the earlier ACORD notion that the UK 
should simply wait for the US developments in wind turbine technology. It suggested that 
American developments were ‘over-sophisticated’ and their manufacture in the UK would 
involve ‘high capital expenditure’. Furthermore it stated vaguely that US machines were 
‘not suitable for optimum exploitation of the highest merit sites available in the UK and 
overseas’, before making the rather more salient and persuasive political point that a ‘home 
initiative will maximise employment of the required skills that already exist in UK 
industry’.18  
 
 The February 1977 meeting of ACORD considered the consortium’s proposal.19 
Despite the appearance that wind energy was gaining official support in this period, the 
November 1976 meeting had given ETSU the rather negative task of defining ‘the 
minimum Department of Energy programme to ensure that its overall position on the 
subject was defensible’.20 Advice to ACORD further illustrated the tokenistic nature of the 
initiative. The Chairman of the ACORD Programme Committee pointed out that it had 
already been established that wind energy ‘may be economic on a few remote sites’, but 
emphasised that this was ‘still a long way from any thought of series ordering which must 
be the option of interest to the Department.’ However, in accordance with the ‘defensible’ 
position desired by the DoEn the advice recommended that ACORD should ‘welcome the 
active participation of industry, including commitment of finance, in a small on-going 
programme without any commitment whatsoever to prototype construction.’ 21 
 
 ACORD followed this advice closely and supported the Hawker Siddeley proposal, 
albeit in overwhelmingly negative terms. The council echoed the view that the study would 
add little to that which was already known about wind energy on ‘prime sites’ and would 
not ‘demonstrate whether or not wind energy could be economic on a more general 
basis…’. Moreover it re-stated the view that the environmental impact of ‘the large 
                                            
18 TNA, EG 16/118, Hawker Siddeley Dynamics Limited. p.2  
19 TNA, EG 16/118, ET 4/1/021, FPRD(77) 2nd Meeting, Department of Energy, Advisory Council for 
Research and Development for Fuel and Power, Minutes of meeting, 8 February 1977.  
20 TNA 16/118, FPRD(77) 12. My italics 
21 TNA 16/118, FPRD(77) 12, My italics  
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numbers of machines required to make any significant contribution...would in all 
probability prevent wind power exploitation.’ 22 Walter Marshall added the typically 
trenchant observation that ‘He, himself, doubted that wind power could be proved an 
economic option’ but conceded that ‘it was important to assess its economic viability in an 
objective and responsible manner’.23 Perhaps, he could also have added ‘defensible’ to this 
list.  
 
 By early 1978 the consortium had completed its feasibility study. During 1977 
Hawker Siddeley Dynamics had been nationalised as a leading part of the new British 
Aerospace under the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977 following a manifesto 
commitment by the Labour Government in 1974. Despite earlier reluctance to move to a 
prototype, the study recommended that as a next stage in the investigation of wind energy 
a demonstration turbine should be constructed on an appropriate site in Scotland. The 
suggested prototype was a massive 3.7 MW turbine with a blade diameter spanning 60 
metres, at a time when the largest successfully demonstrated machines (such as in the 
Netherlands) spanned around 23 metres. Clearly the scale of this prototype did not daunt 
the DoEn and a further 12-month study costing £341,000 was funded to refine the design 
of the turbine and to investigate potential sites. Evidently, the enthusiasm for wind power 
was increasing during 1978 as the DoEn also commissioned a further study of the potential 
for offshore wind. How can this shift in attitudes be understood? 
 
 There are perhaps a number of key factors that help to explain the increasing 
attention paid to wind energy in the UK at the end of the 1970s. First, and perhaps most 
important, was the example of the US wind energy R&D programme. From 1974 the US 
had committed millions of dollars to developing reliable onshore wind technology. As 
noted above, ACORD was aware of the scale of the US programme and was initially 
tempted to allow the Americans to bear the cost, and some of the potential first-mover 
advantages, of wind energy development. However, pressures from influential industrial 
partners such as Hawker Siddeley over the impact on British technology jobs forced the 
DoEn to reconsider its position. Also the apparent commitment in the US to develop 
domestic wind energy capacity, and the introduction of legislation favourable to renewable 
                                            
22 TNA, EG 16/118, ET 4/1/021, FPRD(77)  
23 Ibid. 
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energy sources, offered a valuable export opportunity to UK industry at a time of serious 
balance of payments pressures.24  
 
 Second, the interest and involvement of the Electricity Boards encouraged the 
DoEn to reconsider the potential of wind energy. As well as the commitment of the SSEB 
and the NSHEB to the initial Hawker Siddeley study, the CEGB also began actively 
pursuing the feasibility of onshore and offshore wind energy during this period. The 
electricity boards were attracted by the advanced technological development of wind 
turbines, and by the examples of its exploitation by electricity providers in other countries. 
Closely related to this for the Scottish Boards was the involvement of leading UK 
industrial firms in wind energy. The interest and financial commitment of leading 
companies such as Hawker Siddeley Dynamics and Taylor Woodrow in wind energy 
encouraged confidence among the Boards for the potential of wind energy.  
 
 Third, as previous chapters have shown, was the growing realisation that wave 
energy development would take longer and prove more costly than originally envisaged. 
The impetus for wave energy advocated by the CPRS recommendation in 1974 and 
Salter’s groundbreaking work coincided serendipitously to create an initial enthusiasm for 
this exciting new energy source. Staggering conversion efficiencies demonstrated by 
Salter, and confirmed by the CEGB among others, suggested that by scaling up a wave 
device tremendous amounts of electricity could be captured. However technical challenges 
were emerging that cast some doubt on the economic feasibility of wave energy which 
were fully revealed at the Heathrow Wave Energy Conference in 1978. Wind energy 
technology was on the other hand much less technically challenging and therefore a 
cheaper option. Whilst Britain pioneered the development of wave energy (and bore the 
costs of this) wind energy had been developed internationally and the UK could benefit 
from this established expertise. 
 
 Set against these factors for the development of wind energy was the repeated 
concern over the environmental impact of large-scale deployment of wind turbines. After 
the initial temptation to allow the US to do the ‘donkey work’ on wind power was 
                                            
24  For an account of the effect of the new legislation on renewable energy development in the United States 
see, Russo, M. V., ‘Institutions, Exchange Relations, and the Emergence of New Fields: Regulatory Policies 
and Independent Power Production in America, 1978-1992’, Administrative Science Quarterly,  46 (2001), 
pp. 57-86; Thompson, E., ‘The Rapid Transformation of Intergovernmental Energy Relations’, Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism, 13 (Fall 1983) 
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overturned, the only consistent argument against wind energy in the UK was focused on its 
environmental impact and the potential reaction of the public to this visual intrusion. 
Among countless examples, Freddie Clarke, Research Director at Harwell (and subsequent 
Chairman of the Wind Energy Steering Committee) stated,   
 
It will be noticed that [windy sites] do not generally coincide with the areas 
of maximum industrial or domestic demand for electricity. Indeed they tend 
to lie in the more remote areas of natural beauty. 25  
 
 
Glyn England, the CEGB chairman, doubted whether ‘the public would welcome the 
intrusion of these gaunt, massive structures into the landscape’.26 Official government 
assessments of renewable energy also routinely cited environmental factors as a primary 
impediment to wind energy.  
 
Wind Energy Steering Committee 
In June 1978 the Wind Energy Steering Committee (WISC) was set up at Harwell. Despite 
the earlier reluctance on the part of ACORD to establish a steering committee for wind 
energy, the increased activity following the recommendations of Energy Paper 21 and the 
subsequent Hawker Siddeley study eventually sealed the case for its creation.27 Although 
perhaps the removal of the wind-sceptical Walter Marshall as Chief Scientist at the DoEn 
(and chairman of ACORD) in 1977 and his replacement in both roles with the arguably 
more sympathetic Sir Herman Bondi also had some impact. As a reflection of the 
importance of the new committee, Harwell’s research director, Freddie Clarke, took up the 
role of WISC chairman. The committee initially was comprised of representatives from 
ETSU, Government departments and the CEGB, but WISC signalled at the first meeting 
that it was anxious to have representatives from industry join the committee as soon as 
possible.28 The main functions of the committee were similar to those of the previously 
established Wave Energy Steering Committee (WESC) and its main role was, 
                                            
25 Clarke, F. J. P., ‘Status Report on the Alternative Energy Sources’, ATOM, 252, October 1977.  
26 England, G., ‘Renewable Sources of Energy - The Prospects for Electricity’, ATOM, 264, October 1978, 
pp. 271-272.  
27 The acronym ‘WISC’ was chosen as the Wave Energy Steering Committee had already adopted the 
‘WESC’ acronym.  
28 TNA, EG 16/150, WISC(78) M1, Wind Energy Steering Committee, ‘Minutes of the 1st Meeting’, 14 June 
1978.  
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To advise upon the formulation and management of a Government 
Programme on wind energy and to consider and make recommendations for 
support on individual proposals. 29 
 
 The minutes of the early meetings of WISC reveal a vigour that was perhaps absent 
when considering the deliberations of WESC at a similar stage. The focus of WESC had 
been, and largely remained, on the identification of the most appropriate wave energy 
device to take forward to the demonstration phase. For WISC the more advanced state of 
experience with the technology and the reduced scale of technical challenges placed the 
committee much closer to demonstration of wind energy. The earlier Hawker Siddeley 
study had already produced a single reference design and two further tranches of 
Government funding had also been approved for further work on the construction of a 
3.7MW turbine. In many senses WISC was simply taking up the reins of a programme 
which already had a significant degree of momentum.  
 
 As stated above the first task of the committee was to formulate a ‘Government 
Programme’ for wind energy in similar terms to the earlier Wave Energy Programme 
(WEP) described in chapter 4.  While work by the industrial consortium30 on the design, 
construction and siting of the 3.7MW demonstration turbine continued through 1979, the 
committee regularly reviewed the progress of the study. By February 1979 ACORD had 
agreed the detailed strategy for the wind energy programme which was set within the 
overall aim, 
 
...to establish the total feasibility of both land based and offshore sited 
aerogenerators, and the nature and size of the contribution they might make 
to the UK energy supply. 31 
 
 During 1979 there was a marked increase in activity on wind energy in the UK. 
WISC added selected industrial partners to the steering committee, and in December 1979 
appointed a full-time wind energy programme manager, Len Bedford from Harwell. The 
committee reported to ACORD in March 1980 that ‘In the UK, during the past year, there 
has been an increasing level of optimism regarding the prospects for wind energy 
                                            
29 Ibid. 
30 The consortium for this second study was the same as the earlier study. It comprised, British Aerospace 
(formerly Hawker Siddeley Dynamics), Cleveland Bridge Engineering Ltd, Taylor Woodrow Ltd, and ERA 
Ltd.  
31 TNA, EG 16/305, FPRD (80) 7, Department of Energy, Advisory Council on Research and Development 
for Fuel and Power, ‘Wind Energy Programme: Report from the Wind Energy Steering Committee’, March 
1980.  
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becoming a viable alternative source of energy.’32 Perhaps this was partly as a result of the 
disappointment surrounding the discussions at the Heathrow Wave Energy Conference, but 
it is also explained by the total abandonment of the earlier ACORD notion that the UK 
should allow other nations to take the lead in wind energy development. The WISC 
progress report for 1979/80 described a range of DoEn-funded wind energy studies set in 
progress during the year.33 
 
 The main thrust of the new Wind Energy Programme (WEG) remained focused on 
the reference design for a 3.7MW turbine recommended by the earlier Hawker Siddeley 
study. Although the new report had not yet been completed, the preliminary conclusion 
suggested that the ‘report will largely confirm the conclusions reached by the feasibility 
study.’ Moreover, a suitable site for the demonstration turbine had been identified at 
Bennan Hill in Ayrshire, Scotland.34  Also as a further indication of serious intent, during 
1979 WISC had appointed W.S. Atkins and Partners as technical consultants to the wind 
programme, and through 1980 Atkins prepared an assessment of the consortium’s overall 
turbine design.   
 
 In addition to this, the DoEn were now funding a range of other wind energy 
initiatives. Although the horizontal axis wind turbine (HAWT) favoured by the consortium 
was coming to dominate wind energy development both in the UK and abroad, there 
remained a significant interest in the alternative design of the vertical axis wind turbine 
(VAWT). Peter Musgrove, an important pioneer of UK wind energy in the 1970s, was an 
advocate of the VAWT and the DoEn was funding a study led (again) by British 
Aerospace and Taylor Woodrow Ltd (key members of the 3.7MW HAWT turbine 
consortium) into the potential of the VAWT, with Musgrove acting as a consultant.  
 
 The verdict on the Musgrove study has some interesting parallels with the 
development of wave energy. The 1980 WISC report stated that despite some promising 
wind tunnel results, the Musgrove turbine was ‘a new concept originating from the UK’. 
This was clearly seen as a negative assessment. Given the ‘considerable amount of 
experience’ already gained with the HAWT and the ‘knowledge that MW size machines 
were already planned or under construction in other countries’  WISC were hesitant about 
                                            
32 Ibid. p.1  
33 Ibid.  
34 This site would eventually be rejected in favour of the eventual site in Orkney (see below)  
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funding a megawatt-sized Musgrove turbine. Instead they recommended that an 
‘intermediate size machine of about 25 to 30m diameter, and 100 to 250kW rated output, 
should be taken to the reference design stage.’ 35 Clearly in the case of the VAWT, as with 
wave energy devices, innovation in renewable energy sources was seen as too great a risk 
for the DoEn.  
 
CEGB 
A further important stimulus to wind energy in the UK in the late 1970s was the active 
interest of the CEGB.36 As was seen in previous chapters, the CEGB had also taken an 
early interest in wave energy. Don Swift-Hook from the CEGB was a very early visitor to 
Salter’s workshop in Edinburgh and the CEGB had invested time and money into wave 
energy R&D from 1975 onwards. This was not entirely surprising as both wave and wind 
were primary electricity-producing renewable technologies. And although the CEGB, like 
the Government, retained an abiding faith in the nuclear option it was seen as sensible to 
investigate the long-term potential of the renewable options. Indeed it may well have 
appeared attractive to the CEGB to have some control over ‘fuels’ after decades of 
wrestling with the government, the NCB, and the UKAEA over supply. Certainly the early 
estimates of renewable energy potential seemed to offer some encouragement to the 
CEGB, demonstrated most famously in the speech of the CEGB chairman, Glyn England, 
at Fawley Power Station in 1978. He said,  
 
...in planning how to meet any future shortage of fossil fuels for electricity 
generation, we are not nailing our colours to the nuclear mast alone. We 
expect that, in time, nuclear power will be augmented by energy from some 
of the renewable sources. 37 
 
 Although in the same speech England described wave energy ‘as the most 
promising of the renewable energy sources’ and promised that the CEGB were ‘not 
daunted’ by the technical challenges, as already discussed the scale of these challenges was 
beginning to dent enthusiasm for wave energy. 
 
                                            
35 TNA, EG 16/305, FPRD (80) 7. p.3  
36 TNA, EG 16/305, FPRD (80) 7. p.7. The report refers to the ‘wish [of the CEGB] to see the potential of 
wind energy properly explored’.  
37 England, G., ‘Renewable Sources of Energy - The Prospects for Electricity’, ATOM, 264, October 1978, 
pp. 271-272. 
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 During 1979, no doubt in part encouraged by government activity in wind energy 
and perhaps equally discouraged by the disappointment of wave energy at Heathrow, the 
CEGB began its own studies of both onshore and offshore wind energy and collaborated 
with many of the other government programmes. Swift-Hook who had worked on earlier 
studies of wave energy now switched his focus to wind technology.38 The CEGB worked 
on a number of different aspects of wind energy during this period. One of these was 
offshore siting, which many regarded as the best response to the widely discussed and 
imagined environmental problems of onshore wind. This study was conducted in 
collaboration with Taywood Engineering Ltd, ERA Technology Ltd, and Newcastle 
University. Musgrove also acted as a consultant on this element of the programme. The 
initial results of this study were very encouraging and the report considered offshore siting 
was ‘feasible for a 60m diameter machine’. The study also confirmed earlier estimates that 
a total 200 TWh/year, at a cost of around 4p per kWh, could be generated from offshore 
wind. The cost in particular contrasts very favourably with the wave energy estimates from 
Heathrow which were in the ‘very high range’ of 20-50p per kWh (see chapter 4).39  
 
 In addition to the work on offshore wind, the CEGB also examined other important 
aspects of wind energy development. In particular, this was focused on two important 
areas; turbine cluster spacing and perhaps most crucially, integration into the National 
Grid. A central theme of this thesis is the techno-institutional barrier that existed in the UK 
and constrained the development and deployment of renewable energy technologies during 
the period. The primary technical barrier discussed was the National Grid and its historical 
creation on a model of large, centrally located power stations. I have suggested that this 
served to create a dominant energy problem-frame that discouraged innovation in small to 
medium scale energy sources in the UK, due in part to the perceived technical challenges, 
and perhaps the lack of will, in connecting these sources to the National Grid. The nature 
of the CEGB’s involvement in wind energy addresses some of these claims.  
 
  It is clear that the research into wind energy carried out by the CEGB after 1979 
recognised that integration into the Grid would be a key issue for this new technology. The 
accepted scale of the resource, and the low projected generating costs, encouraged a ‘next 
                                            
38 Swift-Hook eventually left the CEGB after a long career and through the formation of the British Wind 
Energy Association (BWEA) became a leading advocate for wind energy in the UK.  
39 Salter Archive, ‘Clarke, F. J. P., Introduction to the Conference, Proceedings: Wave Energy Conference, 
Heathrow Hotel, London. 22-23 November 1978. Sponsored by the Department of Energy. Organised by the 
Energy Technology Support Unit, Harwell.’  
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stage’ study of Grid integration that had been absent in wave energy. And WISC reported 
that the CEGB had concluded that it would be ‘unlikely’ for there to be any ‘major 
operational difficulties in incorporating aerogenerator capacity’ into the Grid. This was, of 
course, greatly encouraging for all of the renewable technologies, but the favourable cost 
estimates for wind energy had by this time shifted the focus firmly towards wind power.  
 
 Although, as has been seen, wider research activity in wind energy intensified 
through 1979, the ‘main plank’ of the UK Wind Energy Programme remained the 
construction of the 3.7MW reference design turbine at an initial estimated cost of £5.4m. 
Relative to other elements within the wider UK renewables programme this represented a 
significant investment by the government in a single demonstration project; by 1980 a total 
of around £17m had been spent on the entire programme since inception. This provides 
further evidence of the extent of the DoEn’s newly-discovered faith in wind energy at the 
time. Moreover, as the new Conservative Government took up office in May 1979 with a 
pledge to make cuts in public expenditure, it makes the subsequent decision to cut the 
wave energy programme appear inevitable.  
 
 In 1979, the DoEn’s ‘Briefs for Incoming Ministers’ were telling for the fate of the 
renewable energy programme.40 Reflecting Thatcher’s stated intentions for the new 
government, a ‘Tory version’ of a key document titled ‘The scope for cuts in public 
expenditure’ outlined the possible areas where savings could be made.41 For the major 
element of its expenditure, the DoEn rejected the idea that any possible ‘good 
housekeeping cuts’ could be made to the nuclear programme without the requirement for 
‘explicit policy decisions on major programmes.’ Similarly, other key elements of the 
DoEn budget were seen as yielding little in the way of savings. The exception highlighted 
in the brief is ‘non-nuclear research and development’ and ‘energy conservation’. For 
conservation the DoEn estimated that £7m could be saved by 1982/83 ‘if the entire 
programme were terminated’.  Whilst in ‘non-nuclear’ (the renewable energy programme) 
the brief stated that there could be ‘small savings in early years, rising to about £18 million 
by 1982/83 if programmes are sacrificed.’42  
 
                                            
40 TNA, EG 16/298/1 & 2, General Election ‘Briefs for Incoming Ministers’  
41 TNA, EG 16/298/1, FB 10/51, “Election Briefing’ Covering letter. G. G. Campbell, 2 May 1979.  
42 TNA, EG 16/298/2, ‘Energy Technologies for the United Kingdom: An appraisal for R, D&D planning’, 
Volume 1, 27 March 1979. pp. 96-97.  
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 Accompanying the ‘Briefs for Incoming Ministers’ at the DoEn was the paper 
‘Energy Technologies for the United Kingdom’ which would be published that same year 
as Energy Paper 39, which was prepared by ETSU.  Following a similar publication from 
ETSU in 1976, Energy Paper 11, this represented a major appraisal of the UK’s ‘R, D & D 
planning’, and it gives some insight into the shift in focus from wave energy to wind 
energy which had accelerated by 1979. The renewable technologies were categorised in the 
report in terms of their likely contribution to the UK’s energy future. They were described 
as either being a ‘supplementary technology’ to those needs, or falling into the more 
familiar and less important ‘insurance technology’ category.  The document reflects the 
disappointment over wave energy development and quoting figures produced at Heathrow 
it concluded that hopes for a ‘near full-scale prototype operating by the mid 1980s are […] 
unlikely to be realised.’ Wave energy was accordingly classified as an ‘insurance 
technology’.  
 
 By contrast, wind energy, largely dismissed in Energy Paper 11, was described in 
the newer report in much more positive terms. The estimated costs for wind turbines (£320 
- £380 per kW of installed capacity including maintenance and transmission costs) were in 
stark contrast to the frighteningly high costs for wave devices (estimated at Heathrow at a 
staggering £4000 - £9000 per kW installed capacity, without including maintenance and 
transmission). Furthermore, the report made clear that wind turbine technology was at a 
much more advanced stage than many of the other renewable energy technologies, and the 
3.7MW demonstration machine ‘suitable for mass production’ would be constructed within 
‘the next few years’.  
 
Orkney Turbine: ‘the star attraction’ 43 
In January 1981, the Secretary of State for Energy, David Howell, formally announced the 
government’s plan to build ‘a 60 meter blade diameter’ wind turbine ‘of about 3 
megawatts’ at Burgar Hill, Orkney. The government hoped to have the machine in 
operation and connected to the island’s electricity supply by 1983-84. Financial support of 
up to £4.6m would be provided by the government, with a further £1m (and the provision 
of the site) coming from the NSHEB.  Howell also confirmed that a smaller 20-metre 
machine (250kW) would ‘share the site’ and was expected to be in operation by October 
                                            
43 TNA, EG 16/124, ‘The Department’s Wind Energy Programme - proposal to construct a 3.7MW 
horizontal axis turbine’, Note for ACORD, Appendix I, Chief Scientist’s Branch, 10 October 1980.  
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1981.44 Since the completion of the first Hawker Siddeley study in 1978, the proposed site 
for the demonstration turbine had been Bennan Hill in Ayrshire. Through 1979 and 1980 
detailed site investigations had been carried out and negotiations with the relevant Board 
(SSEB) had been ongoing. What explains this change to a more remote island site after 
nearly two years of planning for another location, and what does this tell us about the 
development of wind energy in the UK?  
 
 Two main factors came into play which caused a last minute change to the site of 
the proposed demonstration turbine. Most important of these was the rapidly accelerating 
development of wind energy in the United States and in Europe. By late 1979 WISC noted 
that ‘the US wind energy RD&D programme is 4 to 5 years ahead of the UK programme.45 
WISC member, Dr R. H. Taylor (CEGB) had visited a US wind energy workshop in 
October 1979 and returned to report the scale of the US programme to the committee. He 
stated that the US Department of Energy was spending $56.9m on the wind power 
programme alone in 1979, and had budgeted for $63.4m in 1980. His breakdown of the 
figures showed that the bulk of US spending in 1979 would be on ‘Engineering 
development’, but that in 1980 this would shift significantly in favour of ‘Capital 
equipment and construction’. Taylor went on to report President Carter’s announcement 
that a target of 20% of US energy should be provided by ‘solar energy’ by 2000.46 He 
noted that this had caused the US wind power programme to accelerate and there was a 
plan to achieve 500MW of installed capacity by 1986, which would require a $1bn 
programme.47  
 
 During his stay, Taylor had also visited two leading US companies involved in the 
US wind power programme; GEC and Westinghouse. GEC had submitted evidence to the 
US Government that the target should be much higher, at 750MW. Whilst two other 
leading aerospace firms interested in wind energy, Boeing and Hamilton Standard, 
suggested even higher targets of 1000MW and 1500MW respectively.48 Similar to the UK, 
it is notable that leading industrial firms were expressing interest and spending money on 
wind energy development in the period. Similar too, but perhaps unsurprising, is that these 
                                            
44 HC Deb 27 January 1981 vol. 997 c345W 
45 TNA, EG 16/150, ET 20/3/038, WISC (79) M7, Wind Energy Steering Committee, Minutes of the 9th 
meeting, 15 November 1979.  
46 In the US the convention was to refer to all renewable sources as ‘solar energy’.  
47 TNA, EG 16/150, ET 20/3/038, WISC (79) M7. 
48 Ibid 
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firms were concentrated in the aerospace and electrical engineering sectors of industry. 
What is more unexpected is the ambitious scale of their hopes for wind energy 
development. WISC noted that this initiative would ‘bring down the unit cost of wind 
power and will demonstrate to US utilities that machines can operate reliably in the grid.’49 
These developments in the US caused the wider energy community in the UK to take 
serious notice of wind energy.  
 
 Closely related to the scale and rapid development of the US wind power 
programme was the reaction it created among the electricity Boards in the UK. 
Significantly it had been the CEGB representative on WISC who had made the trip to the 
US, and the Scottish Boards also began to take notice of the increasing interest and 
participation of US utilities in wind energy. For the CEGB, with its greater resources and 
facilities, this acted as a catalyst for its expansion of wind energy RD&D in the UK. In 
addition to its representation on WISC and its involvement in some of the DoEn sponsored 
studies, the CEGB also made plans to construct its own demonstration turbine, 
independently of the UK Wind Energy Programme. The Scottish Boards could not match 
the resource base of the CEGB in this regard, and therefore pressed the DoEn to forge 
ahead with wind energy developments. In particular, the NSHEB had been active since 
1977 in examining the potential of wind energy for remote island sites.  
 
 The Scottish islands relied mainly on diesel oil for electricity generation, and were 
therefore a notable casualty of the high oil prices that prevailed during the 1970s. This 
problem had been recognised by the DoEn and there were several mentions throughout the 
period about the particular energy ‘problems’ of remote island sites. In 1978 the Chief 
Scientist advised that despite the DoEn not having ‘primary responsibility’ for energy 
supply to the Scottish islands, ‘it would probably be to the Department’s advantage to be 
able to claim the interest in the social advantage that development of better energy supplies 
could bring to small communities.’50 The NSHEB were understandably even more acutely 
aware of the problem and this caused their early involvement in the potential of wind 
energy.  
 
                                            
49 TNA, EG 16/150, ET 20/3/038, WISC (79) M7, p.6 
50 TNA, EG 16/132, Linacre (Chief Scientist’s Branch) to Skipper, 17 April 1978.  
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 The consortium had recommended the site for a demonstration turbine at Bennan 
Hill on the Scottish mainland (and within the SSEB area) based both on an assessment of 
its position (a windy hilltop site) and its accessibility, and WISC had accepted this 
advice.51 The choice made sound economic sense as it would keep construction and 
transport costs down. However the NSHEB were determined that the demonstration 
turbine should be built on Orkney. Through 1980, as WISC ironed out plans for the 
construction at Bennan Hill, Alex Murray, Chief Engineer at the NSHEB keep constant 
pressure on the DoEn (supported by the consortium52) to reconsider its decision; eventually 
threatening to buy wind turbines from abroad to fulfill its requirements. The pressure 
worked and WISC began to hesitate over its initial choice of site. At a meeting in 1980 the 
NSHEB was described as ‘a real customer’ and WISC looked more closely at Orkney as a 
potential site for the 3.7MW turbine. The SSEB on the other hand had access to a range of 
conventional power stations within its area including the nuclear power station at 
Hunterston. This meant that the SSEB had a less pressing need to explore alternatives.  
 
 Meetings of WISC through 1980 considered closely the proposals to relocate the 
demonstration turbine on Orkney. Although their discussions were finely balanced 
between the ‘definite requirement for the machine on Orkney to solve an immediate 
economic problem’ and the ‘greater difficulties for the construction, commissioning and 
operation of a prototype machine’, the committee made the decision to recommend to 
ACORD that the 3.7MW demonstration turbine should still be built at Bennan Hill in 
Ayrshire.53 In the meantime the NSHEB had formed its own plans to construct a smaller 
250kW turbine on Orkney in collaboration with Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd at a 
proposed cost of £1m. WISC had recommended that the DoEn should fund 30% of the cost 
of this smaller machine.54 In 1980 ACORD considered the WISC recommendations for the 
3.7MW turbine as ‘the major item’ of its October meeting.55 Although WISC favoured the 
plan to build the 3.7MW at Bennan Hill and the 250kW machine on Orkney, reflecting the 
fine balance within its deliberations it also offered the alternative proposal to ACORD that 
both machines could be built on Orkney. WISC estimated that the additional costs of siting 
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the 3.7MW on Orkney could amount to an estimated £225,000, where the total cost of each 
option offered by WISC ranged around a figure of £7m.  
 
 This was a difficult decision for ACORD and its new chairman (and also newly 
appointed Chief Scientist), Dr Anthony Challis. The briefing note for the chairman 
highlights two aspects of the proposals in particular. First, on a positive level was the 
confidence of the DoEn in the new wind energy consortium led by Taylor Woodrow, 
which the note suggested was ‘likely to perform much more satisfactorily’ than earlier 
‘insufficiently well directed industrial partners’. Second was the ‘sheer size of the 
programme’ in terms of cost. This would mean ‘juggling the spend profile to accommodate 
this and all our other projects in the R&D budget’.56 This clearly had direct implications 
for the Wave Energy Programme among others. ACORD made the decision to recommend 
to the DoEn that the wind energy programme should go ahead with the construction of 
both machines on Orkney. The most immediate concern for ACORD in deciding against 
Bennan Hill and the SSEB was the recognition that ‘the Consortium would gain valuable 
experience through being involved with a customer (NSHEB) that needed the electricity 
generated…’.57 The suggestion from the NSHEB that they ‘might eventually order a 
further 5-10 large aerogenerators’ also helped to convince ACORD.58 
 
 The ACORD decision to construct the DoEn’s large demonstration turbine on 
Orkney was also driven by a variety of wider considerations. The emergence of a strong 
industrial consortium and the perceived ‘failure’ of the Wave Energy Programme were 
important in this regard. Arguably more crucial though to the progress of wind energy in 
the UK were the dual impact of the US wind energy programme and the probable 
emergence of an international market for wind turbines. Vast amounts of spending on wind 
energy development in the US appeared to convince the DoEn that it was the most 
promising of the renewable energy technologies in the period. The strong support for wind 
energy development by the NSHEB and the CEGB seemed to confirm this view. This 
signalled a change in the direction of the UK renewable energy programme. In part this 
was undoubtedly ideologically-driven by a new Conservative Government committed to a 
move away from publicly-funded energy R&D, but I would argue that it also demonstrates 
                                            
56 TNA EG 16/124. ET 4/1/039, FPRD(80), p.3.  
57 TNA, EG 16/316/2, Annex, ‘Proposal to construct a 60 metre diameter aerogenerator on Orkney’. My 
emphasis.  
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a fundamental lack of confidence in British innovation. It was widely acknowledged within 
the DoEn that the UK occupied the lead position in wave energy, whilst it remained ‘4 to 5 
years’ behind the US lead in wind technology. Despite this advantage the DoEn was 
daunted by the scale of the investment required to develop wave energy. The enthusiastic 
participation of a range of leading industrial partners in wind energy, the existence of ‘real 
customers’ in the NSHEB and possibly the CEGB, and the prospects for export swayed the 
DoEn towards the safer option of wind energy. 
 
‘Large Scale Wind Power Comes of Age on Orkney’ 59 
In November 1987, almost ten years after the initial reference design for a 3.7MW 
demonstration turbine was formulated, the Secretary of State for Energy, Cecil Parkinson, 
finally ‘inaugurated the UK’s largest wind turbine’ on Orkney. Changes to the design 
meant that that the two-bladed 60m turbine now had an output of 3MW - ‘enough power 
for 2000 homes’.60 However, during the ten years between conception and construction the 
international wind energy scene had gone through some crucial changes, and in many 
senses the Orkney turbine had become passé even before its blades started to turn. The 
United States, the main external driver for Britain’s wind energy programme, had 
experienced a frenzy of activity between 1980-85. In particular, changes to legislation and 
the introduction of financial incentives for wind energy developers in California had seen a 
flurry of new ‘wind farms’ appearing after 1980 in a ‘Californian wind rush’. But at the 
end of December 1985 the financial incentives were greatly reduced and caused an almost 
immediate drop-off in wind development in the United States. Suddenly the prime export 
market for UK wind turbines largely disappeared.61 Furthermore, technical problems on 
many of the US wind-farms cast some doubts over the economics and reliability of wind 
energy. Just as the US wind energy industry went into a decline, the DoEn unveiled its 
‘star attraction’.  
 
 Following David Howell’s announcement in February 1980 negotiations began 
between the DoEn, NSHEB, and the consortium of Taylor Woodrow, British Aerospace, 
and GEC (soon after the consortium formed a new enterprise for the project called the 
Wind Energy Group). Relations became fraught at times as the NSHEB grew impatient 
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61 Interview, Peter Jamieson (formerly of Howden Engineering Ltd), 28 April 2008  
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with the pace of the project, threatening at one point to withdraw from the agreement and 
instead buy its wind turbines from Sweden.62 Some of the initial delay was due to 
contractual disputes between the DoEn and the Wind Energy Group (WEG) over funding 
and ownership issues. WEG was very keen to place limits on their liability on Orkney, and 
pressed the DoEn to offer guarantees that all of their costs (including profit) would be 
reimbursed by the government. The DoEn resisted the idea that WEG should have a ‘risk-
free’ part in the project, and negotiations slowed accordingly.  
 
 An essential element of the Orkney project was the construction of the smaller 20 
metre 250kW turbine prior to the larger machine. This contract had already been agreed 
separately between NSHEB, WEG and the DoEn, but it now came to be included in the 
overall project. Whilst the DoEn and NHSEB were funding the cost of the larger machine 
(the DoEn were contributing £4.6m, whilst the NSHEB contribution was £1m) the smaller 
machine included a financial commitment from WEG. This 20-metre machine was now 
estimated at £1.1m, with a WEG contribution of £225,000. WEG now emphasised the 
importance of the 20m turbine to the successful construction of the larger turbine, and they 
argued that this constituted a financial commitment to the success of the overall project. 
Eventually, after WEG refused to proceed with the 20-metre turbine until guarantees were 
forthcoming for the 60 metre machine, the DoEn was persuaded and the Government took 
on the bulk of the risks associated with the project. Finally in August 1982, after nearly 
two years of negotiations, the contracts were signed and final design and installation work 
could begin.63 
 
Other Developments (I): CEGB 
Whilst the DoEn was locked in the protracted contractual negotiations over the Orkney 
project, other developments in wind energy were taking place in the UK. Around the same 
time as the Orkney announcement was made the CEGB announced that it intended to build 
its own demonstration wind turbine in the UK.  This came as a complete surprise to WISC 
and the DoEn, and caused some degree of annoyance as the CEGB was a key member of 
WISC (it was Dr Taylor of the CEGB that had travelled to the US in 1977 to assess the 
developments in wind energy for WISC). WISC had repeatedly asked the CEGB to clarify 
its position on wind energy R&D in recent years, but they had always been non-committal, 
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63 Salter Archive, ‘The Orkney 60 metre Horizontal Axis Wind Turbine Generator - A Progress Report’, 
Seventh BWEA Wind Energy Conference, Oxford, 27-29 March 1985.  
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or at least low-key, about any plans to develop their own wind programme. The CEGB 
chairman denied to the Chief Scientist that they had any firm plans to develop wind 
turbines, but in fact site investigations had been taking place from the end of 1980.64 
  
         Throughout the early wind energy programme the CEGB had remained an interested, 
and often active, participant in the DoEn developments. It had contributed to the earlier 
DoEn sponsored studies on offshore siting and carried out important research on clustering 
and Grid connection at its Leatherhead laboratory (under the direction of Don Swift-
Hook). Dr Taylor was a founding member of WISC, but the CEGB took no part in the 
flagship 3.7MW demonstration turbine project, other than its role within WISC. During an 
earlier energy crisis, in the early 1950s, the CEGB had attempted to construct a 
demonstration wind turbine on the Lleyn Peninsula in Wales. This was eventually 
overturned by ‘intense local opposition’ on environmental grounds by the affected 
community.65 Now the CEGB planned to resurrect its plans for a demonstration turbine 
outwith the DoEn programme. By January 1981 a site was chosen next to its existing 
Carmarthen Bay power station in Wales.66 Rather than developing their own design the 
CEGB made the decision to ‘buy a proven commercial design when such machines 
become available’.67 It was proposed by the CEGB Chairman, Glyn England that an initial 
‘medium sized generator’ would lead to the development of wind turbine installations at 
other CEGB sites in the UK; and they named three possible sites for their first wind farm.68 
The tendering process considered five proposals and the CEGB settled on an American-
designed 24 metre 200kW HAWT turbine to be manufactured in the UK by the Glasgow 
engineering firm, James Howden Ltd., at an estimated cost of £500,000.69 In contrast to the 
protracted and ongoing negotiations over the Orkney project, the CEGB’s wind turbine 
was constructed quickly and was ‘switched on’ by November 1982. Ironically, it was the 
recently installed CEGB Chairman, (now) Sir Walter Marshall accompanied by Lady 
Marshall, who carried out the ceremonial duty. He said of the experimental turbine, 
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It will enable us to gain valuable experience of operation and maintenance 
and help us to find out how a much greater amount of wind energy could be 
integrated into the public electricity supply system. [ …] If our economic 
targets can be met, and if our programme has public support, wind energy 
on lowland sites could begin to make some contribution to public electricity 
supplies in the 1990s, with a progressively greater contribution thereafter. 70 
 
            Marshall also stressed that the CEGB was not ‘exclusively preoccupied with coal 
and nuclear energy, but was interested in all forms of energy which showed promise of 
producing economical supplies of electricity’.  In the event the Carmarthen Bay turbine 
was an unsuccessful experiment although this did not deter the CEGB from announcing in 
May 1983 that it intended to press ahead with a much larger turbine.71 Blade problems 
with the American-designed machine (first revealed in the US) meant that it only operated 
for a total of 400 hours between November 1982 and January the following year. Despite 
this, Marshall announced plans to build a massive 90-metre 4MW machine at the chosen 
site of Richborough in Kent with the possibility that ‘a cluster of up to ten large wind 
turbines of proven design’ could follow.72  
 
                What does the role of the CEGB tell us about the development of wind energy in 
the UK during this period? There are two aspects that are perhaps worth highlighting. First, 
the independence of the CEGB initiative can be explained most simply by its limited 
access to suitably windy sites. It had been well established since the most rudimentary 
wind maps were produced that the best sites for wind energy in the UK, and therefore the 
most economical, were located in Scotland. This meant that the DoEn wind programme 
was formed around the development of hilltop sites that would be of little use to the 
CEGB. This forced the CEGB to investigate the potential of lowland sites. Second, was the 
determination of the CEGB to press ahead with wind energy development using large-
scale machines despite the failure of its experimental turbine at Carmarthen Bay. On the 
one hand, this again illustrated the influence of developments elsewhere (particularly in the 
US) where wind energy was fast gaining acceptance as a viable alternative energy source. 
Moreover, it also emphasised the continuing influence in the UK of the dominant energy 
problem-frame, which required large-scale solutions to energy needs. The CEGB plan to 
construct huge wind turbines, of a size far greater than anything currently operating, shows 
an understanding of energy sources based entirely on the conventional power systems. The 
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proposal for Richborough was that 10 turbines could provide 400MW of electricity - 
comparable to coal-fired power station. Though admittedly some of this push towards this 
early model of wind farms was driven by the anticipated environmental objections to their 
construction, the CEGB approach (in common with the Orkney Project) emphasises the 
mistaken assumption that ‘size mattered’ in the development of wind energy in the UK.  
 
Other Developments (II): James Howden Ltd.  
Also operating largely outwith the DoEn wind programme through the 1980s was the 
Glasgow engineering firm, James Howden Ltd.73 During the 1970s Howden had enjoyed a 
very profitable spell working on a range of engineering projects (including nuclear power) 
and it was keen to explore lucrative new avenues in developing its range of engineering 
activities. After a meeting with the NSHEB in the winter of 1979, and no doubt intrigued 
by the involvement of other leading UK engineering firms in the potential of wind energy, 
from around 1980 Howden began to examine the possibilities of involvement in this 
emerging new sector. The initial plan was for Howden to buy out an existing turbine 
manufacturer but enquiries revealed that only one private firm in the UK, Sir Henry 
Lawson-Tancred, had developed a working wind turbine (a 100kW machine) with any 
immediate commercial potential. After a visit by two of its senior engineers Howden made 
an attempt to buy out the company.  
 
 When the independent-minded Sir Henry resisted this Howden shifted its attention 
abroad and bought out the US company, Wind Technology Generation (WTG) who had 
designed and manufactured a 300kW HWAT. Unfortunately for Howden, the WTG 
turbine design of large steel blades had major weaknesses due to stress, which were only 
revealed after installation. It was this machine design that the CEGB commissioned from 
Howden at Carmarthen Bay, which failed soon after it went into operation. After this 
initially unhappy experience Howden were undeterred and made an approach to the 
NSHEB to construct and test out an amended design of its HAWT on Orkney. Using its 
own expertise in engineering design a team of four engineers from Howden soon produced 
an alternative turbine blade from scratch, manufactured from a wood polymer. As the 
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DoEn/WEG negotiations ground on, Howden successfully installed and tested their new 
22m 300kW turbine on Orkney during 1983.74  
 
 Perhaps realising the glacial pace of progress in wind energy development in the 
UK, particularly when compared to the US, Howden began to make approaches to 
American wind farm developers in California to exploit the growing opportunities 
becoming available. Danish turbine manufacturers had already made significant progress 
in the US and Howden also saw the chance for a lucrative new export market. The 
breakthrough came in 1984 with a single machine built for Southern Californian Edison. 
This 26m 330kW machine led directly to a massive order for the major US wind farm 
development at Altamont Pass in California, where Howden secured a deal for seventy-
five 330kW turbines, ten 15m 60kW rated machines, and a further single 45m 750kW 
turbine.75 In 1985 the price of blades was roughly £10 per kilo, making the cost of a single 
Howden blade around £10,000. The Altamont deal amounted to 225 blades making this a 
significant job for Howden.76  
 
 Unfortunately the blades experienced problems right from testing. These were 
technical issues related to inadequate quality control which eventually resulted in all of the 
Howden/Edison blades breaking. Musgrove estimates that the total cost of this breakdown, 
including loss of electricity sales and the redesign and replacement of the blades, totaled 
more than £13m.77 As a result, in 1986-87 Howden made a loss on its new wind energy 
division.  Howden blamed the subcontractors but Peter Jamieson (who had helped to 
design the blades and was closely involved with the Altamont job) thought that the 
problems originated in Howden’s rush to complete this major order without adequate 
testing. The new system of US tax credits for wind farms was due to terminate at the end 
of 1985 and was unlikely to be renewed. Just as in the UK a change of government in the 
US signalled a shift in attitudes towards public subsidies and this directly affected the 
renewable energy programmes. Awareness of the looming deadline caused Howden and 
others to reconsider their participation in the disappearing US wind energy market.  
 
                                            
74 Musgrove, Wind Power, pp. 151-2 
75 Musgrove, Wind Power, pp. 151-2 
76 Interview, Peter Jamieson, 28 April 2008.  
77 Musgrove, Wind Power, pp. 151-2 
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 This change of mood, and the experience of heavy losses, signalled the demise of 
Howden’s interest in wind energy. They constructed three more turbines (750Kw HAWTs) 
over the next couple of years - one of these for the CEGB at their new site at Richborough 
- before in April 1989 withdrawing completely from the wind energy business. Peter 
Jamieson, who had been closely involved with wind energy at Howden from the outset, 
cites the lack of any real support from the government for wind energy development in the 
UK as a key factor in Howden’s decision. He compared the UK unfavourably with 
Denmark where he claimed there existed a concept of growing a new wind energy 
industry. The reliance on what he termed ‘the purist free market agenda’ severely 
constrained any prospect of developing a viable wind energy sector in the UK. 
 
Conclusions   
The inauguration of the Orkney turbine in 1987 proved to be the conclusion of the UK 
government’s involvement in wind energy and was the last act of the UK renewable 
energy programme. As its blades began to rotate slowly in the Orcadian wind the 
government announced its plans for electricity privatisation. From 1989 onwards 
renewable energy would cease to receive any direct government funding and would instead 
be encouraged through the new Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO). By this time Danish 
turbine manufactures had demonstrated that any immediate potential for wind energy lay 
in machines somewhat smaller than the massive 3MW WEG machine, which quickly 
transformed into an elegant white elephant. By this time, Howden, the UK’s only viable 
commercial manufacturer of wind turbines had pulled out of the industry after its unhappy 
experience in the US. However, the CEGB retained some faith in the future for wind 
energy in the UK. Howden’s final involvement in wind energy (following its 
announcement to withdraw from the industry) was to complete the turbine at Richborough 
for the CEGB, and in February 1988, one month after privatisation was announced, Walter 
Marshall unveiled plans to build three wind farms in the UK. The CEGB plan was for each 
wind farm to comprise 25 turbines with a capacity of about 8MW. In the event only one of 
these, at Cold Northcott in Cornwall, was ever built.78 
 
 The UK’s involvement with wind energy was radically different from its earlier 
interest in the development of wave energy. From the outset this more mature technology 
provided an opportunity for the UK to exploit its own vast wind resource and to encourage 
                                            
78 Musgrove, Wind Power, p. 155 
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the development of manufacturing capability which could take advantage of the export 
opportunities provide by the burgeoning US market. Relative to other countries in Europe 
such as Denmark, Germany, and Sweden, the UK made a late start on its wind energy 
programme. Recognition of this fact forced the DoEn to ditch other renewables 
programmes, most controversially wave, in order that resources could be concentrated on 
wind energy. However, rather than recognising that the commercial potential lay in 
machines rated 1MW and less the UK concentrated its attention on the huge 3MW 
demonstration machine on Orkney. Moreover, as had been seen, extended contractual 
difficulties meant that it took the government more than five years to construct the Orkney 
turbine. During this time Howden had entered the industry, designed and developed its 
own machine, and sold and built its machines in the US. Also the CEGB had built and 
tested its own machine at Carmarthen Bay.  
 
 Energy Paper 55 ‘Renewable Energy in the UK: The Way Forward’ set out the 
government’s new approach to renewable energy in the UK.79 The Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation (NFFO) would be used to encourage commercial exploitation of renewable 
energy in the UK and government involvement (and expenditure) would gradually decline. 
However for wind energy the decision of Howden makes it clear that industry was not 
attracted to the commercial potential. Despite the CEGB announcement to build three wind 
farms the interest of industry was practically non-existent. Only WEG (the consortium of 
Taylor Woodrow, British Aerospace, and GEC) would continue its involvement in wind 
energy.  Indeed it is arguable that wind energy and renewables more generally would have 
disappeared at the end of the 1980s were it not for the discovery of the science of climate 
change. The imperatives of rising oil prices, security of supply, and dwindling fossil fuel 
reserves that had driven renewable energy since 1974 were increasing replaced after 1989 
with the new incentive of reducing carbon emissions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
79 Department of Energy, Renewable Energy in the UK: The Way Forward, Energy Paper 55 (London: 
HMSO, 1988 
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Chapter 7 
 
Some economic aspects of the UK Renewable Energy 
Programme 
 
 This account of the development of renewable energy sources in the UK in the 
period following the first global oil crisis presented in the foregoing chapters has focused 
on the political and social aspects of the story.  This is explained with reference to the 
primary assumption of this thesis that it was these two factors that combined to create, 
maintain, and ultimately end the UK renewable energy programme.  Throughout this 
account this thesis has sought to emphasise how social movements and political 
imperatives dominated energy debates in the UK during the 1970s and how these 
profoundly influenced the impact of economic assessment of renewable energy sources in 
particular. It is also central to the hypothesis proposed here that socio-political factors took 
precedence over economic considerations in government policy on renewable energy 
sources. However, it important to the development of this thesis that the economic 
elements of the period are considered and this chapter will explore some of the key 
economic aspects of the development of renewable energy sources during the period 1974-
88. It is not a suggestion of this thesis that costs were unimportant. This chapter will show 
that the estimated generating costs for renewable energy (in particular wave energy) were 
constantly used to appraise the programme. Rather, it is advanced that during this time it 
was widely accepted that energy prices were generally unreliable as a guide in UK energy 
policy. 
 
Although many of the central economic issues appear in the main body of this 
thesis, this chapter will gather this information together and consider the wider socio-
economic conditions against which the programme operated during the period. This will 
include the role of the UK government in R&D and in creating prices during this period. 
The chapter will begin by revisiting the theme of government intervention in energy 
matters and the constructed nature of fuel pricing explored elsewhere in this thesis. It will 
continue with a general discussion of the role that economics played in the evolution of 
renewable energy programmes during the period before moving on to highlight many of 
the key issues using a case study of the economics of wave energy during the 1970s. Some 
consideration will also be give to the impact of externalities that play such a large part in 
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current economic assessments of renewable energy.  Through the use of a case study of the 
WEP this chapter will focus on the challenges that confronted those involved in the 
development of renewable energy when it came to calculations of estimated cost. The huge 
variation in estimates between groups and the over time will give some insight into the 
limits and politics of economic evaluation during the period. This will also go some way to 
explaining the rationale behind the focus of this thesis on socio-political factors.  
 
As I have shown in Chapter 3 the UK government’s renewable energy programme 
was created in large part as a reaction to the increased price of oil after 1973. The key 
element of that programme, the Wave Energy Programme (WEP), was constantly 
evaluated in economic terms in what seemed to be an objective measure: the price per kWh 
of generating electricity. The ‘objective measure’, however, proved contentious. In 1978 
the Heathrow Conference revealed the findings of the consultants RPT. These dealt with 
the technical and economic challenges that faced wave energy – and as was shown the 
estimated costs caused the government to back away from wave energy. Later, after the 
WEP was closed down, Stephen Salter consistently challenged the government’s estimated 
costs, offering revised versions of the cost per kWh. Following the WEP, the wind energy 
programme again was focused on cost throughout its short-lived existence prior to the 
privatisation of electricity in the late 1980s.  
  
 So in many respects the history of this period of the development of renewable 
energy in the UK could be regarded as a quite simple tale of economic imperatives.  The 
narrative could go something like this: The government experimented with the development 
of alternative forms of energy following the oil crisis, but these proved too costly. 
However, this thesis has rejected this view of the period and regards it as (to use a phrase 
of Salter’s) simplistic rather than simple.1 This deterministic view might be more 
acceptable if we accepted that decisions about energy were based entirely on cost; however 
I hope to have shown in the foregoing that this was not the case in the UK during the 
twentieth century. Chick wrote that national energy policy not always ‘a matter of rational 
economic calculation’ and as this quote from a 1970s Energy Commission paper 
demonstrates energy prices were a product of a rather more complex set of circumstances.2  
 
                                            
1 See p.147. DoEn, ETSU R9, ‘Wave Energy Steering Committee, Proceedings of a workshop on wave 
energy, Maidenhead, 16-18 December, 1979’.  
2 Chick, Electricity, p.18 
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Current energy prices are the product of the varying circumstances and 
histories of the individual industries….Coal, gas and electricity are not 
internationally traded to the same extent as oil. There is greater freedom of 
manoeuvre to determine, in the context of energy policy, the principles 
which should underlie their pricing…The general principle of relating price 
to the costs of supply […] may be difficult to apply in practice.3  
 
The fact that fuel prices are created by more than their related costs of discovery, 
extraction, transport and conversion is not surprising. It was widely accepted that the 
‘market’ for energy in the UK as something less than efficient. Michael Posner stated that 
fuel policy was ‘tendentious’ and went on to claim that,  
 
…all the energy industries were operating in a market of which the 
characteristics were, in part, artificially determined not just by the permanent 
elements of imperfect competition, but by government trying to play God in 
the system without having divine knowledge or divine power.4 
 
 
This was a view echoed by the governments own White Paper on Energy in 1967:  
 
National fuel policy is presumably meant to overcome the deficiencies of an 
imperfect market by imposing on its dominant institutions decisions that 
serve the public interest better than those they would otherwise make.   The 
record makes it appear doubtful whether that purpose was either achieved or 
achievable.5 
 
In addition the fact that electricity prices are further complicated by government choices 
over generation methods is equally widely known (see chapter 3). These conclusions over 
the uncertain relationship between energy costs and energy prices for mature fuels such as 
oil, gas and coal suggest that it would be challenging to integrate a ‘new’ fuel into this 
complex network of ‘varying circumstances and histories’.6 This thesis suggests that this 
was indeed the case for renewable resources in general during the period 1974-88, and 
certainly for wave energy during the 1970s.  
 
The central contention here is that the development of renewable energy resources 
after 1973, partially instigated through social movements, was maintained and encouraged 
by social and political imperatives. This was explored in detail in Chapter 2 and is echoed 
                                            
3 Energy Commission, Working Document on Energy Policy, Paper Number 1. Annex 4, ‘Instruments for 
implementing energy policy’, pp.79-80  
4 Quoted in Ashworth, Coal, p.55 
5 Ashworth, Coal, p.58 
6 Energy Commission, Working Document, pp.79-80 
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throughout this thesis. ‘Disrupters of institutionalised arrangements’ kept continual 
pressure on the government to explore alternative sources of energy, based mainly on an 
opposition to nuclear energy.7 Throughout the post-war period the UK government made 
largely political decisions on fuel and energy policy.  The most obvious example of this, 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, was the UK nuclear industry. Based on a perceived need for 
energy security and a post-war thirst for big science, the government created a succession 
of highly expensive nuclear programmes in the UK. Scholars have agreed that this 
programme was not driven by its economic attractions, but rather by political goals.8 This 
political nature of energy decisions applied equally to the renewables programme after 
1973 and explains the overwhelming focus on these issues in this thesis.  
 
Externalities 
It is difficult, from the viewpoint of the twenty-first century, to think of renewable energy 
resources separately from climate change. Much, if not all, of the enthusiasm for 
renewable sources of energy appear to emanate from concern about the impact of carbon 
emissions. This close relationship has certainly encouraged the subsequent development of 
renewables through post-privatisation instruments such as the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation 
(NFFO) and the later Renewables Obligation (RO). As discussed at length in Chapter 2 the 
1970s was the period when the ‘environment’ began to creep into the consciousness of the 
developed world through the appearance of landmark publications such as The Limits to 
Growth (LTG) and the first UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Important 
social movements such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace were created during the 
1970s and all campaigned hard on environmental issues. As discussed, energy did appear 
at the margins of this debate but did not occupy the key role that it has for these same 
groups today. Energy-related environmental concerns during the 1970s were instead 
focused on one main issue: depletion.  Emanating from the LTG thesis of rapid depletion 
of fossil fuels the focus of environmental concern was on renewable energy as an 
inexhaustible energy supply, rather than (necessarily) a clean supply. During the 1970s the 
science of climate change was developing. Below is an early, and highly unusual, mention 
in an official government publication of carbon emissions but this made little impact on 
thinking about renewable energy resources until later in the 1980s: 
                                            
7 Sine and Lee, ‘Tilting’, p.124 
8 Williams, Nuclear Power Decisions; Patterson, Nuclear Power: Patterson, Critical  
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…concern about the effects of increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the 
world’s atmosphere could lead to limits being set on fossil fuel combustion 
well within a 50 year time horizon.9  
 
 
 During the 1970s environmental groups were preoccupied with the impact of 
pollution. This was a direct result of the publication at the beginning of the 1960s of 
Rachel Carson’s seminal Silent Spring.  Throughout the 1970s environmental groups and 
publications such as The Ecologist magazine in the UK concentrated on issues such as acid 
rain and air pollution. The link to energy was not well developed other than through 
attention to the pollution emitted by the coal-burning power stations. The other key area of 
concern for environmental groups at this time (and still today) was nuclear energy. The 
harmful effects of radiation and the problems of waste disposal were key concerns of many 
environmentalists from the outset and, as discussed in Chapter 2, these issues encouraged 
both the creation and development of many social movements from the 1950s. These 
concerns about nuclear energy encouraged support for clean renewable energy sources 
from environmental groups during the 1970s. This added to the social and political 
pressure for renewable energy, rather than being included in any economic assessment.  
 
The Wave Energy Programme 
As mentioned above, from its inception in 1974 until well after its closure in 1982, the cost 
of the new technology (defined as the cost of producing electricity from wave energy) 
within the Wave Energy Programme (WEP) was continually scrutinised by the 
government, mainly through ACORD (as described in chapter 4). This formed a key part 
of the general assessment process which all the renewables programmes were subject to in 
‘Phase 1’ of the governments plan.10  Although the plan appears in Energy Paper 55 as a 
rather neat and ordered programme of ‘research, development and demonstration’ from the 
UK government it was in fact devised roughly two-thirds of the way through that 
programme. Phase 1 (Mid 70s to mid 80s) which focused on wave energy was described 
thus: 
The programme identified feasible technologies, their costs, their technical 
potential as contributors to UK energy supply and the possible timescale of 
                                            
9 Department of Energy, Energy Technologies for the United Kingdom, Energy Paper 39 (London: HMSO, 
1979) 
10 Department of Energy, Renewable Energy in the UK: The Way Forward, Energy Paper 55 (London: 
HMSO, 1988), Phase 1 – Mid 70s to mid 80s. p.2 
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that contribution. This phase was conducted mainly by analysis and 
experiment without heavy financial commitment to technology development 
at full scale. Further expenditure on those technologies unlikely to 
contribute significantly in the UK was curtailed and increased effort focused 
on the more promising ones. 11 
 
Therefore alongside cost, the other early considerations for the government were the 
technical potential of the resource and the state of the technology. Of course both of these 
additional elements for investigation were in fact very much related to cost. The scale of 
the potential resource and its location and accessibility would have a direct impact on cost, 
as would the developmental stage of wave technology. Therefore each of these elements, 
expressed as disparate issues by the government, could all be measured by cost. It is no 
surprise then that cost (in terms of electricity generation) was central to both the initial 
enthusiasm and the eventual gloom of the WEP, although it was a ‘cost’ that as both 
constructed and contested.  
 
 From before the creation of the WEP, economics featured strongly in the dialogue 
surrounding wave energy. Gordon Goodwin made several mentions during his very first 
visit to Salter’s workshop of his view that… 
 
…any major undertaking has to fit in with existing economic structure, 
must be costed on a totally comprehensive basis, and has to compete with 
other dominant calls upon National [sic] resources. 12 
 
Although Salter was completely absorbed by the technical challenges of wave energy he 
had a clear understanding that wave energy must be ‘economic’ in order that it be adopted 
more widely.13 The challenge for developers and for the government in a very uncertain 
environment was to make an accurate assessment of what the costs might be  
 
The calculation of the cost of wave energy 
Although he does not appear in the period during which decisions were made initially, an 
important figure in the development of accurate costs estimates for wave energy was Tom 
Thorpe. Thorpe was a senior scientist at ETSU and he produced two lengthy reports on 
wave energy during the 1990s; one in 1992 and the other in 1999.  These reports were 
                                            
11 Ibid 
12 TNA, EG 16/13, Note for the file, ‘Wave Power’ 
13 SA, First Year Interim Report on Edinburgh Wave Power Project “Study of Mechanisms for Extracting 
Power from Sea Waves” September 1975, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Edinburgh 
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commissioned by the government (through the DTI) in response to the increasing evidence 
of the existence and impact of climate change and growing pressure from environmental 
groups and Select Committees to reconsider the potential of wave energy.14 Thorpe had the 
benefit of being some distance from the controversy surrounding the closure on the WEP 
on economic grounds in 1982, so was able to take a detached and clinical look at such facts 
that were available. His 1999 report summarises all of the officially generated costs for 
wave energy from 1983 onwards and gives a useful insight into the challenges of 
calculating the costs of new and uncertain technology.15 As Thorpe himself put it in his 
1992 report. 
 
…until the technology matures, estimates of the cost of power from wave 
energy devices represent a snapshot of the status and costs of the designs at 
(the current) stages of their development.16 
 
In 1999 he was still keen to emphasise the ‘considerable uncertainty’ associated with his 
cost estimates and went on to suggest that predicted generating costs ‘could vary by up to 
±20%’.17 
 
  The ‘cost’ of the early wave energy schemes was calculated on the relatively 
simple basis of capital costs (annuitized over the lifetime of the plant), fuel costs, and the 
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, essentially the same kinds of cost estimates 
deployed for more traditional sources of energy from fossil fuels. More recent and helpful 
concepts such as energy coefficients were absent in these simplified calculations. As 
already mentioned in the introduction this approach caused a number of challenges for 
wave energy. Firstly, although the energy in the waves is free, the capital costs of 
establishing very uncertain technology can be difficult or impossible to calculate 
accurately. As Thorpe noted above these were never more than a ‘snapshot’ during periods 
of rapid technological progress in the 1970s. For mature technologies the elements of the 
calculation were well established and reasonably predictable. To further complicate 
matters, as mentioned above, the established energy industries drew on a range of subsidies 
that obscured the true cost of fossil fuels.  
 
                                            
14 Ross, D., ‘Scuppering’ p.16  
15 Thorpe, T. W., ‘A Review of Wave Energy’, ETSU Report number R-120 for the DTI (May 1999) 
16 Thorpe, T. W., ‘A Review of Wave Energy’, Vols. 1 and 2, ETSU Report number R-72 (December 1992)  
17 Thorpe, ‘Wave Energy’, (May 1999). Executive summary p.iv 
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Discount rates 
An important element of the calculations was the discount rates applied and the 
concomitant estimated plant life. Although an important element of any calculation of cost, 
in the period it was less of an issue for wave energy. Although arguable, plant life for wave 
devices was estimated to be similar than that for fossil fuel plants at 25-30 years.  Of more 
importance to the fate of wave energy was the discount rate that was applied. Over the 
period this was the same for wave as for fossil fuels – varying from 8% (public sector) to 
15% (commercial rates) over the period. Small changes in the discount rate can have a 
major impact on total cost – and marginal differences in the base cost can be magnified 
over time. However the major challenge for renewables in general and wave energy in 
particular is that by far the largest proportion of total cost for a ‘free’ fuel resides in the 
capital plant and the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs. The benefit of free fuel can 
be swamped by larger capital costs discounted over the life of the plant.  This was a 
particularly so as the impact of hugely uncertain prices over time for fossil fuels in the 
calculations should have allowed a tremendous advantage to renewable energy sources. 
Therefore the need to arrive at as accurate a figure as possible for construction of the 
physical plant is crucial to the perceived cost-effectiveness of renewables. Unsurprisingly 
it was in this area that most of the disagreements between the wave device developers and 
the government appeared.   
 
 Ross provided some examples of the disputes that arose with the government over 
capital costs.  
It was assumed that a non-return valve in a wind turbine would fail once in a 
million hours while the same valve in a wave energy device would fail 68 
times during the same period. The cost of the steel canister and concrete 
casing of the Duck caused extraordinary diversity. Salter’s team obtained 
estimates of £208 per tonne. The RPT figure was £10,000 per tonne. The 
difference added up top £2.7 million per Duck.  RPT calculated the ‘average’ 
cost of wave power by comparing all the devices, including those assessed as 
the most expensive. So if one device was costed at 4p and the most expensive 
at 12p, then the average would automatically be 8p. But if someone 
introduced a spendthrift invention costed at, say, 24p, then the average would 
automatically have gone up to 14p. Salter was not the only protester. 
Professor Michael French of Lancaster University, who had invented an 
inflatable air bag to generate wave-electricity, proposed to use scrap iron as 
ballast. The official estimate put it at £3,000 a tonne. The normal price was 
£100.18  
 
                                            
18 Ross, ‘Scuppering the Waves’, p.15 
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For wave energy these uncertainties and disputes over the factors involved in the 
estimation of generating costs remained (and still remain?) problematic. The vast 
complexity of variables led to some very imprecise calculations, which was prevalent 
throughout the 1970s. Furthermore, the general unreliability of these figures was widely 
acknowledged at the time. However, what was beyond dispute was the fact that, even 
allowing for wide variations in estimates, the cost of wave energy was significantly above 
that of the cheapest generating fuel – coal. At the time of the Heathrow Conference coal 
averaged 2p/kWh compared to the 20p-50p/kWh estimated for wave.  
 
Thorpe (1999) and the Edinburgh Duck 
This subsection examines a much later assessment of wave energy. The intention is that 
this will illustrate two facts about wave energy relevant to this thesis. First, it will show the 
huge challenges that the developers and the government faced in determining an accurate 
indication of the generating cost for wave energy. Second, it will show the dramatic fall in 
generating costs as the technology developed over a 15-year period. The evidence here 
would suggest that the cost estimates for wave energy during the 1970s were subject to 
even greater inaccuracy and variation. This then leads back to a central contention of this 
thesis that estimated generating costs formed only one element of the process in the 
decision to close down the wave programme. Developers and the government (through 
ACORD, ETSU, and the consultants RPT) knew that estimates of generating costs were as 
Thorpe late put it ‘snapshots’ of the technology.  More relevant to the government at the 
time was the scale of its commitment to an uncertain new technology. Wave energy clearly 
had many years of development ahead – a point Salter was always anxious to make (see 
Chapter 5). Faced with cuts to the energy R&D budget, ACORD made the understandable 
decision to invest in wind energy, a much more mature renewable technology. However, 
this thesis argues that this was not based on finely balanced economic estimates, but rather 
on much broader numbers. A clear example of this was in Energy Paper 3, prepared by 
ETSU, which showed low estimated costs of £320-£380 per kW of installed capacity 
(including operation and maintenance) for wind.19  This contrasted sharply with the figures 
for wave presented at Heathrow of £4000-£9000 per kW of installed capacity (excluding 
operation and maintenance). This vast gulf in the cost of installed capacity and the 
                                            
19 TNA, EG 16/298/2, ‘Energy Technologies for the United Kingdom: An appraisal for R, D&D planning’, 
Volume 1, 27 March 1979. 
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investment of time and money needed to develop wave that it suggested were arguably 
more pertinent than the accepted unreliability of generation cost estimates.  
 
In 1999 Tom Thorpe produced his second report on wave energy within 10 years 
for the DTI.  In the report he summarised the current state of wave energy development 
and offered some assessment of the economic and technical potential of the resource.  His 
1992 report concluded that ‘optimistic expectations for the original wave energy devices 
were unfounded’, but by 1999 ‘the same review methodology now indicates that wave 
energy could become a useful source of energy’.20 As this later date falls outside the focus 
of my research it is somewhat of a moot point. What is useful to this thesis is the 
methodology that Thorpe adopts to calculate the generating costs of wave energy.  The 
complexity of his calculations reveals the challenges that faced developers and consultants 
in the 1970s. This is further emphasised by the margin for error referred to above (±20%).  
 
 Under a heading ‘Economic Assessment’ Thorpe builds a model of the variables 
that make up the capital cost estimates for wave energy. These divide into two main 
categories as shown in Table 7.1. The table expresses the complexity involved in 
estimating generation costs for wave energy. The range of variables in the table is 
concentrated on the issues of site selection and the device itself. For each of these 
categories a further list of variables was added. The challenges were increased in the case 
of the Duck, ‘which would exploit the maximum amount of wave energy resource in deep 
water’. As Thorpe pointed out, 
 
This required the Duck to operate under more energetic wave regimes, which 
would place great technical demands on the device. The Edinburgh team has 
acknowledged that the Duck would require a long R&D programme…21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
20 Thorpe, ‘Wave Energy’, (May 1999) Executive summary. p.iii 
21 Thorpe, ‘Wave Energy’, (May 1999) p.53 
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Table 7.1 Methodology for Economic appraisal 
 
Wave Power resource ⇒ Power levels in the sea 
                   ⇓ 
⇒ 
Site Selection  
                                          ⇒ Directionality factor ⇒ Available wave power 
                   ⇓ 
 Capture efficiency ⇒ Captured wave power 
                   ⇓ 
Power chain efficiency ⇒ Maximum annual output 
                   ⇓ 
Availability  ⇒ 
          ⇓ 
Actual annual output 
                   ⇓ 
O&M costs ⇒       
                                ⇓ 
Cost of electricity 
           ⇑ Annual cost 
           ⇑                   ⇑ 
Capital costs ⇒ 
                                          ⇒ 
 
                                          ⇒ 
Device selection 
                                          ⇒ 
 
 
                                          ⇒ 
  
 
Source: Thorpe, ‘Wave Energy’ (May 1999) 
 
 
In his 1999 report Thorpe looked at three versions of the Duck: the 1983, the 1991, 
and the 1998 version. He charted the technical improvements that the Edinburgh team had 
made over nearly three decades of development and provided a summary of the dramatic 
reductions in estimated generating costs. This variation over fifteen years from a high of 
83p/kWh in 1983 to a figure of 5.3p/kWh in 1998 gave some indication of the effects of 
the ‘long R&D programme’ that the Edinburgh team had always envisaged (see Table 7.2). 
Interestingly the 1998 figure of 5.3p/kWh was the target that ACORD had set for wave 
energy in 1982 prior to closure (see p.120).  
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Table 7.2  
 Costs of Generating Electricity for the Edinburgh Duck, 1983-98. 
                                Generating Costs  
 8% discount rate 15% discount rate  
1983 Duck 57p/kWh 83p/kWh  
1991 Duck 17p/kWh 26p/kWh 
1998 Duck  5.3p/kWh 8p/kWh  
Source: Thorpe, ‘Wave Energy’ (May 1999) 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has explored some of the economic issues of the renewable energy 
programme in the period 1974-88. It has shown how energy prices in the UK were subject 
to ‘varying circumstances’ and that the link between cost and price was not always clear. 
For renewable energy this may have offered an opportunity to enter an energy market that 
was less concerned with costs (at least initially). In theory the government could have 
taken a decision to set a low price for wave energy as a route to rapid development.  This 
thesis has shown that prior to the Heathrow Conference in 1978 this may have been a 
possibility amid the unbounded enthusiasm for wave energy.  However following 
Heathrow it was clear that the estimated generating costs for wave energy were 
frighteningly high, which undermined any thought of short-term subsidy. Estimates (that 
Thorpe showed later were actually hugely optimistic) of 20p-50p/kWh – ten to twenty-five 
times the average generation cost of the time - scuppered any enthusiasm for wave energy. 
The emergence of a more reliable and mature renewable energy technology - wind – in the 
early 1980s sealed the fate of wave energy.  Wind had better short-term prospects and 
much lower capital costs at the time, and it had the added appeal of being promoted in the 
United States.  This gave the UK government more faith in the technology and relieved it 
of the pressure of ‘going it alone’ on wave energy. 
 
 This thesis has argued that the development of renewable energy after 1974 was the 
result of a range of factors. Energy security was a key aspect.  Chapter 1 discussed the 
response to the Suez crisis in 1957 with a trebling of the UK nuclear programme at the 
time. It was suggested that this was repeated after the 1973 oil crisis, both in the United 
States (with Project Independence) and the UK.  Official reports, from Rothschild’s CPRS 
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onwards, repeatedly emphasised the need to move away form a reliance on imports of 
foreign oil.  Clearly for the government the main solution to this challenge was as it had 
been in 1957 - the UK’s nuclear programme.  This thesis has shown how the renewables 
programme was consistently regarded by the government as an ‘insurance option’ and it 
was generally compared in any official economic assessments with nuclear energy.22 
Given the heavily subsidised nature of nuclear energy and the uncertainty over the costs of 
wave energy discussed above this was a rather troublesome financial comparison. 
Therefore this suggests that the decisions on wave energy were taken as they were in other 
areas of energy policy at the time – on mainly social and political grounds.  
 
  
 
 
 
                                            
22 Department of Energy, Energy Technologies for the United Kingdom, Energy Paper 39 (London: HMSO, 
1979) 
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Conclusions 
 
The central hypothesis examined in this thesis is the idea that decisions on renewable 
energy sources taken by the UK government are driven largely by socio-political factors – 
with economic issues playing a more minor role than might be expected. It was suggested 
in the introduction that the period 1974-88 was clear evidence of the early evolution of this 
approach with the Wave Energy Programme (WEP) providing a useful case-study of an 
R&D programme which was created, maintained, and eventually closed by socio-political 
policymaking. It was made clear in the introduction that this task would be achieved within 
a broadly based historical narrative and analysis of some of the key political, economic and 
social events of the programme, thus avoiding the narrower debates on technology and 
politics that have characterised the subject so far. Therefore what is put forward here is an 
account of renewable energy that considers the key social and political factors for its 
creation and some of the reasons for its demise which cuts across the existing technical and 
political literature. In doing so it has explored a central theme, first suggested by Langdon 
Winner, that artifacts have politics.1  
 
 It has examined the evolution of renewable energy in the UK in terms of the social 
and political imperatives that in some cases drove change and in others encouraged 
continuity. Central to this has a been a new consideration of the role of the ‘new 
environmentalism’ in pressing for the development of alternative, and benign, sources of 
energy. In their role as what Sine and Lee have described as ‘disrupters of institutions’, 
environmental organisations and publications continually nagged at the government during 
the early 1970s to look at alternatives to traditional energy sources and, in particular, to 
nuclear energy.2 This largely informal social pressure acted to alert the government to the 
potential of renewable energy, and as I have shown, provided ideological inspiration to 
innovators such as Stephen Salter in seeking to create alternatives to nuclear power.  
Although a natural link between environmentalism and renewable energy is often 
(wrongly) assumed, this thesis has shown, in particular by a close analysis of the content of 
The Ecologist magazine during the period, just how environmentalism began to embrace 
the debates on energy during the early 1970s.  
  
                                            
1 Winner, L., ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’, Daedalus, 109:1, Modern Technology: Problem or Opportunity? 
(Winter 1980) pp. 121-136 
2 Sine and Lee, ‘Tilting’, p.124 
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 As the vast majority of renewable sources are used directly to produce electricity, 
this analysis began with a brief consideration of the historical development of electricity 
networks in the UK. This addressed the first of the major themes of this thesis – 
government involvement and intervention in energy matters in the UK.3 Since the early 
days of electricity supply in the UK, government and municipalities recognised its 
importance for economic and social development and largely took control of the fledgling 
industry. The eventual result was the creation of a national distribution grid in the 1930s 
and the subsequent nationalisation of the electricity industry in 1948. One important 
consequence of this was that thereafter the evolution of energy technology in the UK was 
overwhelmingly dictated by the socio-political demands of the postwar era, and this 
influence continued through to the UK renewables programme of the 1970s and 1980s.  
After nationalisation all of the UK’s energy industries became integrated monopolies and 
the market remained distant from energy in the UK until a series of privatisations in the 
later 1980s. As Helm put it, 
 
The nationalised coal industry dug coal primarily for the nationalised 
electricity industry, which built enough power stations to secure supply. 
Customers, with nowhere else to go, paid the costs.  When North Sea oil and 
gas were discovered, the Gas Council (and the British Gas Corporation, 
BGC, at it became known) built the National Transmission System (NTS), 
converted households to natural gas and signed long-term contracts for gas 
to flow through its planned network. The British National Oil Company 
(BNOC) completed the picture, set up in 1976 to give the state a direct hand 
in the North Sea, complementing the oil interests of British Gas.4  
 
 When the Government did intervene on energy it was often on what it perceived as 
matters of national security, such as during the Suez crisis when its motivations were 
overtly political. Chick described this as the ‘patriotic cloak’ of national energy security, 
when alongside the infamous trebling of the UK’s nuclear programme, the crisis also 
pushed the country away from cheap oil imports towards protectionism for the coal 
industry, as domestic employment triumphed over cheap energy.5 Despite these occasional 
interventions, during the two decades following the Second World War, energy forecasting 
and planning was largely left to the nationalised giants of the CEGB, the NCB, and the 
UKAEA, and as Hannah pointed out, within these organisations the ‘engineers’ 
                                            
3 Introduction. pp.17-1p 
4 Helm, Energy, p.14  
5 Chick, Electricity.  
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dominated.6 Within the framework of statutory monopoly and integration inhabited by the 
nationalised energy industries during the period this was to lead to an approach to energy 
that was dominated by a constrained technological development (mainly in nuclear) and 
which paid little attention to the cost of electricity.  
 
 Bound up in the general disregard of cost to the electricity consumer during this 
period were the political decisions over fuel choice, which were a more central concern of 
this thesis. The CEGB remained throughout the postwar period the most important 
customer for coal, and as the quote from Helm (above) illustrates, its decisions over fuel 
were always dictated by the needs of at least one other nationalised energy industry - 
usually coal. In the postwar golden age of increasing prosperity, domestic consumers were 
keen to switch from ‘dirty’ coal heating to electric heating and the survival of the coal 
industry depended entirely on the CEGB’s decision to burn coal to provide that electricity.7 
This, exacerbated by the Government’s concerns over energy security following Suez, 
further restricted the opportunity for the CEGB to take advantage of cheaper oil-fired 
power stations. This situation was made worse by the troubled development of nuclear 
energy in the UK. Once more, energy security and the dominance of the engineers in 
energy supply meant that the huge costs of nuclear power development were absorbed by 
the cost per therm to the consumer, as the UK repeatedly tried, and largely failed, to 
establish a dependable nuclear programme. This approach resulted in what Baumgartner 
and Midttun termed the ‘haphazard’ UK policy before 1974, during which there was ‘no 
serious attempt to explore the longer term energy future of the UK’.8  
  
 In 1973 the global oil crisis shook the UK government’s complacency on energy 
policy. It responded immediately by creating a Department of Energy and turning its 
attention to energy forecasting and attempted for the first time to create plans for the 
medium and long term energy needs of the UK. For the next fifteen years, until 
privatisation, the UK Government made various attempts to formulate an energy policy. 
This was a unique period in UK energy policy during the twentieth century when the 
Government attempted to directly control and guide the development of energy planning in 
the UK. Although focused on the traditional fuels of coal and nuclear, as well as the 
                                            
6 Hannah, Engineers.  
7 Ashworth, Coal : Volume 5,  p.43 
8 Baumgartner, T., and Midttun, A. (eds.), The Politics of Energy Forecasting: A Comparative Study of 
Energy Forecasting in Western Europe and North America (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) p. 115 
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‘newer’ North Sea oil and gas, this new attempt at formulating a UK energy policy also 
extended to energy conservation and renewable energy sources. With the sensational 
publication of Limits to Growth and the growing profile of the new environmentalist lobby 
in the UK, the Government was alerted to the potential of the ‘alternative’ sources within 
its wider energy strategy.   
 
 Another theme examined in this thesis was the idea of energy morality. This 
described a new social interest in matters relating to energy taken up by the newly 
emerging environmental groups of the 1970s. The influence of the new environmental 
movement was crucial in advancing the case for renewable energy sources during the early 
part of the 1970s. Emerging from the swirl of anti-establishment, anti-capitalist, anti-
industrialist counter culture of the late 1960s, the UK environmental movement advocated 
the development of alternative energy sources, mainly as an alternative to nuclear energy. 
Through influential publications such as The Ecologist and the newly formed, more 
radical, environmental organisations such as Friends of the Earth UK (FoEUK) the 
ideological case for renewable energy was pushed into the mainstream. This thesis has 
shown that this not only attracted the attention of developers, but it also prompted the 
government to respond in some way. As several recent accounts of the 1970s have shown, 
during this period the government was keenly aware of the growth and perceived dangers 
of radical thought.9 Turner and others have shown in detail how the government became 
fixated on responding to these threats to the established order, and how the ‘muesli-eaters, 
ecology freaks, loony leftists and other nutters’ in many ways typified these new and 
dangerous elements in British society during the period.10 This indicates that the new 
environmental movement had gathered sufficient momentum to represent a threat to the 
government, and that the UK renewables programme can be seen in some ways as a 
response, and a token, for this new section of society. 
 
 Alongside the social pressure created by the formation and growth of the new 
environmental movement was the important political influence of Lord Rothschild and his 
Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS).  This thesis has shown how during 1974 Rothschild 
and the CPRS occupied, albeit temporarily, a vacuum in UK energy policy following the 
                                            
9 Beckett, A., When the Lights Went Out: What Really Happened to Britain in the Seventies (London: Faber 
and Faber, 2009); Turner, A. W., Crisis? What Crisis? Britain in the 1970s (London: Aurum Press, 2008); 
Wheen, F., Strange Days Indeed: The Golden Age of Paranoia (London: Fourth Estate, 2009) 
10 Turner, Crisis, p. 50 
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oil crisis. Amid political upheaval, which included two UK general elections in that year, 
Rothschild’s views on energy arguably set the tone for UK energy policy at least until the 
new Conservative Government of 1979, and perhaps even until privatisation in 1989.  His 
overall strategy of attention to coal, nuclear and conservation (known as CoCoNuke), 
included a key recommendation on wave energy. This specific recommendation had arisen 
following a study carried out by an official in the Department of Industry, who then used 
Rothschild’s high profile report to advance the case for a detailed R&D programme on 
wave energy. The serendipity continued as Stephen Salter’s early work on wave energy 
provided a startling example of the potential for wave power.  Therefore, renewable 
energy, beginning with wave energy, emerged, almost from nowhere, to form a key part of 
the Government’s new energy policy after 1974.  
 
 The need for diversification in nuclear energy R&D helped to encourage the UK 
renewable energy programme. This was explained by the efforts, led by Keith Dawson of 
the UKAEA, to establish an energy technology centre at its Harwell R&D facility. This 
was part of a larger effort by Harwell director, Walter Marshall, to ensure the survival of 
Harwell through the 1960s when research on nuclear energy was scaled back as the 
technology matured. From 1972 Dawson had been submitting plans to establish a new unit 
at Harwell, and the oil crisis (and the intervention of Rothschild) provided the final 
impetus to the Government to agree the creation of a new unit, to be called the Energy 
Technology Support Unit (ETSU).  Working within the new Department of Energy, ETSU 
became the central coordinating body for the UK renewable energy programme. Although 
the location of ETSU at Harwell was eventually to draw some understandable criticism, it 
was clear that the motivation for the unit was based on the needs of the UKAEA rather 
than as a direct response to any exogenous growth in renewable energy technology.  This 
provides some evidence for the conclusions of this thesis that renewable energy 
development in the UK during this period is also partly explained by a greater 
understanding of the needs of the UKAEA, and the wider political imperatives of the UK 
government.  The influential demands of the UKAEA during this time leads to one of the 
themes examined in this thesis, the domination of energy policy by key energy institutions 
through an energy techno-institutional complex (TIC). 
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 Within the analysis of social and political pressure on the course of technological 
development this thesis has explored the theme, suggested by the work of Laird for the US, 
of an energy techno-institutional (TIC) complex in the UK. One effect of the energy TIC 
was the existence of powerful interest groups within the UK energy scene, chiefly created 
through nationalisation as discussed above. This included the monopolies of the National 
Coal Board, the British Gas Council and the Central Electricity Generating Board which 
combined to dominate energy policy in the UK.  However, the attention of this thesis has 
been drawn to a close analysis of the role of one powerful group in particular, the UK 
Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). From the time of its creation in the early 1950s, the 
UKAEA represented a key element of UK energy planning. During this period the 
technological promise of nuclear energy was bound up in complexity and mystery. Nuclear 
technology represented a weapon for postwar Governments, both in the military sense and 
as a method of ensuring self-sufficiency in energy terms.  The military aspects of the 
project allowed nuclear energy to simultaneously hide behind a veil of national security 
and to attract huge amounts of Government funding with little public accountability.  
Nuclear energy was ‘big science’ and the UKAEA grew quickly to dominate UK energy 
R&D. Thereafter, ‘new’ energy technology came to be mediated through the UKAEA, and 
this was shown in Chapter 4 in the negotiations to establish the Energy Technology 
Support Unit (ETSU) and the subsequent control of renewable energy R&D by the nuclear 
establishment at Harwell.  
 
 A defining characteristic of the UK energy TIC was the representation of energy 
policy in the UK through a dominant energy paradigm. This paradigm understood energy 
in specific terms. First, it accepted the false notion of the historical energy transitions of 
industrialisation.  These were understood as the great energy revolutions from water to 
coal at the beginning of the nineteenth century; coal to oil in the first half of the twentieth 
century; and then, most probably, oil to nuclear in the future. This was despite the evidence 
to the contrary which this thesis has emphasised. For each of these ‘transitions’ the reality 
was much less ‘historic’. It has been shown that in the textile industry water power 
lingered well into the twentieth century; that coal remains to the present day the major 
source of the world’s primary energy supply; and that the latter transition to nuclear energy 
remains unfulfilled.  However, this paradigm had a direct impact on the renewable energy 
programme in the UK. This thesis has shown that renewable energy sources were routinely 
judged by their capacity to replace existing fuels, and the economic measure for renewable 
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energy was an unreliable comparison with the cost per kWh of nuclear energy. This 
revealed an essential misunderstanding of the nature of renewable energy sources that 
could only result in the failure of its development. Now we understand renewable energy 
as complementary to fossil fuel and nuclear as part of a much wider energy mix. The 
dominant energy paradigm of the period had a much narrower conception of this mix 
derived from an essentially Whiggish belief in energy transitions.  
 
 Set within the dominant energy paradigm this historical analysis of the UK 
renewables programme has suggested that the programme was characterised mainly by 
fundamentally mistaken assumptions and the consequently misguided programmes. The 
rationale for launching a renewable energy R&D programme during the early 1970s was 
based almost entirely on social and political pressure. The government, through the DoEn, 
was too readily convinced by the advocates of alternatives in the period that renewable 
sources could make a significant contribution to the UK’s energy mix in the short to 
medium term.  However, although conceived in a socio-political vacuum, the programme 
came to be judged, ostensibly, on economic and technical grounds. Very quickly, initially 
through the Wave Energy Programme, the huge technical challenges that confronted the 
developers became plain as the tantalising initial estimates for the potential contribution of 
renewables receded into myth. It became clear to the Government that both significant 
amounts of time and money would be needed to realise this potential. The much more 
tangible and shorter term solutions of North Sea oil and gas, and to some extent nuclear 
power, were clearly of far more relevance to UK energy policy at this time. Setting out 
from a position of mistaken assumptions, the UK renewables programmes were soon 
assailed by a series of retreats and ill-timed changes in direction. As this thesis has 
described, the Wave Energy Programme was halted just as it began to achieve the 
ambitious and continually revised targets on cost, and a wholesale shift towards wind 
energy replaced it as the centre-piece of the UK renewables programme.  
 
 In conclusion, although this thesis has focused on a UK renewables programme that 
extended until the end of the 1980s and ended with the advent of privatisation in the 
energy industries, it is in many senses a story of the 1970s. The programme was 
established by a Labour government amid the particular social and political context of the 
1970s, which was undergoing the slow transition from postwar consensus to the free 
market ideology encapsulated by the Thatcher government after 1979. The new 
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government inherited the renewables programme, and has been seen, set about reducing 
expenditure on renewable energy R&D. It can also be seen that the wind energy 
programme was conducted with a somewhat different approach than its predecessor in 
wave energy. The attempted commercialisation of wind power, and the inclusion of 
industrial partners, was much more of a priority for wind power.  In contrast, in wave 
energy industrial partnerships were viewed with an element of unfamiliarity, and even 
suspicion. In a sense therefore, this thesis represents an analysis of the long 1970s, rather 
than the 1980s.  
 
  Further historical research which focuses on the transition in renewable energy at 
the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s would be useful in examining the shift from 
directly funded R&D to the provision of incentives for renewables development. After 
1990 the UK government introduced a scheme that obliged electricity suppliers to 
purchase a percentage of their generation from ‘non-fossil fuel’ sources. Commentators 
have pointed out how this careful definition allowed the inclusion of nuclear energy as a 
‘non-fossil fuel’ and the negative impact that this had on the development of renewable 
energy. Eventually, this criticism resulted in the later introduction of a new scheme of   
specific Renewables Obligations (ROs) in the UK. Again, an historical account based on 
archival sources would be important in examining this crucial change in approach in the 
development of renewables in Britain. 
 
 This thesis has examined one aspect of the UK government’s relatively brief 
flirtation with energy policy during the twentieth century, and has focused on the UK 
renewables programme when the imperatives of state and society temporarily quashed the 
economic and technological rationality of the period. The detailed analysis of this period 
showed that social pressure from the emergent environmental movement in the UK, the 
survival instincts of the UKAEA at Harwell, the influence of several key individuals at the 
heart of government, and the lead of the United States in ‘alternative energy’ R&D 
encouraged the UK government to suspend disbelief in the potential of renewable energy 
and then to fund a wide-ranging programme. This thesis has therefore presented the UK 
renewables programme as an essentially tokenistic gesture by the Government, keen to be 
seen as reflecting both the mood of society and also acting responsibly in exploring the 
potential of ‘alternatives’ in pursuit of wider energy security. Government studies 
produced in the early 1970s showed clearly that despite the widely fluctuating estimates 
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for the overall potential of renewable energy sources in the UK the economic and technical 
challenges were considerable. The failure to engage widespread commercial interest in 
renewable energy and the lukewarm attitude of its main customer, the CEGB, reflected the 
limits to the development of renewable energy in the period.  
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Appendix I 
 
Primary and Secondary Energy Sources 
 
It is important to emphasise the important distinction between primary and secondary 
energy sources. Primary sources of energy are those which ‘contain’ energy- the original 
source - and consequently they are the most important element of any energy system. In 
modern energy systems fossil fuels - coal, oil, and natural gas - are the most commonly 
used primary energy sources. However, this category also includes biofuels such as wood, 
straw, and dried dung which even today constitute the key source of energy (mainly for 
heating and cooking) for many parts of the world.1 Also included among the primary 
energy sources is nuclear energy, created from uranium. All forms of renewable energy 
also represent primary energy sources. The sun, the waves, the action of the tides, and the 
wind are the most commonly utilised sources of primary renewable energy. Ramage and 
Everett highlight the ‘rather arbitrary nature of the definition’ of primary energy giving the 
example of solar energy, which is only ‘counted’ if it is used in solar panels or 
photovoltaic cells. This overlooks the contribution of solar energy in ‘warming and 
illuminating our buildings.’ 2  
 
 Secondary energy sources are those which use a primary source and convert that 
energy into an alternative, often more usable, form. This can take a number of different 
forms and examples include the conversion of coal to gas (town gas) and oil; gas to oil; 
and oil to gas. Although examples of secondary energy sources these are essentially the 
conversion of one primary fuel to another primary fuel driven by demand and availability. 
The most recognisable and dominant secondary source of energy is electricity. Since the 
development of mains electricity in the 1880s it has come to dominate our energy needs.  
Strictly speaking, electricity is not in fact an energy source but a method for converting 
primary energy into a source of power. Indeed Patterson, whose work exposes our 
common misunderstandings of energy, claims that ‘for more than a century we have 
treated electricity as though it were a fuel’.3 In many respects this has served to conceal the 
                                            
1 The persistence of ‘old’ technologies in many parts of the world is emphasised most recently in, Edgerton, 
D., The Shock of the Old: Technology and global history since 1900 (London: Profile Books, 2006)  
2 Ramage, J. and Everett, B., ‘Primary Energy’ in Boyle, G., Everett,B., and Ramage, J. (eds.) Energy 
Systems and Sustainability: Power for a Sustainable Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 57  
3 Patterson, Keeping, p.55 
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actual fuels that feed our power stations. Electrical output is delivered in measurable and 
controllable quantities known as watts which further suggests the view of electricity as a 
commodity or ‘substance’.4 Its rapid success was due to its clear advantages over the 
incumbent energy technologies, most notably town gas. As Everett observed, ‘It could 
supply lighting with less smell than town gas, drive electric motors that were more 
convenient than steam, gas or petrol engines and could be used in the steadily developing 
world-wide telegraph network.’5
                                            
4 Ibid. 
5 Everett, B., ‘Electricity’ in Boyle et al (eds.), Energy Systems, p.333 
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Appendix II 
 
Renewable and Non-Renewable Energy Sources 
 
A further key distinction demanded in the interests of clarity is the fundamental difference 
between renewable and non-renewable primary energy sources. This is particularly 
crucial to this thesis as it forms the basis of the entire debate over renewable energy. 
Energy is described as ‘renewable’ if it is ‘continuously replenished by natural systems’.1  
Thus, it provides an endless and unlimited flow of primary energy. However, no effective 
means have yet been devised that can store this continuous flow of renewable energy.2 
Renewable energy sources include solar energy, wind power, wave power, bioenergy, tidal 
energy, and geothermal energy. Non-renewable primary energy sources are, on the other 
hand, a form of highly concentrated stored energy. These sources, such as coal, oil, gas, 
and uranium will not be replenished on a continuous basis. Mostly (with the exception of 
uranium) they have been formed by natural processes of fossilisation occurring over 
millions of years. Ultimately they too will be replenished, but only after the passage of 
many millennia. Therefore, this means that the fossil fuels - coal, oil, and gas - are finite 
sources of primary energy. Over time the reserves will be depleted - and this applies also to 
uranium, the mineral that is the primary energy source for nuclear power.  
 
 This ultimate weakness of fossil fuel as a primary energy source also represents its 
greatest strength and accounts for its dominance in modern energy systems.  It means that 
it can be used where and when it is needed and for as long as it is needed (notwithstanding 
its eventual depletion). It can effectively be turned on and off at will. It is transportable, 
predictable and flexible, and as energy technology has developed over the twentieth 
century the uses of its by-products are also multifarious. As well as providing the energy 
source that this thesis examines, it also has a myriad of other applications from transport to 
chemicals. Coal, and more particularly oil, are fundamental ingredients in the modern 
world, particularly in plastics. However, it is the nature of fossil fuels as a stored form of 
energy that makes them most irresistible. Renewable sources of primary energy are by 
definition not stored - as stated above; they are continuous flows of energy. Therefore they 
                                            
1 Patterson, Transforming, p.186 
2 There are however ongoing developments in battery technology in this area. See, Ter-Gazarian, A. Energy 
storage for power systems. IEE Energy Series 6. (London: Peter Peregrinus Ltd., 1994)   
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cannot be turned on and off at will, and they are not generally predictable in any reliable 
sense.  Furthermore, renewable energy provides nothing but the energy itself: it has no 
useful by-product. In fact, renewable energy is the purest form of primary energy. 
Arguably, fossil fuels are the repository of energy rather than primary sources in 
themselves. The energy has already been naturally converted into a fuel, deep under the 
earth in a process taking millions of years. With renewables that first stage of conversion 
to a usable form has not taken place and the energy remains to be harnessed. Therefore the 
problems of storage remain to be solved. Much effort has been put into battery and 
hydrogen storage technology in an attempt to address this fundamental feature of 
renewable energy, but the innovation remains well short of the massive requirements of 
modern energy systems. The only renewable energy resource that confronts this issue is 
hydropower, where the energy can be ‘stored’ in reservoirs and used when required. This 
also helps to explain the success of hydropower when compared with the other renewable 
energy sources.  
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